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Andrzej Duda

Publications and source records attributed to Andrzej Duda.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

INFERMAL: Inferential analysis of maliciously registered domains

Cybercriminals have long depended on domain names for phishing, spam, malware distribution, and botnet operation. To facilitate the malicious activities, they continually register new domain names for exploitation. Previous work revealed an abnormally high concentration of malicious registrations in a handful of domain name registrars and top-level domains (TLDs). Anecdotal evidence suggests that low registration prices attract cybercriminals, implying that higher costs may potentially discourage them. However, no existing study has systematically analyzed the factors driving abuse, leaving a critical gap in understanding how different variables influence malicious registrations. In this report, we carefully distill the inclinations and aversions of malicious actors during the registration of new phishing domain names. We compile a comprehensive list of 73 features encompassing three main latent factors: registration attributes, proactive verification, and reactive security practices. Through a GLM regression analysis, we find that each dollar reduction in registration fees corresponds to a 49% increase in malicious domains. The availability of free services, such as web hosting, drives an 88% surge in phishing activities. Conversely, stringent restrictions cut down abuse by 63%, while registrars providing API access for domain registration or account creation experience a staggering 401% rise in malicious domains. This exploration may assist intermediaries involved in domain registration to develop tailored anti-abuse practices, yet aligning them with their economic incentives.

cs.CR

Day in the Life of RIPE Atlas: Operational Insights and Applications in Network Measurements

Network measurement platforms are increasingly popular among researchers and operators alike due to their distributed nature, simplifying measuring the remote parts of the Internet. RIPE Atlas boasts over 12.9K vantage points in 178 countries worldwide and serves as a vital tool for analyzing anycast deployment, network latency, and topology, to name a few. Despite generating over a terabyte of measurement results per day, there is limited understanding of the underlying processes. This paper delves into one day in the life of RIPE Atlas, encompassing 50.9K unique measurements and over 1.3 billion results. While most daily measurements are user-defined, it is built-ins and anchor meshes that account for 89% of produced results. We extensively examine how different probes and measurements contribute to the daily operations of RIPE Atlas and consider any bias they may introduce. Furthermore, we demonstrate how existing measurements can be leveraged to investigate censorship, traceroute symmetry, and the usage of reserved address blocks, among others. Finally, we curate a set of recommendations for researchers using the RIPE Atlas platform to foster transparency, reproducibility, and ethics.

cs.NI

WHOIS Right? An Analysis of WHOIS and RDAP Consistency

Public registration information on domain names, such as the accredited registrar, the domain name expiration date, or the abusecontact is crucial for many security tasks, from automated abuse notifications to botnet or phishing detection and classification systems. Various domain registration data is usually accessible through the WHOIS or RDAP protocols-a priori they provide the same data but use distinct formats and communication protocols. While WHOIS aims to provide human-readable data, RDAP uses a machine-readable format. Therefore, deciding which protocol to use is generally considered a straightforward technical choice, depending on the use case and the required automation and security level. In this paper, we examine the core assumption that WHOIS and RDAP offer the same data and that users can query them interchangeably. By collecting, processing, and comparing 164 million WHOIS and RDAP records for a sample of 55 million domain names, we reveal that while the data obtained through WHOIS and RDAP is generally consistent, 7.6% of the observed domains still present inconsistent data on important fields like IANA ID, creation date, or nameservers. Such variances should receive careful consideration from security stakeholders reliant on the accuracy of these fields.

cs.NI

Guardians of DNS Integrity: A Remote Method for Identifying DNSSEC Validators Across the Internet

DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provide the most effective way to fight DNS cache poisoning attacks. Yet, very few DNS resolvers perform DNSSEC validation. Identifying such systems is non-trivial and the existing methods are not suitable for Internet-scale measurements. In this paper, we propose a novel remote technique for identifying DNSSEC-validating resolvers. The proposed method consists of two steps. In the first step, we identify open resolvers by scanning 3.1 billion end hosts and request every non-forwarder to resolve one correct and seven deliberately misconfigured domains. We then build a classifier that discriminates validators from non-validators based on query patterns and DNS response codes. We find that while most open resolvers are DNSSEC-enabled, less than 18% in IPv4 (38% in IPv6) validate received responses. In the second step, we remotely identify closed non-forwarders in networks that do not have inbound Source Address Validation (SAV) in place. Using the classifier built in step one, we identify 37.4% IPv4 (42.9% IPv6) closed DNSSEC validators and cross-validate the results using RIPE Atlas probes. Finally, we show that the discovered (non)-validators actively send requests to DNS root servers, suggesting that we deal with operational recursive resolvers rather than misconfigured machines.

