arXiv subjects

Andrés Fábrega

Publications and source records attributed to Andrés Fábrega.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Crypto x AI, AI x Crypto: A Survey

The intersection of crypto x AI is spawning papers, products, online posts, and companies. All the surrounding buzz, though, obscures what exactly has been done, what the opportunities and challenges are, and what open questions deserve attention. This survey paper asks what AI can do for blockchain-based technologies (broadly construed as "crypto") (crypto x AI), and vice versa (AI x crypto). We systematize existing work, summarize key takeaways, highlight open research questions, and offer a perspective on pervasive industry misconceptions, concluding that AI and crypto are still in the very early stages of meaningful integration.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

$π$Creds: Privately Inferred Credentials

Decentralized verifiable credential systems have seen limited deployment in practice. Existing constructions, built on zero-knowledge proofs, are complex, application-specific, and largely restricted to predicates over structured data. We present Privately Inferred Credentials ($π$Creds): privacy-preserving, legacy-compatible, decentralized verifiable credentials generated by trusted LLM inference over authenticated data. LLMs' ability to semantically reason over unstructured data substantially expands the range of claims $π$Creds can certify over existing credential systems. The use of LLMs also introduces new application-level threats, which we formalize through two problems: the Source-Constrained Adversarial Example (SCAE) problem, which captures robustness against adversaries that manipulate authenticated data to obtain misleading credentials, and the Authenticated Covert Predicate Poisoning (ACPP) problem, which captures privacy leakage through adversarial model selection. We characterize applications of $π$Creds over user data, and a novel class of credentials over proprietary software that certifies properties of a service without revealing its source code. Our prototype supports issuing credentials over live financial, health, email, and code sources, and we empirically study the SCAE and ACPP threats on a product expertise credential over real financial data.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

"AI Watermarking": Bridging Policy Discourse and Technical Capabilities

The widespread deployment of generative artificial intelligence (AI) models has raised serious concerns about the proliferation of AI-generated content. This has led to a surge of interest in, and demand for, reliable tracking and detection mechanisms for content that is AI-generated, such as watermarking, metadata tagging, content tagging, and more. The problem has captured the attention of policymakers as well as the popular media, and a spate of recent bills in the US have sought to regulate the spread of AI content, and enforce or promote methods to track and label it. This work performs a critical analysis of the policy discourse surrounding generative AI content transparency in the US and EU. Through a broad document selection methodology, we first collect a broad corpus of documents containing legislative language and policy-relevant discourse on the topic. We then analyze these through inductive coding, and leverage our coding to systematize these documents, identifying key patterns, gaps, and open questions. We identify critical points of disconnect between policy and technological capabilities and practice, and we highlight and discuss potential ambiguities and pitfalls raised by the trends in our corpus.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

The CoinAlg Bind: Profitability-Fairness Tradeoffs in Collective Investment Algorithms

Collective Investment Algorithms (CoinAlgs) are increasingly popular systems that deploy shared trading strategies for investor communities. Their goal is to democratize sophisticated -- often AI-based -- investing tools. We identify and demonstrate a fundamental profitability-fairness tradeoff in CoinAlgs that we call the CoinAlg Bind: CoinAlgs cannot ensure economic fairness without losing profit to arbitrage. We present a formal model of CoinAlgs, with definitions of privacy (incomplete algorithm disclosure) and economic fairness (value extraction by an adversarial insider). We prove two complementary results that together demonstrate the CoinAlg Bind. First, privacy in a CoinAlg is a precondition for insider attacks on economic fairness. Conversely, in a game-theoretic model, lack of privacy, i.e., transparency, enables arbitrageurs to erode the profitability of a CoinAlg. Using data from Uniswap, a decentralized exchange, we empirically study both sides of the CoinAlg Bind. We quantify the impact of arbitrage against transparent CoinAlgs. We show the risks posed by a private CoinAlg: Even low-bandwidth covert-channel information leakage enables unfair value extraction.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

