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Andrei Constantinescu

Publications and source records attributed to Andrei Constantinescu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Challenges in Deep Learning-Based Small Organ Segmentation: A Benchmarking Perspective for Medical Research with Limited Datasets

Accurate segmentation of carotid artery structures in histopathological images is vital for cardiovascular disease research. This study systematically evaluates ten deep learning segmentation models including classical architectures, modern CNNs, a Vision Transformer, and foundation models, on a limited dataset of nine cardiovascular histology images. We conducted ablation studies on data augmentation, input resolution, and random seed stability to quantify sources of variance. Evaluation on an independent generalization dataset ($N=153$) under distribution shift reveals that foundation models maintain performance while classical architectures fail, and that rankings change substantially between in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings. Training on the second dataset at varying sample sizes reveals dataset-specific ranking hierarchies confirming that model rankings are not generalizable across datasets. Despite rigorous Bayesian hyperparameter optimization, model performance remains highly sensitive to data splits. The bootstrap analysis reveals substantially overlapping confidence intervals among top models, with differences driven more by statistical noise than algorithmic superiority. This instability exposes limitations of standard benchmarking in low-data clinical settings and challenges assumptions that performance rankings reflect clinical utility. We advocate for uncertainty-aware evaluation in low-data clinical research scenarios from two perspectives. First, the scenario is not niche and is rather widely spread; and second, it enables pursuing or discontinuing research tracks with limited datasets from incipient stages of observations.

cs.CV

A new Surrogate Microstructure Generator for Porous Materials with Applications to the Buffer Layer of TRISO Nuclear Fuel Particles

We present a surrogate material model for generating microstructure samples reproducing the morphology of the real material. The generator is based on Gaussian random fields, with a Mat\'ern kernel and a topological support field defined through ellipsoidal inclusions clustered by a random walk algorithm. We identify the surrogate model parameters by minimizing misfits in a list of statistical and geometrical descriptors of the material microstructure. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the method for porous nuclear materials, we apply the generator to the buffer layer of Tristructural Isotropic Nuclear Fuel (TRISO) particles. This part has been shown to be failure sensitive part of TRISO nuclear fuel and our generator is optimized with respect to a dataset of FIB-SEM tomography across the buffer layer thickness. We evaluate the performance by applying mechanical modeling with problems of linear elastic homogenization and linear elastic brittle fracture material properties and comparing the behaviour of the dataset microstructure and the surrogate microstructure. This shows good agreement between the dataset microstructure and the generated microstructures over a large range of porosities.

cond-mat.mtrl-sci

From Few to Many Faults: Optimal Adaptive Byzantine Agreement

Achieving agreement among distributed parties is a fundamental task in modern systems, underpinning applications such as consensus in blockchains, coordination in cloud infrastructure, and fault tolerance in critical services. However, this task can be intensive, often requiring a large number of messages to be exchanged as well as many rounds of communication, especially in the presence of Byzantine faults. This makes efficiency a central challenge in the design of practical agreement protocols. In this paper, we study the problem of Binary Agreement and give protocols that are simultaneously optimal in both message and round complexity, parameterized by the actual number of Byzantine faults. In contrast to previous works, we demonstrate that optimal message complexity can be achieved without sacrificing latency. Concretely, for a system of $n$ parties tolerating up to $t$ Byzantine faults, out of which only $f \leq t$ are actually faulty, we give the following results: When $t = \Omega(n)$, in the synchronous (resp. partially synchronous) setting, with optimal resiliency $t < n/2$ (resp. $t < n/3$), we describe a deterministic protocol with optimal communication complexity $O(n \cdot (f+1))$ and optimal round complexity $O(f + 1)$. Building upon this previous result, when $t = o(n)$, for both the synchronous and partially synchronous setting, we describe a deterministic protocol with near-optimal communication complexity $\widetilde{O}(n + t\cdot f)$ and near-optimal round complexity $\widetilde{O}(f+1)$. Our approach relies on a novel use of dispersers to efficiently disseminate a value. For the asynchronous setting, we show a $\Omega(n + t^2)$ lower bound in expectation and provide a randomized protocol with near-optimal $\widetilde{O}(n + t^2)$ communication complexity and $O(1)$ round complexity in expectation.

