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Andreas Peter

Publications and source records attributed to Andreas Peter.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

DDH-based schemes for multi-party Function Secret Sharing

Function Secret Sharing (FSS) schemes enable sharing efficiently secret functions. Schemes dedicated to point functions, referred to as Distributed Point Functions (DPFs), are the center of FSS literature thanks to their numerous applications including private information retrieval, anonymous communications, and machine learning. While two-party DPFs benefit from schemes with logarithmic key sizes, multi-party DPFs have seen limited advancements: $O(\sqrt{N})$ key sizes (with $N$, the function domain size) and/or exponential factors in the key size. We propose a DDH-based technique reducing the key size of existing multi-party schemes. In particular, we build an honest-majority DPF with $O(\sqrt[3]{N})$ key size. Our benchmark highlights key sizes up to $10\times$ smaller (on realistic problem sizes) than state-of-the-art schemes. Finally, we extend our technique to schemes supporting comparison functions.

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Towards a Functionally Complete and Parameterizable TFHE Processor

Fully homomorphic encryption allows the evaluation of arbitrary functions on encrypted data. It can be leveraged to secure outsourced and multiparty computation. TFHE is a fast torus-based fully homomorphic encryption scheme that allows both linear operations, as well as the evaluation of arbitrary non-linear functions. It currently provides the fastest bootstrapping operation performance of any other FHE scheme. Despite its fast performance, TFHE suffers from a considerably higher computational overhead for the evaluation of homomorphic circuits. Computations in the encrypted domain are orders of magnitude slower than their unencrypted equivalents. This bottleneck hinders the widespread adoption of (T)FHE for the protection of sensitive data. While state-of-the-art implementations focused on accelerating and outsourcing single operations, their scalability and practicality are constrained by high memory bandwidth costs. In order to overcome this, we propose an FPGA-based hardware accelerator for the evaluation of homomorphic circuits. Specifically, we design a functionally complete TFHE processor for FPGA hardware capable of processing instructions on the data completely on the FPGA. In order to achieve a higher throughput from our TFHE processor, we implement an improved programmable bootstrapping module, which outperforms the current state-of-the-art by 240% to 480% more bootstrappings per second. Our efficient, compact, and scalable design lays the foundation for implementing complete FPGA-based TFHE processor architectures.

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Secure Sparse Matrix Multiplications and their Applications to Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning

To preserve data privacy, multi-party computation (MPC) enables executing Machine Learning (ML) algorithms on private data. However, MPC frameworks do not include optimized operations on sparse data. This absence makes them unsuitable for ML applications involving sparse data; e.g., recommender systems or genomics. Even in plaintext, such applications involve high-dimensional sparse data, that cannot be processed without sparsity-related optimizations due to prohibitively large memory requirements. Since matrix multiplication is a central building block of ML algorithms, our work proposes dedicated MPC algorithms to multiply secret-shared sparse matrices. Our sparse algorithms have several advantages over secure dense matrix multiplications (i.e., the classic multiplication). On the one hand, they avoid the memory issues caused by the "dense" data representation of dense multiplications. On the other hand, our algorithms can significantly reduce communication costs (up to $\times1000$) for realistic problem sizes. We validate our algorithms in two machine learning applications where dense matrix multiplications are impractical. Finally, we take inspiration from real-world sparse data properties to build 3 techniques minimizing the public knowledge necessary to secure sparse algorithms.

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Eliminating Exponential Key Growth in PRG-Based Distributed Point Functions

Distributed Point Functions (DPFs) enable sharing secret point functions across multiple parties, supporting privacy-preserving technologies such as Private Information Retrieval, and anonymous communications. While 2-party PRG-based schemes with logarithmic key sizes have been known for a decade, extending these solutions to multi-party settings has proven challenging. In particular, PRG-based multi-party DPFs have historically struggled with practicality due to key sizes growing exponentially with the number of parties and the field size. Our work addresses this efficiency bottleneck by optimizing the PRG-based multi-party DPF scheme of Boyle et al. (EUROCRYPT'15). By leveraging the honest-majority assumption, we eliminate the exponential factor present in this scheme. Our construction is the first PRG-based multi-party DPF scheme with practical key sizes, and provides key up to 3x smaller than the best known multi-party DPF. This work demonstrates that with careful optimization, PRG-based multi-party DPFs can achieve practical performances, and even obtain top performances.

