arXiv subjects

Andrea Bovo

Publications and source records attributed to Andrea Bovo.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A continuous-time dynamic contracting problem with limited liability and finite horizon

We perform a detailed study of a principal--agent problem in a continuous time version of the celebrated Holmström--Milgrom model (Econometrica 55 (2), 1987) where we add limited liability for the Agent. We develop a probabilistic methodology to prove that the Principal's value function is the unique bounded classical solution to a fully nonlinear and fully degenerate partial differential equation (PDE) with Cauchy-Dirichlet boundary conditions on $[0,T]\times[0,\infty)$. Indeed, we also prove infinite continuous differentiability of the solution in the interior of the domain. The strength of our regularity result is such that we can ensure existence of optimal controls in strong form---a rare occurrence in dynamic contracting---and we obtain fine properties of the optimal control map, including a characterisation via a further nonlinear degenerate PDE.

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arXiv2025

Finite-time horizon, stopper vs. singular-controller games on the half-line

We prove existence of a value for two-player zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller games on finite-time horizon, when the underlying dynamics is one-dimensional, diffusive and bound to evolve in $[0,\infty)$. We show that the value is the maximal solution of a variational inequality with both obstacle and gradient constraint and satisfying a Dirichlet boundary condition at $[0,T)\times\{0\}$. Moreover, we obtain an optimal strategy for the stopper. In order to achieve our goals, we rely on new probabilistic methods, yielding gradient bounds and equi-continuity for the solutions of penalised partial differential equations that approximate the variational inequality.

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arXiv2025

Global regularity of the value function in a stopper vs. singular-controller game

We study a class of zero-sum stochastic games between a stopper and a singular-controller, previously considered in [Bovo and De Angelis (2025)]. The underlying singularly-controlled dynamics takes values in $\mathcal{O}\subseteq\mathbb{R}$. The problem is set on a finite time-horizon and is connected to a parabolic variational inequality of min-max type with spatial-derivative and obstacle constraints. We show that the value function of the problem is of class $C^1$ in the whole domain $[0,T)\times\mathcal{O}$ and that the second-order spatial derivative and the second-order mixed derivative are continuous everywhere except for a (potential) jump across a non-decreasing curve (the stopping boundary of the game). The latter discontinuity is a natural consequence of the partial differential equation associated to the problem. Beyond its intrinsic analytical value, such a regularity for the value function is a stepping stone for further exploring the structure and properties of the free-boundaries of the stochastic game, which in turn determine the optimal strategies of the players.

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arXiv2024

On the saddle point of a zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller game

We construct a saddle point in a class of zero-sum games between a stopper and a singular-controller. The underlying dynamics is a one-dimensional, time-homogeneous, singularly controlled diffusion taking values either on $\mathbb{R}$ or on $[0,\infty)$. The games are set on a finite-time horizon, thus leading to analytical problems in the form of parabolic variational inequalities with gradient and obstacle constraints. The saddle point is characterised in terms of two moving boundaries: an optimal stopping boundary and an optimal control boundary. These boundaries allow us to construct an optimal stopping time for the stopper and an optimal control for the singular-controller. Our method relies on a new link between the value function of the game and the value function of an auxiliary optimal stopping problem with absorption. We show that the smooth-fit condition at the stopper's optimal boundary (in the game), translates into an absorption condition in the auxiliary problem. This is somewhat in contrast with results obtained in problems of singular control with absorption and it highlights the key role of smooth-fit in this context.

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arXiv2024

Stopper vs. singular-controller games with degenerate diffusions

We study zero-sum stochastic games between a singular controller and a stopper when the (state-dependent) diffusion matrix of the underlying controlled diffusion process is degenerate. In particular, we show the existence of a value for the game and determine an optimal strategy for the stopper. The degeneracy of the dynamics prevents the use of analytical methods based on solution in Sobolev spaces of suitable variational problems. Therefore we adopt a probabilistic approach based on a perturbation of the underlying diffusion modulated by a parameter $γ>0$. For each $γ>0$ the approximating game is non-degenerate and admits a value $u^γ$ and an optimal strategy $τ^γ_*$ for the stopper. Letting $γ\to 0$ we prove convergence of $u^γ$ to a function $v$, which identifies the value of the original game. We also construct explicitly optimal stopping times $θ^γ_*$ for $u^γ$, related but not equal to $τ^γ_*$, which converge almost surely to an optimal stopping time $θ_*$ for the game with degenerate dynamics.

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arXiv2024

Zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller games with constrained control directions

We consider a class of zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller games in which the controller can only act on a subset $d_0<d$ of the $d$ coordinates of a controlled diffusion. Due to the constraint on the control directions these games fall outside the framework of recently studied variational methods. In this paper we develop an approximation procedure, based on $L^1$-stability estimates for the controlled diffusion process and almost sure convergence of suitable stopping times. That allows us to prove existence of the game's value and to obtain an optimal strategy for the stopper, under continuity and growth conditions on the payoff functions. This class of games is a natural extension of (single-agent) singular control problems, studied in the literature, with similar constraints on the admissible controls.

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arXiv2023

Variational inequalities on unbounded domains for zero-sum singular-controller vs. stopper games

We study a class of zero-sum games between a singular-controller and a stopper over finite-time horizon. The underlying process is a multi-dimensional (locally non-degenerate) controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) evolving in an unbounded domain. We prove that such games admit a value and provide an optimal strategy for the stopper. The value of the game is shown to be the maximal solution, in a suitable Sobolev class, of a variational inequality of `min-max' type with obstacle constraint and gradient constraint. Although the variational inequality and the game are solved on an unbounded domain we do not require boundedness of either the coefficients of the controlled SDE or of the cost functions in the game.

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