cs.DC

Condorcet Winners and Anscombes Paradox Under Weighted Binary Voting

We consider voting on multiple independent binary issues. In addition, a weighting vector for each voter defines how important they consider each issue. The most natural way to aggregate the votes into a single unified proposal is issue-wise majority (IWM): taking a majority opinion for each issue. However, in a scenario known as Ostrogorski's Paradox, an IWM proposal may not be a Condorcet winner, or it may even fail to garner majority support in a special case known as Anscombe's Paradox. We show that it is co-NP-hard to determine whether there exists a Condorcet-winning proposal even without weights. In contrast, we prove that the single-switch condition provides an Ostrogorski-free voting domain under identical weighting vectors. We show that verifying the condition can be achieved in linear time and no-instances admit short, efficiently computable proofs in the form of forbidden substructures. On the way, we give the simplest linear-time test for the voter/candidate-extremal-interval condition in approval voting and the simplest and most efficient algorithm for recognizing single-crossing preferences in ordinal voting. We then tackle Anscombe's Paradox. Under identical weight vectors, we can guarantee a majority-supported proposal agreeing with IWM on strictly more than half of the overall weight, while with two distinct weight vectors, such proposals can get arbitrarily far from IWM. The severity of such examples is controlled by the maximum average topic weight $\tilde{w}_{max}$: a simple bound derived from a partition-based approach is tight on a large portion of the range $\tilde{w}_{max} \in (0,1)$. Finally, we extend Wagner's rule to the weighted setting: an average majority across topics of at least $\frac{3}{4}$'s precludes Anscombe's paradox from occurring.

cs.GT

Byzantine Game Theory: Sun Tzus Boxes

We introduce the Byzantine Selection Problem, living at the intersection of game theory and fault-tolerant distributed computing. Here, an event organizer is presented with a group of $n$ agents, and wants to select $\ell < n$ of them to form a team. For these purposes, each agent $i$ self-reports a positive skill value $v_i$, and a team's value is the sum of its members' skill values. Ideally, the value of the team should be as large as possible, which can be easily achieved by selecting agents with the highest $\ell$ skill values. However, an unknown subset of at most $t < n$ agents are byzantine and hence not to be trusted, rendering their true skill values as $0$. In the spirit of the distributed computing literature, the identity of the byzantine agents is not random but instead chosen by an adversary aiming to minimize the value of the chosen team. Can we still select a team with good guarantees in this adversarial setting? As it turns out, deterministically, it remains optimal to select agents with the highest $\ell$ values. Yet, if $t \geq \ell$, the adversary can choose to make all selected agents byzantine, leading to a team of value zero. To provide meaningful guarantees, one hence needs to allow for randomization, in which case the expected value of the selected team needs to be maximized, assuming again that the adversary plays to minimize it. For this case, we provide linear-time randomized algorithms that maximize the expected value of the selected team.

cs.GT

Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution

Given the low throughput of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, scalability - the ability to process an increasing number of transactions - has become a central focus of blockchain research. One promising approach is the parallelization of transaction execution across multiple threads. However, achieving efficient parallelization requires a redesign of the incentive structure within the fee market. Currently, the fee market does not differentiate between transactions that access multiple high-demand storage keys (i.e., unique identifiers for individual data entries) versus a single low-demand one, as long as they require the same computational effort. Addressing this discrepancy is crucial for enabling more effective parallel execution. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap between the current fee market and the need for parallel execution by exploring alternative fee market designs. To this end, we propose a framework consisting of two key components: a Gas Computation Mechanism (GCM), which quantifies the load a transaction places on the network in terms of parallelization and computation, measured in units of gas, and a Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM), which assigns a price to each unit of gas. We additionally introduce a set of desirable properties for a GCM, propose several candidate mechanisms, and evaluate them against these criteria. Our analysis highlights two strong candidates: the weighted area GCM, which integrates smoothly with existing TFMs such as EIP-1559 and satisfies a broad subset of the outlined properties, and the time-proportional makespan GCM, which assigns gas costs based on the context of the entire block's schedule and, through this dependence on the overall execution outcome, captures the dynamics of parallel execution more accurately.

