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Andre Assumpcao

Publications and source records attributed to Andre Assumpcao.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Check-Eval: A Checklist-based Approach for Evaluating Text Quality

Evaluating the quality of text generated by large language models (LLMs) remains a significant challenge. Traditional metrics often fail to align well with human judgments, particularly in tasks requiring creativity and nuance. In this paper, we propose \textsc{Check-Eval}, a novel evaluation framework leveraging LLMs to assess the quality of generated text through a checklist-based approach. \textsc{Check-Eval} can be employed as both a reference-free and reference-dependent evaluation method, providing a structured and interpretable assessment of text quality. The framework consists of two main stages: checklist generation and checklist evaluation. We validate \textsc{Check-Eval} on two benchmark datasets: Portuguese Legal Semantic Textual Similarity and \textsc{SummEval}. Our results demonstrate that \textsc{Check-Eval} achieves higher correlations with human judgments compared to existing metrics, such as \textsc{G-Eval} and \textsc{GPTScore}, underscoring its potential as a more reliable and effective evaluation framework for natural language generation tasks. The code for our experiments is available at \url{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/check-eval-0DB4}

cs.CL

INACIA: Integrating Large Language Models in Brazilian Audit Courts: Opportunities and Challenges

This paper introduces INACIA (Instru\c{c}\~ao Assistida com Intelig\^encia Artificial), a groundbreaking system designed to integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) into the operational framework of Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (TCU). The system automates various stages of case analysis, including basic information extraction, admissibility examination, Periculum in mora and Fumus boni iuris analyses, and recommendations generation. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate INACIA's potential in extracting relevant information from case documents, evaluating its legal plausibility, and formulating propositions for judicial decision-making. Utilizing a validation dataset alongside LLMs, our evaluation methodology presents a novel approach to assessing system performance, correlating highly with human judgment. These results underscore INACIA's potential in complex legal task handling while also acknowledging the current limitations. This study discusses possible improvements and the broader implications of applying AI in legal contexts, suggesting that INACIA represents a significant step towards integrating AI in legal systems globally, albeit with cautious optimism grounded in the empirical findings.

cs.CL

Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court

Multiple studies have documented racial, gender, political ideology, or ethnical biases in comparative judicial systems. Supplementing this literature, we investigate whether judges rule cases differently when one of the litigants is a politician. We suggest a theory of power collusion, according to which judges might use rulings to buy cooperation or threaten members of the other branches of government. We test this theory using a sample of small claims cases in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, where no collusion should exist. The results show a negative bias of 3.7 percentage points against litigant politicians, indicating that judges punish, rather than favor, politicians in court. This punishment in low-salience cases serves as a warning sign for politicians not to cross the judiciary when exercising checks and balances, suggesting yet another barrier to judicial independence in development settings.

econ.GN

Electoral Crime Under Democracy: Information Effects from Judicial Decisions in Brazil

This paper examines voters' responses to the disclosure of electoral crime information in large democracies. I focus on Brazil, where the electoral court makes candidates' criminal records public before every election. Using a sample of local candidates running for office between 2004 and 2016, I find that a conviction for an electoral crime reduces candidates' probability of election and vote share by 10.3 and 12.9 percentage points (p.p.), respectively. These results are not explained by (potential) changes in judge, voter, or candidate behavior over the electoral process. I additionally perform machine classification of court documents to estimate heterogeneous punishment for severe and trivial crimes. I document a larger electoral penalty (6.5 p.p.) if candidates are convicted for severe crimes. These results supplement the information shortcut literature by examining how judicial information influences voters' decisions and showing that voters react more strongly to more credible sources of information.

econ.GN