arXiv subjects

Ana Cristina Franco da Silva

Publications and source records attributed to Ana Cristina Franco da Silva.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2022

Adopting Microservices and DevOps in the Cyber-Physical Systems Domain: A Rapid Review and Case Study

The domain of cyber-physical systems (CPS) has recently seen strong growth, e.g., due to the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) in industrial domains, commonly referred to as "Industry 4.0". However, CPS challenges like the strong hardware focus can impact modern software development practices, especially in the context of modernizing legacy systems. While microservices and DevOps have been widely studied for enterprise applications, there is insufficient coverage for the CPS domain. Our goal is therefore to analyze the peculiarities of such systems regarding challenges and practices for using and migrating towards microservices and DevOps. We conducted a rapid review based on 146 scientific papers, and subsequently validated our findings in an interview-based case study with 9 CPS professionals in different business units at Siemens AG. The combined results picture the specifics of microservices and DevOps in the CPS domain. While several differences were revealed that may require adapted methods, many challenges and practices are shared with typical enterprise applications. Our study supports CPS researchers and practitioners with a summary of challenges, practices to address them, and research opportunities.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2021

Using a Cyber Digital Twin for Continuous Automotive Security Requirements Verification

A Digital Twin (DT) is a digital representation of a physical object used to simulate it before it is built or to predict failures after the object is deployed. In this article, we introduce our approach, which applies the concept of a Cyber Digital Twin (CDT) to automotive software for the purpose of security analysis. In our approach, automotive firmware is transformed into a CDT, which contains automatically extracted, security-relevant information from the firmware. Based on the CDT, we evaluate security requirements through automated analysis and requirements verification using policy enforcement checks and vulnerabilities detection. The evaluation of a CDT is conducted continuously integrating new checks derived from new security requirements and from newly disclosed vulnerabilities. We applied our approach to about 100 automotive firmwares. In average, about 600 publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and 80 unknown weaknesses were detected per firmware in the pre-production phase. Therefore, the use of a CDT enables efficient continuous verification of security requirements.

cs.CR↗