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Amna Zafar

Publications and source records attributed to Amna Zafar.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

DUFT: Device-Unique Feedback Traversal for Entropy-Estimated Response Extraction and Mutual Authentication using SRAM PUFs

Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising technology in the realm of random number generation for key generation, but for PUF-based authentication, they have been sidelined due to their limited challenge space as a reservoir of Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs). In this paper, we develop a seed-based, round-iterated feedback mechanism, which we name Device-Unique Feedback Traversal (DUFT). The feedback chain is driven by the device's unstable and stable bit positions in its stability mask against the address to create a unique traversal. Additionally, a device-key hashed from the unique SRAM-PUF array is also included in calculating the next round of the chain to keep it secret. By estimating the physical SRAM source's entropy and error rate empirically, or by having a source with established metrics in both, DUFT estimates the number of rounds of feedback in the traversal to be performed to achieve a certain amount of min-entropy. We reach 128 bits of estimated min-entropy on our reference hardware under stated assumptions and experimental estimates. The number of rounds in the traversal scales directly with measured source-entropy, allowing security to be increased for weaker sources at the cost of running time. Using this feedback-traversal wrapper over SRAM-PUFs to obtain a measured-response, we propose an extremely lightweight authentication and key-encapsulation protocol for resource-constrained embedded devices. We realize and evaluate DUFT end-to-end on physical IoT/embedded hardware: a discrete-SRAM node pair running the complete mechanism and end-to-end protocol, and an embedded-SRAM microcontroller for the mechanism alone.

cs.CR↗

LSEG: A Lightweight and Secure Key Exchange Protocol for Smart Grid Communication

The increasing deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT) edge devices in modern smart grid environments requires secure and efficient communication protocols specifically designed for resource-constrained environments. However, most existing authentication schemes either impose excessive computational overhead or lack robustness against advanced cyber threats, making them unsuitable for resource-limited smart grid deployments. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a lightweight authentication and secure key exchange protocol for smart grid (LSEG) environments. The proposed LSEG protocol utilizes a unified elliptic curve key pair, enabled by birational mapping between Ed25519 and Curve25519, for signing and key exchange. Initial keys are derived using the hash based message authentication code (HMAC) based key derivation function (HKDF), while ephemeral key pairs, generated through the Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE), are used in each session to ensure forward secrecy. Session communication is protected using ASCON128a, a lightweight, NIST-standardized, authenticated encryption algorithm. Formal security proofs in the random oracle model validate the security properties of LSEG, including mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and resistance to impersonation, replay, and man in the middle attacks. Experimental results on both Raspberry Pi and Intel Core i9-based systems demonstrate practical efficiency, achieving execution times under 5.5 milliseconds on embedded hardware and a communication cost of only 1024 bits for the protocol's message exchanges. The results demonstrate that LSEG effectively balances security, efficiency, and compliance, making it a scalable solution for secure communication in smart grid infrastructures.

cs.CR↗