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How to Securely Shuffle? A survey about Secure Shufflers for privacy-preserving computations

Ishai et al. (FOCS'06) introduced secure shuffling as an efficient building block for private data aggregation. Recently, the field of differential privacy has revived interest in secure shufflers by highlighting the privacy amplification they can provide in various computations. Although several works argue for the utility of secure shufflers, they often treat them as black boxes; overlooking the practical vulnerabilities and performance trade-offs of existing implementations. This leaves a central question open: what makes a good secure shuffler? This survey addresses that question by identifying, categorizing, and comparing 26 secure protocols that realize the necessary shuffling functionality. To enable a meaningful comparison, we adapt and unify existing security definitions into a consistent set of properties. We also present an overview of privacy-preserving technologies that rely on secure shufflers, offer practical guidelines for selecting appropriate protocols, and outline promising directions for future work.

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Revisiting the attacker's knowledge in inference attacks against Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Encrypted search schemes have been proposed to address growing privacy concerns. However, several leakage-abuse attacks have highlighted some security vulnerabilities. Recent attacks assumed an attacker's knowledge containing data ``similar'' to the indexed data. However, this vague assumption is barely discussed in literature: how likely is it for an attacker to obtain a "similar enough" data? Our paper provides novel statistical tools usable on any attack in this setting to analyze its sensitivity to data similarity. First, we introduce a mathematical model based on statistical estimators to analytically understand the attackers' knowledge and the notion of similarity. Second, we conceive statistical tools to model the influence of the similarity on the attack accuracy. We apply our tools on three existing attacks to answer questions such as: is similarity the only factor influencing accuracy of a given attack? Third, we show that the enforcement of a maximum index size can make the ``similar-data'' assumption harder to satisfy. In particular, we propose a statistical method to estimate an appropriate maximum size for a given attack and dataset. For the best known attack on the Enron dataset, a maximum index size of 200 guarantees (with high probability) the attack accuracy to be below 5%.

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Privacy-Preserving Vertical K-Means Clustering

Clustering is a fundamental data processing task used for grouping records based on one or more features. In the vertically partitioned setting, data is distributed among entities, with each holding only a subset of those features. A key challenge in this scenario is that computing distances between records requires access to all distributed features, which may be privacy-sensitive and cannot be directly shared with other parties. The goal is to compute the joint clusters while preserving the privacy of each entity's dataset. Existing solutions using secret sharing or garbled circuits implement privacy-preserving variants of Lloyd's algorithm but incur high communication costs, scaling as O(nkt), where n is the number of data points, k the number of clusters, and t the number of rounds. These methods become impractical for large datasets or several parties, limiting their use to LAN settings only. On the other hand, a different line of solutions rely on differential privacy (DP) to outsource the local features of the parties to a central server. However, they often significantly degrade the utility of the clustering outcome due to excessive noise. In this work, we propose a novel solution based on homomorphic encryption and DP, reducing communication complexity to O(n+kt). In our method, parties securely outsource their features once, allowing a computing party to perform clustering operations under encryption. DP is applied only to the clusters' centroids, ensuring privacy with minimal impact on utility. Our solution clusters 100,000 two-dimensional points into five clusters using only 73MB of communication, compared to 101GB for existing works, and completes in just under 3 minutes on a 100Mbps network, whereas existing works take over 1 day. This makes our solution practical even for WAN deployments, all while maintaining accuracy comparable to plaintext k-means algorithms.