cs.CR

Don't Get Hijacked: Prevalence, Mitigation, and Impact of Non-Secure DNS Dynamic Updates

DNS dynamic updates represent an inherently vulnerable mechanism deliberately granting the potential for any host to dynamically modify DNS zone files. Consequently, this feature exposes domains to various security risks such as domain hijacking, compromise of domain control validation, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Originally devised without the implementation of authentication mechanisms, non-secure DNS updates were widely adopted in DNS software, subsequently leaving domains susceptible to a novel form of attack termed zone poisoning. In order to gauge the extent of this issue, our analysis encompassed over 353 million domain names, revealing the presence of 381,965 domains that openly accepted unsolicited DNS updates. We then undertook a comprehensive three-phase campaign involving the notification of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). Following extensive discussions spanning six months, we observed substantial remediation, with nearly 54\% of nameservers and 98% of vulnerable domains addressing the issue. This outcome serves as evidence that engaging with CSIRTs can prove to be an effective approach for reporting security vulnerabilities. Moreover, our notifications had a lasting impact, as evidenced by the sustained low prevalence of vulnerable domains.

cs.CR

Exploring the Dark Side of AI: Advanced Phishing Attack Design and Deployment Using ChatGPT

This paper explores the possibility of using ChatGPT to develop advanced phishing attacks and automate their large-scale deployment. We make ChatGPT generate the following parts of a phishing attack: i) cloning a targeted website, ii) integrating code for stealing credentials, iii) obfuscating code, iv) automating website deployment on a hosting provider, v) registering a phishing domain name, and vi) integrating the website with a reverse proxy. The initial assessment of the automatically generated phishing kits highlights their rapid generation and deployment process as well as the close resemblance of the resulting pages to the target website. More broadly, we demonstrate that recent advances in AI underscore the potential risks of its misuse in phishing attacks, which can lead to their increased prevalence and severity. This highlights the necessity for enhanced countermeasures within AI systems.

cs.CR

The Closed Resolver Project: Measuring the Deployment of Source Address Validation of Inbound Traffic

Source Address Validation (SAV) is a standard aimed at discarding packets with spoofed source IP addresses. The absence of SAV for outgoing traffic has been known as a root cause of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and received widespread attention. While less obvious, the absence of inbound filtering enables an attacker to appear as an internal host of a network and may reveal valuable information about the network infrastructure. Inbound IP spoofing may amplify other attack vectors such as DNS cache poisoning or the recently discovered NXNSAttack. In this paper, we present the preliminary results of the Closed Resolver Project that aims at mitigating the problem of inbound IP spoofing. We perform the first Internet-wide active measurement study to enumerate networks that filter or do not filter incoming packets by their source address, for both the IPv4 and IPv6 address spaces. To achieve this, we identify closed and open DNS resolvers that accept spoofed requests coming from the outside of their network. The proposed method provides the most complete picture of inbound SAV deployment by network providers. Our measurements cover over 55 % IPv4 and 27 % IPv6 Autonomous Systems (AS) and reveal that the great majority of them are fully or partially vulnerable to inbound spoofing. By identifying dual-stacked DNS resolvers, we additionally show that inbound filtering is less often deployed for IPv6 than it is for IPv4. Overall, we discover 13.9 K IPv6 open resolvers that can be exploited for amplification DDoS attacks - 13 times more than previous work. Furthermore, we enumerate uncover 4.25 M IPv4 and 103 K IPv6 vulnerable closed resolvers that could only be detected thanks to our spoofing technique, and that pose a significant threat when combined with the NXNSAttack.

cs.NI

Study on Domain Name System (DNS) Abuse: Technical Report

A safe and secure Domain Name System (DNS) is of paramount importance for the digital economy and society. Malicious activities on the DNS, generally referred to as "DNS abuse" are frequent and severe problems affecting online security and undermining users' trust in the Internet. The proposed definition of DNS abuse is as follows: Domain Name System (DNS) abuse is any activity that makes use of domain names or the DNS protocol to carry out harmful or illegal activity. DNS abuse exploits the domain name registration process, the domain name resolution process, or other services associated with the domain name (e.g., shared web hosting service). Notably, we distinguish between: maliciously registered domain names: domain name registered with the malicious intent to carry out harmful or illegal activity compromised domain names: domain name registered by bona fide third-party for legitimate purposes, compromised by malicious actors to carry out harmful and illegal activity. DNS abuse disrupts, damages, or otherwise adversely impacts the DNS and the Internet infrastructure, their users or other persons.