B-Privacy: Defining and Enforcing Privacy in Weighted Voting

In traditional, one-vote-per-person voting systems, privacy equates with ballot secrecy: voting tallies are published, but individual voters' choices are concealed. Voting systems that weight votes in proportion to token holdings, though, are now prevalent in cryptocurrency and web3 systems. We show that these weighted-voting systems overturn existing notions of voter privacy. Our experiments demonstrate that even with secret ballots, publishing raw tallies often reveals voters' choices. Weighted voting thus requires a new framework for privacy. We introduce a notion called B-privacy whose basis is bribery, a key problem in voting systems today. B-privacy captures the economic cost to an adversary of bribing voters based on revealed voting tallies. We propose a mechanism to boost B-privacy by noising voting tallies. We prove bounds on its tradeoff between B-privacy and transparency, meaning reported-tally accuracy. Analyzing 3,582 proposals across 30 Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), we find that the prevalence of large voters ("whales") limits the effectiveness of any B-Privacy-enhancing technique. However, our mechanism proves to be effective in cases without extreme voting weight concentration: among proposals requiring coalitions of $\geq5$ voters to flip outcomes, our mechanism raises B-privacy by a geometric mean factor of $4.1\times$. Our work offers the first principled guidance on transparency-privacy tradeoffs in weighted-voting systems, complementing existing approaches that focus on ballot secrecy and revealing fundamental constraints that voting weight concentration imposes on privacy mechanisms.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Voting-Bloc Entropy: A New Metric for DAO Decentralization

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) use smart contracts to foster communities working toward common goals. Existing definitions of decentralization, however -- the 'D' in DAO -- fall short of capturing the key properties characteristic of diverse and equitable participation. This work proposes a new framework for measuring DAO decentralization called Voting-Bloc Entropy (VBE, pronounced ''vibe''). VBE is based on the idea that voters with closely aligned interests act as a centralizing force and should be modeled as such. VBE formalizes this notion by measuring the similarity of participants' utility functions across a set of voting rounds. Unlike prior, ad hoc definitions of decentralization, VBE derives from first principles: We introduce a simple (yet powerful) reinforcement learning-based conceptual model for voting, that in turn implies VBE. We first show VBE's utility as a theoretical tool. We prove a number of results about the (de)centralizing effects of vote delegation, proposal bundling, bribery, etc. that are overlooked in previous notions of DAO decentralization. Our results lead to practical suggestions for enhancing DAO decentralization. We also show how VBE can be used empirically by presenting measurement studies and VBE-based governance experiments. We make the tools we developed for these results available to the community in the form of open-source artifacts in order to facilitate future study of DAO decentralization.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

How To Think About End-To-End Encryption and AI: Training, Processing, Disclosure, and Consent

End-to-end encryption (E2EE) has become the gold standard for securing communications, bringing strong confidentiality and privacy guarantees to billions of users worldwide. However, the current push towards widespread integration of artificial intelligence (AI) models, including in E2EE systems, raises some serious security concerns. This work performs a critical examination of the (in)compatibility of AI models and E2EE applications. We explore this on two fronts: (1) the integration of AI "assistants" within E2EE applications, and (2) the use of E2EE data for training AI models. We analyze the potential security implications of each, and identify conflicts with the security guarantees of E2EE. Then, we analyze legal implications of integrating AI models in E2EE applications, given how AI integration can undermine the confidentiality that E2EE promises. Finally, we offer a list of detailed recommendations based on our technical and legal analyses, including: technical design choices that must be prioritized to uphold E2EE security; how service providers must accurately represent E2EE security; and best practices for the default behavior of AI features and for requesting user consent. We hope this paper catalyzes an informed conversation on the tensions that arise between the brisk deployment of AI and the security offered by E2EE, and guides the responsible development of new AI features.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Cryptographic Verifiability for Voter Registration Systems

Voter registration systems are a critical - and surprisingly understudied - element of most high-stakes elections. Despite a history of targeting by adversaries, relatively little academic work has been done to increase visibility into how voter registration systems keep voters' data secure, accurate, and up to date. Enhancing transparency and verifiability could help election officials and the public detect and mitigate risks to this essential component of electoral processes worldwide. This work introduces cryptographic verifiability for voter registration systems. Based on consultation with diverse expert stakeholders that support elections systems, we precisely define the requirements for cryptographic verifiability in voter registration and systematize the practical challenges that must be overcome for near-term deployment. We then introduce VRLog, the first system to bring strong verifiability to voter registration. VRLog enables election officials to provide a transparent log that (1) allows voters to verify that their registration data has not been tampered with and (2) allows the public to monitor update patterns and database consistency. We also introduce VRLog$^x$, an enhancement to VRLog that offers cryptographic privacy to voter deduplication between jurisdictions - a common maintenance task currently performed in plaintext or using trusted third parties. Our designs rely on standard, efficient cryptographic primitives, and are backward compatible with existing voter registration systems. Finally, we provide an open-source implementation of VRLog and benchmarks to demonstrate that the system is practical - capable of running on low-cost commodity hardware and scaling to support databases the size of the largest U.S. state voter registration systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Liquefaction: Privately Liquefying Blockchain Assets