cs.GT

Logarithmic Approximation for Road Pricing on Grids

Consider a graph $G = (V, E)$ and some commuters, each specified by a tuple $(u, v, b)$ consisting of two nodes in the graph $u, v \in V$ and a non-negative real number $b$, specifying their budget. The goal is to find a pricing function $p$ of the edges of $G$ that maximizes the revenue generated by the commuters. Here, each commuter $(u, v, b)$ either pays the lowest-cost of a $u$-$v$ path under the pricing $p$, or 0, if this exceeds their budget $b$. We study this problem for the case where $G$ is a bounded-width grid graph and give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with approximation ratio $O(\log |E|)$. Our approach combines existing ideas with new insights. Most notably, we employ a rather seldom-encountered technique that we coin under the name 'assume-implement dynamic programming.' This technique involves dynamic programming where some information about the future decisions of the dynamic program is guessed in advance and 'assumed' to hold, and then subsequent decisions are forced to 'implement' the guess. This enables computing the cost of the current transition by using information that would normally only be available in the future.

cs.DS

Byzantine Stable Matching

In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to be stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matching. We consider solving stable matching in a distributed synchronous setting, where each agent is its own process. Moreover, we assume up to $t_L$ agents on one side and $t_R$ on the other side can be byzantine. After properly defining the stable matching problem in this setting, we study its solvability. When there are as many agents on each side with fully-ordered preference lists, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for stable matching to be solvable in the synchronous setting. These conditions depend on the communication model used, i.e., if parties on the same side are allowed to communicate directly, and on the presence of a cryptographic setup, i.e., digital signatures.

cs.DC

Validity in Network-Agnostic Byzantine Agreement

Byzantine Agreement (BA) considers a setting of $n$ parties, out of which up to $t$ can exhibit byzantine (malicious) behavior. Honest parties must decide on a common value (agreement), which must belong to a set determined by the honest inputs (validity). Depending on the use case, this set can grow or shrink, leading to various possible desiderata collectively known as validity conditions. Varying the validity property requirement can affect the regime under which BA is solvable. Our work investigates how the selected validity property impacts BA solvability in the network-agnostic model, where the network can either be synchronous with up to $t_s$ byzantine parties or asynchronous with up to $t_a \leq t_s$ byzantine parties. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a validity property to render BA solvable, both for the case with cryptographic setup and for the one without. This traces the precise boundary of solvability in the network-agnostic model for every validity property. Our proof of sufficiency provides a universal protocol, that achieves BA for a given validity property whenever the provided conditions are satisfied. We note that, for any non-trivial validity property, the condition $2 \cdot t_s + t_a < n$ is necessary for BA to be solvable, even with cryptographic setup. Specializing this claim to $t_a = 0$ gives that $t < n / 2$ is required whenever one expects a purely synchronous protocol to also work in an asynchronous network when there are no corruptions. This is especially surprising given that, for some validity properties, $t < n$ is a sufficient condition without the last stipulation.

cs.DC

Unifying Partial Synchrony

The distributed computing literature considers multiple options for modeling communication. Most simply, communication is categorized as either synchronous or asynchronous. Synchronous communication assumes that messages get delivered within a publicly known timeframe and that parties' clocks are synchronized. Asynchronous communication, on the other hand, only assumes that messages get delivered eventually. A more nuanced approach, or a middle ground between the two extremes, is given by the partially synchronous model, which is arguably the most realistic option. This model comes in two commonly considered flavors: (i) The Global Stabilization Time (GST) model: after an (unknown) amount of time, the network becomes synchronous. This captures scenarios where network issues are transient. (ii) The Unknown Latency (UL) model: the network is, in fact, synchronous, but the message delay bound is unknown. This work formally establishes that any time-agnostic property that can be achieved by a protocol in the UL model can also be achieved by a (possibly different) protocol in the GST model. By time-agnostic, we mean properties that can depend on the order in which events happen but not on time as measured by the parties. Most properties considered in distributed computing are time-agnostic. The converse was already known, even without the time-agnostic requirement, so our result shows that the two network conditions are, under one sensible assumption, equally demanding.