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Efficient Ranking, Order Statistics, and Sorting under CKKS

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables operations on encrypted data, making it extremely useful for privacy-preserving applications, especially in cloud computing environments. In such contexts, operations like ranking, order statistics, and sorting are fundamental functionalities often required for database queries or as building blocks of larger protocols. However, the high computational overhead and limited native operations of FHE pose significant challenges for an efficient implementation of these tasks. These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that all these functionalities are based on comparing elements, which is a severely expensive operation under encryption. Previous solutions have typically based their designs on swap-based techniques, where two elements are conditionally swapped based on the results of their comparison. These methods aim to reduce the primary computational bottleneck: the comparison depth, which is the number of non-parallelizable homomorphic comparisons in the algorithm. The current state of the art solution for sorting by Hong et al. (IEEE TIFS 2021), for instance, achieves a comparison depth of k log_k^2 N. In this paper, we address the challenge of reducing the comparison depth by shifting away from the swap-based paradigm. We present solutions for ranking, order statistics, and sorting, that achieve a comparison depth of up to 2 (constant), making our approach highly parallelizable and suitable for hardware acceleration. Leveraging the SIMD capabilities of the CKKS FHE scheme, our approach re-encodes the input vector under encryption to allow for simultaneous comparisons of all elements with each other. Experimental results show that our approach ranks a 128-element vector in approximately 5.76s, computes its argmin/argmax in 12.83s, and sorts it in 78.64s.

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Investigating Privacy Attacks in the Gray-Box Setting to Enhance Collaborative Learning Schemes

The notion that collaborative machine learning can ensure privacy by just withholding the raw data is widely acknowledged to be flawed. Over the past seven years, the literature has revealed several privacy attacks that enable adversaries to extract information about a model's training dataset by exploiting access to model parameters during or after training. In this work, we study privacy attacks in the gray-box setting, where the attacker has only limited access - in terms of view and actions - to the model. The findings of our investigation provide new insights for the development of privacy-preserving collaborative learning solutions. We deploy SmartCryptNN, a framework that tailors homomorphic encryption to protect the portions of the model posing higher privacy risks. Our solution offers a trade-off between privacy and efficiency, which varies based on the extent and selection of the model components we choose to protect. We explore it on dense neural networks, where through extensive evaluation of diverse datasets and architectures, we uncover instances where a favorable sweet spot in the trade-off can be achieved by safeguarding only a single layer of the network. In one of such instances, our approach trains ~4 times faster compared to fully encrypted solutions, while reducing membership leakage by 17.8 times compared to plaintext solutions.

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Passive Query-Recovery Attack Against Secure Conjunctive Keyword Search Schemes

While storing documents on the cloud can be attractive, the question remains whether cloud providers can be trusted with storing private documents. Even if trusted, data breaches are ubiquitous. To prevent information leakage one can store documents encrypted. If encrypted under traditional schemes, one loses the ability to perform simple operations over the documents, such as searching through them. Searchable encryption schemes were proposed allowing some search functionality while documents remain encrypted. Orthogonally, research is done to find attacks that exploit search and access pattern leakage that most efficient schemes have. One type of such an attack is the ability to recover plaintext queries. Passive query-recovery attacks on single-keyword search schemes have been proposed in literature, however, conjunctive keyword search has not been considered, although keyword searches with two or three keywords appear more frequently in online searches. We introduce a generic extension strategy for existing passive query-recovery attacks against single-keyword search schemes and explore its applicability for the attack presented by Damie et al. (USENIX Security '21). While the original attack achieves up to a recovery rate of 85% against single-keyword search schemes for an attacker without exact background knowledge, our experiments show that the generic extension to conjunctive queries comes with a significant performance decrease achieving recovery rates of at most 32%. Assuming a stronger attacker with partial knowledge of the indexed document set boosts the recovery rate to 85% for conjunctive keyword queries with two keywords and achieves similar recovery rates as previous attacks by Cash et al. (CCS '15) and Islam et al. (NDSS '12) in the same setting for single-keyword search schemes.

