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Amine Allouah

Publications and source records attributed to Amine Allouah.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

What Is Your AI Agent Buying? Evaluation, Biases, Model Dependence, & Emerging Implications for Agentic E-Commerce

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, AI agents can parse webpages or leverage APIs to view, evaluate and choose products. We investigate the behavior of AI agents using ACES, a provider-agnostic framework for auditing agent decision-making. We reveal that agents can exhibit choice homogeneity, often concentrating demand on a few ``modal'' products while ignoring others entirely. Yet, these preferences are unstable: model updates can drastically reshuffle market shares. Furthermore, randomized trials show that while agents have improved over time on simple tasks with a clearly identified best choice, they exhibit strong position biases -- varying across providers and model versions, and persisting even in text-only "headless" interfaces -- undermining any universal notion of a ``top'' rank. Agents also consistently penalize sponsored tags while rewarding platform endorsements, and sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews vary sharply across models. Finally, we demonstrate that sellers can respond: a seller-side agent making simple, query-conditional description tweaks can drive significant gains in market share. These findings reveal that agentic markets are volatile and fundamentally different from human-centric commerce, highlighting the need for continuous auditing and raising questions for platform design, seller strategy and regulation.

cs.AI

Optimal Pricing with a Single Point

We study the following fundamental data-driven pricing problem. How can/should a decision-maker price its product based on data at a single historical price? How valuable is such data? We consider a decision-maker who optimizes over (potentially randomized) pricing policies to maximize the worst-case ratio of the revenue she can garner compared to an oracle with full knowledge of the distribution of values, when the latter is only assumed to belong to a broad non-parametric set. In particular, our framework applies to the widely used regular and monotone non-decreasing hazard rate (mhr) classes of distributions. For settings where the seller knows the exact probability of sale associated with one historical price or only a confidence interval for it, we fully characterize optimal performance and near-optimal pricing algorithms that adjust to the information at hand. The framework we develop is general and allows to characterize optimal performance for deterministic or more general randomized mechanisms, and leads to fundamental novel insights on the value of data for pricing. As examples, against mhr distributions, we show that it is possible to guarantee $85\%$ of oracle performance if one knows that half of the customers have bought at the historical price, and if only $1\%$ of the customers bought, it still possible to guarantee $51\%$ of oracle performance.

cs.GT

Robust and fair work allocation

In today's digital world, interaction with online platforms is ubiquitous, and thus content moderation is important for protecting users from content that do not comply with pre-established community guidelines. Having a robust content moderation system throughout every stage of planning is particularly important. We study the short-term planning problem of allocating human content reviewers to different harmful content categories. We use tools from fair division and study the application of competitive equilibrium and leximin allocation rules. Furthermore, we incorporate, to the traditional Fisher market setup, novel aspects that are of practical importance. The first aspect is the forecasted workload of different content categories. We show how a formulation that is inspired by the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale program allows us to find an allocation that not only satisfies the forecasted workload, but also fairly allocates the remaining reviewing hours among all content categories. The resulting allocation is also robust as the additional allocation provides a guardrail in cases where the actual workload deviates from the predicted workload. The second practical consideration is time dependent allocation that is motivated by the fact that partners need scheduling guidance for the reviewers across days to achieve efficiency. To address the time component, we introduce new extensions of the various fair allocation approaches for the single-time period setting, and we show that many properties extend in essence, albeit with some modifications. Related to the time component, we additionally investigate how to satisfy markets' desire for smooth allocation (e.g., partners for content reviewers prefer an allocation that does not vary much from time to time, to minimize staffing switch). We demonstrate the performance of our proposed approaches through real-world data obtained from Meta.

cs.GT