cs.DC

Unravelling Expressive Delegations: Complexity and Normative Analysis

We consider binary group decision-making under a rich model of liquid democracy recently proposed by Colley, Grandi, and Novaro (2022): agents submit ranked delegation options, where each option may be a function of multiple agents' votes; e.g., "I vote yes if a majority of my friends vote yes." Such ballots are unravelled into a profile of direct votes by selecting one entry from each ballot so as not to introduce cyclic dependencies. We study delegation via monotonic Boolean functions, and two unravelling procedures: MinSum, which minimises the sum of the ranks of the chosen entries, and its egalitarian counterpart, MinMax. We provide complete computational dichotomies: MinSum is hard to compute (and approximate) as soon as any non-trivial functions are permitted, and polynomial otherwise; for MinMax the easiness results extend to arbitrary-arity logical ORs and ANDs taken in isolation, but not beyond. For the classic model of delegating to individual agents, we give asymptotically near-tight algorithms for carrying out the two procedures and efficient algorithms for finding optimal unravellings with the highest vote count for a given alternative. These algorithms inspire novel tie-breaking rules for the setup of voting to change a status quo. We then introduce a new axiom, which can be viewed as a variant of the participation axiom, and use algorithmic techniques developed earlier in the paper to show that it is satisfied by MinSum and a lexicographic refinement of MinMax (but not MinMax itself).

cs.GT

Solving Woeginger's Hiking Problem: Wonderful Partitions in Anonymous Hedonic Games

A decade ago, Gerhard Woeginger posed an open problem that became well-known as "Woeginger's Hiking Problem": Consider a group of $n$ people that want to go hiking; everyone expresses preferences over the size of their hiking group in the form of an interval between $1$ and $n$. Is it possible to efficiently assign the $n$ people to a set of hiking subgroups so that every person approves the size of their assigned subgroup? The problem is also known as efficiently deciding if an instance of an anonymous Hedonic Game with interval approval preferences admits a wonderful partition. We resolve the open problem in the affirmative by presenting an $O(n^5)$ time algorithm for Woeginger's Hiking Problem. Our solution is based on employing a dynamic programming approach for a specific rectangle stabbing problem from computational geometry. Moreover, we propose natural, more demanding extensions of the problem, e.g., maximizing the number of satisfied participants and variants with single-peaked preferences, and show that they are also efficiently solvable. Last but not least, we employ our solution to efficiently compute a partition that maximizes the egalitarian welfare for anonymous single-peaked Hedonic Games.

cs.GT

Recovering Single-Crossing Preferences From Approval Ballots

An electorate with fully-ranked innate preferences casts approval votes over a finite set of alternatives. As a result, only partial information about the true preferences is revealed to the voting authorities. In an effort to understand the nature of the true preferences given only partial information, one might ask whether the unknown innate preferences could possibly be single-crossing. The existence of a polynomial time algorithm to determine this has been asked as an outstanding problem in the works of Elkind and Lackner. We hereby give a polynomial time algorithm determining a single-crossing collection of fully-ranked preferences that could have induced the elicited approval ballots, or reporting the nonexistence thereof. Moreover, we consider the problem of identifying negative instances with a set of forbidden sub-ballots, showing that any such characterization requires infinitely many forbidden configurations.

cs.GT

Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangements

A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an agent's utility is the sum of their preference values towards their (at most two) direct neighbors. An arrangement is envy-free if no agent strictly prefers someone else's seat, and it is stable if no two agents strictly prefer each other's seats. Recently, it was shown that for both paths and cycles it is NP-hard to decide whether an envy-free arrangement exists, even for symmetric binary preferences. In contrast, we show that, if agents come from a bounded number of classes, the problem is solvable in polynomial time for arbitrarily-valued possibly asymmetric preferences, including outputting an arrangement if possible. We also give simpler proofs of the previous hardness results if preferences are allowed to be asymmetric. For stability, it is known that deciding the existence of stable arrangements is NP-hard for both topologies, but only if sufficiently-many numerical values are allowed. As it turns out, even constructing unstable instances can be challenging in certain cases, e.g., binary values. We completely characterize the existence of stable arrangements based on the number of distinct values in the preference matrix and the number of agent classes. We also ask the same question for non-negative values and give an almost-complete characterization, the most interesting outstanding case being that of paths with two-valued non-negative preferences, for which we experimentally find that stable arrangements always exist and prove it under the additional constraint that agents can only swap seats when sitting at most two positions away. We moreover give a polynomial algorithm for determining a stable arrangement assuming a bounded number of classes.

