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Amos Fiat

Publications and source records attributed to Amos Fiat.

29 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2013

Minimal Indices for Successor Search

We give a new successor data structure which improves upon the index size of the Pǎtraşcu-Thorup data structures, reducing the index size from $O(n w^{4/5})$ bits to $O(n \log w)$ bits, with optimal probe complexity. Alternatively, our new data structure can be viewed as matching the space complexity of the (probe-suboptimal) $z$-fast trie of Belazzougui et al. Thus, we get the best of both approaches with respect to both probe count and index size. The penalty we pay is an extra $O(\log w)$ inter-register operations. Our data structure can also be used to solve the weak prefix search problem, the index size of $O(n \log w)$ bits is known to be optimal for any such data structure. The technical contributions include highly efficient single word indices, with out-degree $w/\log w$ (compared to the $w^{1/5}$ out-degree of fusion tree based indices). To construct such high efficiency single word indices we device highly efficient bit selectors which, we believe, are of independent interest.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2012

Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

In this work we give a tight lower bound on makespan approximations for envy-free allocation mechanism dedicated to scheduling tasks on unrelated machines. Specifically, we show that no mechanism exists that can guarantee an envy-free allocation of jobs to $m$ machines with a makespan of less than a factor of $O(\log m)$ of the minimal makespan. Combined with previous results, this paper definitively proves that the optimal algorithm for obtaining a minimal makespan for any envy-free division can at best approximate the makespan to a factor of $O(\log m)$.

cs.DM↗
arXiv2011

Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games

We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as {\em capacitated} and seek mechanisms that maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive compatible, envy-free, individually rational, and have no positive transfers. If capacities are infinite, then sequentially repeating the 2nd price Vickrey auction meets these requirements. In 1983, Leonard showed that for unit capacities, VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is also envy free. For capacities that are all unit or all infinite, the mechanism produces a Walrasian pricing (subject to capacity constraints). Here, we consider general capacities. For homogeneous capacities (all capacities equal) we show that VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is envy free (VCG with Clarke Pivot payments is always incentive compatible, individually rational, and has no positive transfers). Contrariwise, there is no incentive compatible Walrasian pricing. For heterogeneous capacities, we show that there is no mechanism with all 4 properties, but at least in some cases, one can achieve both incentive compatibility and envy freeness.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2010

Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets

We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $i$ has a private value $v_i$, a budget $b_i$, and is interested in all the items in $S_i$. The value to agent $i$ of a set of items $R$ is $|R \cap S_i| \cdot v_i$. Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for ads in response to an advertiser-dependent set of adwords, and advertisers have budgets. It is known that even of all items are identical and all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel auction that runs in polynomial time, is incentive compatible, and ensures Pareto-optimality for such auctions when the valuations are private and the budgets are public knowledge. This extends the result of Dobzinski et al. (FOCS 2008) for auctions of multiple {\sl identical} items and public budgets to single-valued {\sl combinatorial} auctions with public budgets.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2010

On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness

We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms satisfying each requirement separately have been studied extensively, but there are few results on mechanisms achieving both. We are interested in those allocations for which there exist payments such that the resulting mechanism is simultaneously incentive compatible and envy-free. Cyclic monotonicity is a characterization of incentive compatible allocations, local efficiency is a characterization for envy-free allocations. We combine the above to give a characterization for allocations which are both incentive compatible and envy free. We show that even for allocations that allow payments leading to incentive compatible mechanisms, and other payments leading to envy free mechanisms, there may not exist any payments for which the mechanism is simultaneously incentive compatible and envy-free. The characterization that we give lets us compute the set of Pareto-optimal mechanisms that trade off envy freeness for incentive compatibility.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2009

Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization

We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue maximizing envy free allocation/pricing can be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to an instance of weighted independent set on a perfect graph. We define an allocation/pricing as \textit{multi envy free} if no agent wishes to replace her allocation with the union of the allocations of some set of other agents and her price with the sum of their prices. We show that it is \textit{coNP}-hard to decide if a given allocation/pricing is multi envy free. We also show that revenue maximization multi envy free allocation/pricing is \textit{APX} hard. Furthermore, we give efficient algorithms and hardness results for various variants of the highway problem.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2009

Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of $O(\log m)$, where $m$ is the number of machines. We also show a lower bound of $Ω(\log m / \log\log m)$. This improves the recent result of Hartline {\sl et al.} \cite{Ahuva:2008} who give an upper bound of $(m+1)/2$, and a lower bound of $2-1/m$. For divisible tasks, we show that there always exists an envy-free poly-time mechanism with optimal makespan.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2006

Truly Online Paging with Locality of Reference

The competitive analysis fails to model locality of reference in the online paging problem. To deal with it, Borodin et. al. introduced the access graph model, which attempts to capture the locality of reference. However, the access graph model has a number of troubling aspects. The access graph has to be known in advance to the paging algorithm and the memory required to represent the access graph itself may be very large. In this paper we present truly online strongly competitive paging algorithms in the access graph model that do not have any prior information on the access sequence. We present both deterministic and randomized algorithms. The algorithms need only O(k log n) bits of memory, where k is the number of page slots available and n is the size of the virtual address space. I.e., asymptotically no more memory than needed to store the virtual address translation table. We also observe that our algorithms adapt themselves to temporal changes in the locality of reference. We model temporal changes in the locality of reference by extending the access graph model to the so called extended access graph model, in which many vertices of the graph can correspond to the same virtual page. We define a measure for the rate of change in the locality of reference in G denoted by Delta(G). We then show our algorithms remain strongly competitive as long as Delta(G) >= (1+ epsilon)k, and no truly online algorithm can be strongly competitive on a class of extended access graphs that includes all graphs G with Delta(G) >= k- o(k).

cs.DS↗
arXiv2004

Better algorithms for unfair metrical task systems and applications

Unfair metrical task systems are a generalization of online metrical task systems. In this paper we introduce new techniques to combine algorithms for unfair metrical task systems and apply these techniques to obtain improved randomized online algorithms for metrical task systems on arbitrary metric spaces.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2002

Competitive Paging Algorithms

The paging problem is that of deciding which pages to keep in a memory of k pages in order to minimize the number of page faults. This paper introduces the marking algorithm, a simple randomized on-line algorithm for the paging problem, and gives a proof that its performance guarantee (competitive ratio) is O(log k). In contrast, no deterministic on-line algorithm can have a performance guarantee better than k.

cs.DS↗