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Andrea Prat

Publications and source records attributed to Andrea Prat.

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Political Power and Market Power

We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. We present a joint model of political influence and market competition: an oligopoly lobbies the government over regulation, and competes in the product market shaped by this influence. We show broad conditions for mergers to increase lobbying, both on the intensive margin and the extensive margin. We combine data on mergers with data on lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions in the US from 1999 to 2017. We document a positive association between mergers and lobbying, both by individual firms and by industry trade associations. Mergers are also associated with extensive margin changes such as the formation of in-house lobbying teams and corporate PACs. We find some evidence for a positive association between mergers and higher campaign contributions.

econ.GN

Competing Models

Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability -- as measured by the smallest subjective posterior mean squared prediction error -- and show how it depends on the sample size. With small samples, we present results suggesting it is an agent using a low-dimensional model. With large samples, it is generally an agent with a high-dimensional model, possibly including irrelevant variables, but never excluding relevant ones. We apply our results to characterize the winning model in an auction of productive assets, to argue that entrepreneurs and investors with simple models will be over-represented in new sectors, and to understand the proliferation of "factors" that explain the cross-sectional variation of expected stock returns in the asset-pricing literature.

econ.TH