cs.GT

A Fair and Resilient Decentralized Clock Network for Transaction Ordering

Traditional blockchain design gives miners or validators full control over transaction ordering, i.e., they can freely choose which transactions to include or exclude, as well as in which order. While not an issue initially, the emergence of decentralized finance has introduced new transaction order dependencies allowing parties in control of the ordering to make a profit by front-running others' transactions. In this work, we present the Decentralized Clock Network, a new approach for achieving fair transaction ordering. Users submit their transactions to the network's clocks, which run an agreement protocol that provides each transaction with a timestamp of receipt which is then used to define the transactions' order. By separating agreement from ordering, our protocol is efficient and has a simpler design compared to other available solutions. Moreover, our protocol brings to the blockchain world the paradigm of asynchronous fallback, where the algorithm operates with stronger fairness guarantees during periods of synchronous use, switching to an asynchronous mode only during times of increased network delay.

cs.DC

Computing the Best Policy That Survives a Vote

An assembly of $n$ voters needs to decide on $t$ independent binary issues. Each voter has opinions about the issues, given by a $t$-bit vector. Anscombe's paradox shows that a policy following the majority opinion in each issue may not survive a vote by the very same set of $n$ voters, i.e., more voters may feel unrepresented by such a majority-driven policy than represented. A natural resolution is to come up with a policy that deviates a bit from the majority policy but no longer gets more opposition than support from the electorate. We show that a Hamming distance to the majority policy of at most $\lfloor (t - 1) / 2 \rfloor$ can always be guaranteed, by giving a new probabilistic argument relying on structure-preserving symmetries of the space of potential policies. Unless the electorate is evenly divided between the two options on all issues, we in fact show that a policy strictly winning the vote exists within this distance bound. Our approach also leads to a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for finding policies with the stated guarantees, answering an open problem of previous work. For odd $t$, unless we are in the pathological case described above, we also give a simpler and more efficient algorithm running in expected polynomial time with the same guarantees. We further show that checking whether distance strictly less than $\lfloor (t - 1) /2 \rfloor$ can be achieved is NP-hard, and that checking for distance at most some input $k$ is FPT with respect to several natural parameters.

cs.GT

Voting in Two-Crossing Elections

We introduce two-crossing elections as a generalization of single-crossing elections, showing a number of new results. First, we show that two-crossing elections can be recognized in polynomial time, by reduction to the well-studied consecutive ones problem. We also conjecture that recognizing $k$-crossing elections is NP-complete in general, providing evidence by relating to a problem similar to consecutive ones proven to be hard in the literature. Single-crossing elections exhibit a transitive majority relation, from which many important results follow. On the other hand, we show that the classical Debord-McGarvey theorem can still be proven two-crossing, implying that any weighted majority tournament is inducible by a two-crossing election. This shows that many voting rules are NP-hard under two-crossing elections, including Kemeny and Slater. This is in contrast to the single-crossing case and outlines an important complexity boundary between single- and two-crossing. Subsequently, we show that for two-crossing elections the Young scores of all candidates can be computed in polynomial time, by formulating a totally unimodular linear program. Finally, we consider the Chamberlin-Courant rule with arbitrary disutilities and show that a winning committee can be computed in polynomial time, using an approach based on dynamic programming.

cs.GT

Statistically equivalent surrogate material models and the impact of random imperfections on elasto-plastic response

Manufactured materials usually contain random imperfections due to the fabrication process, e.g., the 3D-printing, casting, etc. These imperfections affect significantly the effective material properties and result in uncertainties in the mechanical response. Numerical analysis of the effects of the imperfections and the uncertainty quantification (UQ) can be often done by use of digital stochastic surrogate material models. In this work, we present a new flexible class of surrogate models depending on a small number of parameters with special focus on two-phase materials. The surrogate models are constructed as the level-set of a linear combination of an intensity field representing the topological shape and a Gaussian perturbation representing the imperfections. The mathematical design parameters of the model are related to physical ones and thus easy to interpret. The calibration of the model parameters is performed using progressive batching sub-sampled quasi-Newton minimization, using a designed distance measure between the synthetic samples and the data. Then, employing a fast sampling algorithm, an arbitrary number of synthetic samples can be generated to use in Monte Carlo type methods. In particular, we illustrate the method in application to UQ of the elasto-plastic response of an imperfect octet-truss lattice which plays an important role in additive manufacturing. To this end, we study the effective material properties of the lattice unit cell under elasto-plastic deformations and investigate the sensitivity of the effective Young's modulus to the imperfections.

cond-mat.mtrl-sci