Inherent in the world of cryptocurrency systems and their security models is the notion that private keys, and thus assets, are controlled by individuals or individual entities. We present Liquefaction, a wallet platform that demonstrates the dangerous fragility of this foundational assumption by systemically breaking it. Liquefaction uses trusted execution environments (TEEs) to encumber private keys, i.e., attach rich, multi-user policies to their use. In this way, it enables the cryptocurrency credentials and assets of a single end-user address to be freely rented, shared, or pooled. It accomplishes these things privately, with no direct on-chain traces. Liquefaction demonstrates the sweeping consequences of TEE-based key encumbrance for the cryptocurrency landscape. Liquefaction can undermine the security and economic models of many applications and resources, such as locked tokens, DAO voting, airdrops, loyalty points, soulbound tokens, and quadratic voting. It can do so with no on-chain and minimal off-chain visibility. Conversely, we also discuss beneficial applications of Liquefaction, such as privacy-preserving, cost-efficient DAOs and a countermeasure to dusting attacks. Importantly, we describe an existing TEE-based tool that applications can use as a countermeasure to Liquefaction. Our work prompts a wholesale rethinking of existing models and enforcement of key and asset ownership in the cryptocurrency ecosystem.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Injection Attacks Against End-to-End Encrypted Applications

We explore an emerging threat model for end-to-end (E2E) encrypted applications: an adversary sends chosen messages to a target client, thereby "injecting" adversarial content into the application state. Such state is subsequently encrypted and synchronized to an adversarially-visible storage. By observing the lengths of the resulting cloud-stored ciphertexts, the attacker backs out confidential information. We investigate this injection threat model in the context of state-of-the-art encrypted messaging applications that support E2E encrypted backups. We show proof-of-concept attacks that can recover information about E2E encrypted messages or attachments sent via WhatsApp, assuming the ability to compromise the target user's Google or Apple account (which gives access to encrypted backups). We also show weaknesses in Signal's encrypted backup design that would allow injection attacks to infer metadata including a target user's number of contacts and conversations, should the adversary somehow obtain access to the user's encrypted Signal backup. While we do not believe our results should be of immediate concern for users of these messaging applications, our results do suggest that more work is needed to build tools that enjoy strong E2E security guarantees.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Exploiting Leakage in Password Managers via Injection Attacks

This work explores injection attacks against password managers. In this setting, the adversary (only) controls their own application client, which they use to "inject" chosen payloads to a victim's client via, for example, sharing credentials with them. The injections are interleaved with adversarial observations of some form of protected state (such as encrypted vault exports or the network traffic received by the application servers), from which the adversary backs out confidential information. We uncover a series of general design patterns in popular password managers that lead to vulnerabilities allowing an adversary to efficiently recover passwords, URLs, usernames, and attachments. We develop general attack templates to exploit these design patterns and experimentally showcase their practical efficacy via analysis of ten distinct password manager applications. We disclosed our findings to these vendors, many of which deployed mitigations.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

DAO Decentralization: Voting-Bloc Entropy, Bribery, and Dark DAOs

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) use smart contracts to foster communities working toward common goals. Existing definitions of decentralization, however-the 'D' in DAO-fall short of capturing key properties characteristic of diverse and equitable participation. We propose a new metric called Voting-Bloc Entropy (VBE, pronounced ''vibe'') that formalizes a broad notion of decentralization in voting on DAO proposals. VBE measures the similarity of participants' utility functions across a set of proposals. We use VBE to prove a number of results about the decentralizing effects of vote delegation, proposal bundling, bribery, and quadratic voting. Our results lead to practical suggestions for enhancing DAO decentralization. One of our results highlights the risk of systemic bribery with increasing DAO decentralization. To show that this threat is realistic, we present the first practical realization of a Dark DAO, a proposed mechanism for privacy-preserving corruption of identity systems, including those used in DAO voting. Our Dark-DAO prototype uses trusted execution environments (TEEs) in the Oasis Sapphire blockchain for attacks on Ethereum DAOs. It demonstrates that Dark DAOs constitute a realistic future concern for DAO governance.

cs.CR↗