arXiv subjects

Alizishaan Khatri

Publications and source records attributed to Alizishaan Khatri.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Safety Beyond the Interface: Detecting Harm via Latent States in Large Language Models

Autonomous systems increasingly rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) yet the safety infrastructure surrounding these models introduces latency and compute overhead. This limits utility in resource-constrained, time-critical deployments. Existing external guardrail models remain blind to the model's internal workings, creating a fundamental assurance gap. We ask: does the model already know when the content is harmful? We extract activations from LLaMA-3.1-8B and train lightweight MLP classifier probes (12.6M parameters) to detect harmful prompts. Evaluated on WildJailbreak, Beavertails, and AEGIS 2.0, our probes achieve F1 scores of 99%, 83%, and 84%, respectively competitive with 1000x larger guard models while cutting latency and compute costs.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Probing the Prefill: Detecting Code Vulnerabilities via Latent Activations

LLM-based code generation is now embedded in mission-critical pipelines, but defenses against vulnerable output remain post-hoc -- static analyzers, fine-tuned classifiers, or an LLM judge that screen completed code, ignoring the generating model's own internal state. We test a narrower, directly measurable question: when an LLM reads a piece of C/C++ code as context, do its hidden activations already carry a signal about that code's vulnerability status? We extract last prefill token activations from four LLMs (Granite-4.1-8B, Qwen3.5-9B, Qwen3.6-27B, Gemma-4-12B) across three model families and train MLP probes on these activations. We evaluate them on four function-level C/C++ benchmarks (Devign, Big-Vul, Draper VDISC, PrimeVul). Our probes achieve 41.7\% average F1 using 13.4--16.0M-parameter probes -- under 0.2\% of base-model size. On Devign, the best probe (Qwen3.5-9B, 68.8\% F1) matches the published fine-tuned-classifier SOTA (67.9\%) despite reading only a frozen, general-purpose LLM's activations; on the harder, more imbalanced benchmarks (Big-Vul, Draper VDISC, PrimeVul) probes trail SOTA substantially. This is early evidence that a coding LLM's own representation of arbitrary code is informative about that code's vulnerability status, motivating further work toward lightweight, model-native vulnerability screening.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Do All LLMs Know When They're Being Harmful? A Reproducibility Study of Latent-Space Safety Probes Across Model Families

Khatri et al. (2026) [DOI: 10.1109/DSN-W70714.2026.00027] show that lightweight MLP probes on final-layer activations of a single 8B model (LLaMA-3.1-8B) detect harmful prompts at F1 competitive with guard models 1000x larger, using one probe per benchmark. We reproduce this pipeline end-to-end and extend it along two axes the original study leaves open. First, we test whether the result generalizes across other model architecture and scale by training identical probes on activations from models like Gemma-4-E4B, Mistral-7B-v0.3, and Qwen2-7B, using the three benchmarks (WildJailbreak, BeaverTails, AEGIS 2.0). Second, we test how much of the reported performance is affected by non-determinism during inference by repeating extraction under five random seeds and measuring the variance of F1 scores. Our results reproduce the original LLaMA model benchmarks within 0.37 percentage points of the original F1 scores (and within 0.2 points on BeaverTails). We find that the original MLP probe architecture extends to other model families with F1 scores within a point of the values reported for LLaMA-3.1-8B. Our experiments varying seed values reveal an interesting observation: final token latent vectors remained the same for all tested architectures irrespective of the seed values used.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Latent Space Probing for Adult Content Detection in Video Generative Models

The rapid proliferation of AI-powered video generation systems has introduced significant challenges in content moderation, particularly with respect to adult and sexually explicit material. Existing detection methods operate on either prompts or decoded pixel-space outputs. Therefore, both approaches are blind to the rich internal representations formed during generation. In this paper, we propose a novel latent space probing framework that intercepts the denoised latent representations produced by the CogVideoX video diffusion model during inference and attaches lightweight classifiers to perform real-time adult content detection. To support this work, we construct a large-scale binary dataset of 11039 ten-second video clips (5086 violating, 5953 non-violating) sourced from adult websites and YouTube respectively. We introduce two lightweight probing classifier architectures. We train and evaluate it on the dataset. Our work demonstrates that latent-space signals encode strong discriminative features for harmful content detection, achieving 97.29% F1 on our held-out test set with an overhead in the 4-6ms range. Our results suggest that probing the latent space results in improvements in both detection performance as well as cost.

cs.CV↗