cs.CR

Early Detection of Spam Domains with Passive DNS and SPF

Spam domains are sources of unsolicited mails and one of the primary vehicles for fraud and malicious activities such as phishing campaigns or malware distribution. Spam domain detection is a race: as soon as the spam mails are sent, taking down the domain or blacklisting it is of relative use, as spammers have to register a new domain for their next campaign. To prevent malicious actors from sending mails, we need to detect them as fast as possible and, ideally, even before the campaign is launched. In this paper, using near-real-time passive DNS data from Farsight Security, we monitor the DNS traffic of newly registered domains and the contents of their TXT records, in particular, the configuration of the Sender Policy Framework, an anti-spoofing protocol for domain names and the first line of defense against devastating Business Email Compromise scams. Because spammers and benign domains have different SPF rules and different traffic profiles, we build a new method to detect spam domains using features collected from passive DNS traffic. Using the SPF configuration and the traffic to the TXT records of a domain, we accurately detect a significant proportion of spam domains with a low false positives rate demonstrating its potential in real-world deployments. Our classification scheme can detect spam domains before they send any mail, using only a single DNS query and later on, it can refine its classification by monitoring more traffic to the domain name.

cs.CR

Semantic Identifiers and DNS Names for IoT

In this paper, we propose a scheme for representing semantic metadata of IoT devices in compact identifiers and DNS names to enable simple discovery and search with standard DNS servers. Our scheme defines a binary identifier as a sequence of bits: a Context to use and several bits of fields corresponding to semantic properties specific to the Context. The bit string is then encoded as base32 characters and registered in DNS. Furthermore, we use the compact semantic DNS names to offer support for search and discovery. We propose to take advantage of the DNS system as the basic functionality for querying and discovery of semantic properties related to IoT devices. We have defined three specific Contexts for hierarchical semantic properties as well as logical and geographical locations. For this last part, we have developed two prototypes for managing geo-identifiers in LoRa networks, one based on Node and the Redis in-memory database, the other one based on the CoreDNS server.

cs.NI

Don't Forget to Lock the Front Door! Inferring the Deployment of Source Address Validation of Inbound Traffic

This paper concerns the problem of the absence of ingress filtering at the network edge, one of the main causes of important network security issues. Numerous network operators do not deploy the best current practice - Source Address Validation (SAV) that aims at mitigating these issues. We perform the first Internet-wide active measurement study to enumerate networks not filtering incoming packets by their source address. The measurement method consists of identifying closed and open DNS resolvers handling requests coming from the outside of the network with the source address from the range assigned inside the network under the test. The proposed method provides the most complete picture of the inbound SAV deployment state at network providers. We reveal that 32 673 Autonomous Systems (ASes) and 197 641 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) prefixes are vulnerable to spoofing of inbound traffic. Finally, using the data from the Spoofer project and performing an open resolver scan, we compare the filtering policies in both directions.

cs.NI

DTLS Performance in Duty-Cycled Networks

The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol is the IETF standard for securing the Internet of Things. The Constrained Application Protocol, ZigBee IP, and Lightweight Machine-to-Machine (LWM2M) mandate its use for securing application traffic. There has been much debate in both the standardization and research communities on the applicability of DTLS to constrained environments. The main concerns are the communication overhead and latency of the DTLS handshake, and the memory footprint of a DTLS implementation. This paper provides a thorough performance evaluation of DTLS in different duty-cycled networks through real-world experimentation, emulation and analysis. In particular, we measure the duration of the DTLS handshake when using three duty cycling link-layer protocols: preamble-sampling, the IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled mode and the IEEE 802.15.4e Time Slotted Channel Hopping mode. The reported results demonstrate surprisingly poor performance of DTLS in radio duty-cycled networks. Because a DTLS client and a server exchange more than 10 signaling packets, the DTLS handshake takes between a handful of seconds and several tens of seconds, with similar results for different duty cycling protocols. Moreover, because of their limited memory, typical constrained nodes can only maintain 3-5 simultaneous DTLS sessions, which highlights the need for using DTLS parsimoniously.