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A Highly Accurate Query-Recovery Attack against Searchable Encryption using Non-Indexed Documents

Cloud data storage solutions offer customers cost-effective and reduced data management. While attractive, data security issues remain to be a core concern. Traditional encryption protects stored documents, but hinders simple functionalities such as keyword search. Therefore, searchable encryption schemes have been proposed to allow for the search on encrypted data. Efficient schemes leak at least the access pattern (the accessed documents per keyword search), which is known to be exploitable in query recovery attacks assuming the attacker has a significant amount of background knowledge on the stored documents. Existing attacks can only achieve decent results with strong adversary models (e.g. at least 20% of previously known documents or require additional knowledge such as on query frequencies) and they give no metric to evaluate the certainty of recovered queries. This hampers their practical utility and questions their relevance in the real-world. We propose a refined score attack which achieves query recovery rates of around 85% without requiring exact background knowledge on stored documents; a distributionally similar, but otherwise different (i.e., non-indexed), dataset suffices. The attack starts with very few known queries (around 10 known queries in our experiments over different datasets of varying size) and then iteratively recovers further queries with confidence scores by adding previously recovered queries that had high confidence scores to the set of known queries. Additional to high recovery rates, our approach yields interpretable results in terms of confidence scores.

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Identifying Near-Optimal Single-Shot Attacks on ICSs with Limited Process Knowledge

Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) rely on insecure protocols and devices to monitor and operate critical infrastructure. Prior work has demonstrated that powerful attackers with detailed system knowledge can manipulate exchanged sensor data to deteriorate performance of the process, even leading to full shutdowns of plants. Identifying those attacks requires iterating over all possible sensor values, and running detailed system simulation or analysis to identify optimal attacks. That setup allows adversaries to identify attacks that are most impactful when applied on the system for the first time, before the system operators become aware of the manipulations. In this work, we investigate if constrained attackers without detailed system knowledge and simulators can identify comparable attacks. In particular, the attacker only requires abstract knowledge on general information flow in the plant, instead of precise algorithms, operating parameters, process models, or simulators. We propose an approach that allows single-shot attacks, i.e., near-optimal attacks that are reliably shutting down a system on the first try. The approach is applied and validated on two use cases, and demonstrated to achieve comparable results to prior work, which relied on detailed system information and simulations.

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Obfuscated Access and Search Patterns in Searchable Encryption

Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a data owner to securely outsource its encrypted data to a cloud server while maintaining the ability to search over it and retrieve matched documents. Most existing SSE schemes leak which documents are accessed per query, i.e., the so-called access pattern, and thus are vulnerable to attacks that can recover the database or the queried keywords. Current techniques that fully hide access patterns, such as ORAM or PIR, suffer from heavy communication or computational costs, and are not designed with search capabilities in mind. Recently, Chen et al. (INFOCOM'18) proposed an obfuscation framework for SSE that protects the access pattern in a differentially private way with a reasonable utility cost. However, this scheme leaks the so-called search pattern, i.e., how many times a certain query is performed. This leakage makes the proposal vulnerable to certain database and query recovery attacks. In this paper, we propose OSSE (Obfuscated SSE), an SSE scheme that obfuscates the access pattern independently for each query performed. This in turn hides the search pattern and makes our scheme resistant against attacks that rely on this leakage. Under certain reasonable assumptions, our scheme has smaller communication overhead than ORAM-based SSE. Furthermore, our scheme works in a single communication round and requires very small constant client-side storage. Our empirical evaluation shows that OSSE is highly effective at protecting against different query recovery attacks while keeping a reasonable utility level. Our protocol provides significantly more protection than the proposal by Chen et al.~against some state-of-the-art attacks, which demonstrates the importance of hiding search patterns in designing effective privacy-preserving SSE schemes.

