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Andrea Civilini

Publications and source records attributed to Andrea Civilini.

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Optimal network structure for collective performance with strategic information sharing

Information sharing between individuals is crucial to improve performance in collective tasks. However, in a competitive world, individuals may be reluctant to share information with the others, and it is still unclear how the presence of strategic behaviors affects the collective performance of a group. In this study, we introduce an evolutionary game modeling the dynamics of individual behaviors in a collective estimation task. The individuals are organized in a network and have to guess the distribution of ball colors in a box. Each of them samples a given number of balls and can strategically decide whether to share or not this information with its neighbors. We develop a framework that allows to investigate analytically how the collective performance depends on the network structure. We find that the optimal network results from a trade-off between the sharing rate and the way the information is integrated in the network. We further reveal that there exists an intermediate average degree for each type of network maximizing the collective performance. In addition to the uniform case, we consider the case of non-homogeneous allocations of the number of individual samples, showing that the largest collective performance is obtained when the number of ball extracted by an individual is inversely proportional to its degree.

physics.soc-ph

Endogenous Feedback in Coevolutionary Games Reshapes the Stability of Cooperation

In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff matrix is a time-dependent function of the level of cooperation. This allows strategic incentives to be continuously modified by the collective behavior they generate. Even in the simplest case of linear and instantaneous feedback, the model reveals feedback-induced regimes, termed chimera games, in which stable cooperation arises despite being incompatible with the predictions of standard fixed-game dynamics. We further show that delayed feedback can destabilize these equilibria and generate sustained oscillations, while nonlinear feedback reshapes equilibrium structure and introduces path dependence. Our results show how cooperation can be promoted, suppressed, or destabilized by incentives generated endogenously by the very same population's collective behavior. We conclude by outlining how our framework connects to real-world systems shaped by endogenous feedback.

physics.soc-ph

Symbolic Higher-Order Analysis of Multivariate Time Series

Identifying patterns of relations among the units of a complex system from measurements of their activities in time is a fundamental problem with many practical applications. Here, we introduce a method that detects dependencies of any order in multivariate time series data. The method first transforms a multivariate time series into a symbolic sequence, and then extract statistically significant strings of symbols through a Bayesian approach. Such motifs are finally modelled as the hyperedges of a hypergraph, allowing us to use network theory to study higher-order interactions in the original data. When applied to neural and social systems, our method reveals meaningful higher-order dependencies, highlighting their importance in both brain function and social behaviour.

physics.soc-ph

Drivers of cooperation in social dilemmas on higher-order networks

Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas requires models that capture the complexity of real-world interactions. While network frameworks have provided valuable insights to model the evolution of cooperation, they are unable to encode group interactions properly. Here, we introduce a general higher-order network framework for multi-player games on structured populations. Our model considers multi-dimensional strategies, based on the observation that social behaviours are affected by the size of the group interaction. We investigate dynamical and structural coupling between different orders of interactions, revealing the crucial role of nested multilevel interactions, and showing how such features can enhance cooperation beyond the limit of traditional models with uni-dimensional strategies. Our work identifies the key drivers promoting cooperative behaviour commonly observed in real-world group social dilemmas.

physics.soc-ph

Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments

The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how strategic decisions coevolve with the environment has so far mostly been overlooked. Here, we consider a game selection model where not only the strategies but also the game can change over time following evolutionary principles. Our results show that coevolutionary dynamics of games and strategies can induce novel collective phenomena, fostering the emergence of cooperative environments. When the model is taken on structured populations the architecture of the interaction network can significantly amplify pro-social behavior, with a critical role played by network heterogeneity and the presence of clustered groups of similar players, distinctive features observed in real-world populations. By unveiling the link between the evolution of strategies and games for different structured populations, our model sheds new light on the origin of social dilemmas ubiquitously observed in real-world social systems.

physics.soc-ph

Explosive cooperation in social dilemmas on higher-order networks

Understanding how cooperative behaviours can emerge from competitive interactions is an open problem in biology and social sciences. While interactions are usually modelled as pairwise networks, the units of many real-world systems can also interact in groups of three or more. Here, we introduce a general framework to extend pairwise games to higher-order networks. By studying social dilemmas on hypergraphs with a tunable structure, we find an explosive transition to cooperation triggered by a critical number of higher-order games. The associated bistable regime implies that an initial critical mass of cooperators is also required for the emergence of prosocial behavior. Our results show that higher-order interactions provide a novel explanation for the survival of cooperation.

physics.soc-ph

Evolutionary game model of group choice dilemmas on hypergraphs

We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the preference of individual decision makers and the consensual choice of a group, that have been empirically observed in choice dilemmas. In particular, a deviation from the Nash equilibrium towards the risky strategy occurs when the dynamics takes place on heterogeneous hypergraphs. These results can explain the emergence of irrational herding and radical behaviours in social groups.

physics.soc-ph

Model of spatial competition on discrete markets

We propose a dynamical model of price formation on a spatial market where sellers and buyers are placed on the nodes of a graph, and the distribution of the buyers depends on the positions and prices of the sellers. We find that, depending on the positions of the sellers and on the level of information available, the price dynamics of our model can either converge to fixed prices, or produce cycles of different amplitudes and periods. We show how to measure the strength of competition in a spatial network by extracting the exponent of the scaling of the prices with the size of the system. As an application, we characterize the different level of competition in street networks of real cities across the globe. Finally, using the model dynamics we can define a novel measure of node centrality, which quantifies the relevance of a node in a competitive market.

physics.soc-ph