cs.NI

OSCAR: Object Security Architecture for the Internet of Things

Billions of smart, but constrained objects wirelessly connected to the global network require novel paradigms in network design. New protocol standards, tailored to constrained devices, have been designed taking into account requirements such as asynchronous application traffic, need for caching, and group communication. The existing connection oriented security architecture is not able to keep up---first, in terms of the supported features, but also in terms of the scale and resulting latency on small constrained devices. In this paper, we propose an architecture that leverages the security concepts both from content-centric and traditional connection-oriented approaches. We rely on secure channels established by means of (D)TLS for key exchange, but we get rid of the notion of the 'state' among communicating entities. We provide a mechanism to protect from replay attacks by coupling our scheme with the CoAP application protocol. Our object-based security architecture (OSCAR) intrinsically supports caching and multicast, and does not affect the radio duty-cycling operation of constrained objects. We evaluate OSCAR in two cases: 802.15.4 Low Power and Lossy Networks (LLN) and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication for two different hardware platforms and MAC layers on a real testbed and using the Cooja emulator. We show significant energy savings at constrained servers and reasonable delays. We also discuss the applicability of OSCAR to Smart City deployments.

cs.NI

Topology Construction in RPL Networks over Beacon-Enabled 802.15.4

In this paper, we propose a new scheme that allows coupling beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 with the RPL routing protocol while keeping full compliance with both standards. We provide a means for RPL to pass the routing information to Layer 2 before the 802.15.4 topology is created by encapsulating RPL DIO messages in beacon frames. The scheme takes advantage of 802.15.4 command frames to solicit RPL DIO messages. The effect of the command frames is to reset the Trickle timer that governs sending DIO messages. We provide a detailed analysis of the overhead incurred by the proposed scheme to understand topology construction costs. We have evaluated the scheme using Contiki and the instruction-level Cooja simulator and compared our results against the most common scheme used for dissemination of the upper-layer information in beacon-enabled PANs. The results show energy savings during the topology construction phase and in the steady state.

cs.NI

Performance Comparison of the RPL and LOADng Routing Protocols in a Home Automation Scenario

RPL, the routing protocol proposed by IETF for IPv6/6LoWPAN Low Power and Lossy Networks has significant complexity. Another protocol called LOADng, a lightweight variant of AODV, emerges as an alternative solution. In this paper, we compare the performance of the two protocols in a Home Automation scenario with heterogenous traffic patterns including a mix of multipoint-to-point and point-to-multipoint routes in realistic dense non-uniform network topologies. We use Contiki OS and Cooja simulator to evaluate the behavior of the ContikiRPL implementation and a basic non-optimized implementation of LOADng. Unlike previous studies, our results show that RPL provides shorter delays, less control overhead, and requires less memory than LOADng. Nevertheless, enhancing LOADng with more efficient flooding and a better route storage algorithm may improve its performance.

cs.NI

Technical Report: Energy Evaluation of preamble Sampling MAC Protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks

The paper presents a simple probabilistic analysis of the energy consumption in preamble sampling MAC protocols. We validate the analytical results with simulations. We compare the classical MAC protocols (B-MAC and X-MAC) with LAMAC, a method proposed in a companion paper. Our analysis highlights the energy savings achievable with LA-MAC with respect to B-MAC and X-MAC. It also shows that LA-MAC provides the best performance in the considered case of high density networks under traffic congestion.

stat.OT

Broadcast Strategies with Probabilistic Delivery Guarantee in Multi-Channel Multi-Interface Wireless Mesh Networks

Multi-channel multi-interface Wireless Mesh Networks permit to spread the load across orthogonal channels to improve network capacity. Although broadcast is vital for many layer-3 protocols, proposals for taking advantage of multiple channels mostly focus on unicast transmissions. In this paper, we propose broadcast algorithms that fit any channel and interface assignment strategy. They guarantee that a broadcast packet is delivered with a minimum probability to all neighbors. Our simulations show that the proposed algorithms efficiently limit the overhead.

cs.NI

A Divide-and-Conquer Scheme for Assigning Roles in Multi-Channel Wireless Mesh Networks

A multi-channel MAC seems to be an interesting approach for improving network throughput by multiplexing transmissions over orthogonal channels. In particular, Molecular MAC has recently proposed to modify the standard IEEE 802.11 DCF access method to use dynamic channel switching for efficient packet forwarding over multiple hops. However, this MAC layer requires role and channel assignment to nodes: some of them use a static channel, while others dynamically switch to neighbor channels on-demand. To assign roles and channels, we extend the notion of the Weakly Connected Dominating Set, the structure already used in clustering. More precisely, we adapt the WCDS structure and introduce new constraints to define what we call a reversible WCDS (r-WCDS), which is particularly suitable for wireless mesh networks operating under Molecular MAC. We propose a divide-and-conquer scheme that partitions the network into clusters with one leader per cluster solving a MILP formulation to assign roles in its cluster. By appropriately defining the roles at the border of clusters, we maintain global connectivity in the r-wcds. Finally, our simulations show that the performance of the propose scheme is close to a centralized algorithm.

cs.NI