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Biometric Verification Secure Against Malicious Adversaries

Biometric verification has been widely deployed in current authentication solutions as it proves the physical presence of individuals. To protect the sensitive biometric data in such systems, several solutions have been developed that provide security against honest-but-curious (semi-honest) attackers. However, in practice attackers typically do not act honestly and multiple studies have shown drastic biometric information leakage in such honest-but-curious solutions when considering dishonest, malicious attackers. In this paper, we propose a provably secure biometric verification protocol to withstand malicious attackers and prevent biometric data from any sort of leakage. The proposed protocol is based on a homomorphically encrypted log likelihood-ratio-based (HELR) classifier that supports any biometric modality (e.g. face, fingerprint, dynamic signature, etc.) encoded as a fixed-length real-valued feature vector and performs an accurate and fast biometric recognition. Our protocol, that is secure against malicious adversaries, is designed from a protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries enhanced by zero-knowledge proofs. We evaluate both protocols for various security levels and record a sub-second speed (between $0.37$s and $0.88$s) for the protocol against semi-honest adversaries and between $0.95$s and $2.50$s for the protocol secure against malicious adversaries.

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Automated Retrieval of ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques for Cyber Threat Reports

Over the last years, threat intelligence sharing has steadily grown, leading cybersecurity professionals to access increasingly larger amounts of heterogeneous data. Among those, cyber attacks' Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) have proven to be particularly valuable to characterize threat actors' behaviors and, thus, improve defensive countermeasures. Unfortunately, this information is often hidden within human-readable textual reports and must be extracted manually. In this paper, we evaluate several classification approaches to automatically retrieve TTPs from unstructured text. To implement these approaches, we take advantage of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, an open knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques, to train classifiers and label results. Finally, we present rcATT, a tool built on top of our findings and freely distributed to the security community to support cyber threat report automated analysis.

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Benchmarks for approximate CNOTs based on a 17-Qubit Surface Code

Scalable and fault-tolerant quantum computation will require error correction. This will demand constant measurement of many-qubit observables, implemented using a vast number of CNOT gates. Indeed, practically all operations performed by a fault-tolerant device will be these CNOTs, or equivalent two-qubit controlled operations. It is therefore important to devise benchmarks for these gates that explicitly quantify their effectiveness at this task. Here we develop such benchmarks, and demonstrate their use by applying them to a range of differently implemented controlled gates and a particular quantum error correcting code. Specifically, we consider spin qubits confined to quantum dots that are coupled either directly or via floating gates to implement the minimal 17-qubit instance of the surface code. Our results show that small differences in the gate fidelity can lead to large differences in the performance of the surface code. This shows that gate fidelity is not, in general, a good predictor of code performance.

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Introducing the Robot Security Framework (RSF), a standardized methodology to perform security assessments in robotics

Robots have gained relevance in society, increasingly performing critical tasks. Nonetheless, robot security is being underestimated. Robotics security is a complex landscape, which often requires a cross-disciplinar perspective to which classical security lags behind. To address this issue, we present the Robot Security Framework (RSF), a methodology to perform systematic security assessments in robots. We propose, adapt and develop specific terminology and provide guidelines to enable a holistic security assessment following four main layers (Physical, Network, Firmware and Application). We argue that modern robotics should regard as equally relevant internal and external communication security. Finally, we advocate against "security by obscurity". We conclude that the field of security in robotics deserves further research efforts.

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Fast and Accurate Likelihood Ratio Based Biometric Comparison in the Encrypted Domain

As applications of biometric verification proliferate, users become more vulnerable to privacy infringement. Biometric data is very privacy sensitive as it may contain information as gender, ethnicity and health conditions which should not be shared with third parties during the verification process. Moreover, biometric data that has fallen into the wrong hands often leads to identity theft. Secure biometric verification schemes try to overcome such privacy threats. Unfortunately, existing secure solutions either introduce a heavy computational or communication overhead or have to accept a high loss in accuracy; both of which make them impractical in real-world settings. This paper presents a novel approach to secure biometric verification aiming at a practical trade-off between efficiency and accuracy, while guaranteeing full security against honest-but-curious adversaries. The system performs verification in the encrypted domain using elliptic curve based homomorphic ElGamal encryption for high efficiency. Classification is based on a log-likelihood ratio classifier which has proven to be very accurate. No private information is leaked during the verification process using a two-party secure protocol. Initial tests show highly accurate results that have been computed within milliseconds range.

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