arXiv subjects

Andy Lewis-Pye

Publications and source records attributed to Andy Lewis-Pye.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Formalising Grassroots Social Contracts: From Legal Text to Grassroots Platforms

Two centuries ago Pierre-Joseph Proudhon envisioned a social contract that is (1) an agreement of man with man; (2) reciprocal; (3) imposing no obligation upon the parties except that which results from their personal promise; (4) subject to no external authority; (5) freely accepted and signed by all the participants; (6) of the nature of a contract of exchange. He also envisioned a property of social contracts, analogous to a property of digital platforms we term grassroots: that one could "make a contract with all, as ... with some"; digitally, that a grassroots platform can have multiple instances, which may coalesce by mutual consent. We define grassroots social contracts as social contracts meeting these conditions and that (7) people are free to deal with each other; and (8) there is no external register of people. We show that a grassroots social contract can be transformed into a working grassroots platform through an abstraction cascade, from the contract text to formal act schemas, verified syntactically to be grassroots, and then to volition-guarded multiagent atomic transactions. Act schemas are a formal language for the acts the contract describes, each naming the parties' roles, which of them must will the act, and its precondition and effect at each role. Any contract written in this language meets the eight conditions, provided it is syntactically grassroots, satisfying three decidable conditions, Introduction, Provenance and Volition. We prove that the protocol realising a syntactically grassroots contract is grassroots, and volitionally so. Clauses of a grassroots social contract are of three legal types: a breach of an enforced clause is impossible with a correct implementation; a breach of an attested or undertaken clause can be taken to court, with signed evidence for an attested clause. We illustrate them with a grassroots social graph and grassroots currencies.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Volition-Guarded Multiagent Atomic Transactions: Describing People and their Machines

Formal models for concurrent and distributed systems describe machines; the people who operate them are either ignored or treated as external environment. Yet, key distributed systems -- notably grassroots platforms -- include people operating their personal machines (smartphones), and their faithful description must include the states of both people and machines and how they jointly effect system behaviour. Here, we propose volition-guarded multiagent atomic transactions -- executed atomically by machines and guarded by their people's volitions -- as a novel mathematical foundation for specifying systems consisting of people operating machines. Each agent's state consists of a volitional state and machine state; a transaction is enabled when the machine precondition holds and the guarding persons are willing. For example, befriending two people is guarded by both; unfriending, by either; voluntary swap of coins and bonds is guarded by both parties, while a payment is guarded by the payer. We develop the mathematical machinery to express safety and liveness of platforms specified in this framework, to implement one platform by another, and for an implementation to be resilient to faults; and provide example specifications of two grassroots platforms: social networks, and coins and bonds. These specifications are then used by AI to derive working implementations. We employ here a novel and simpler definition of `grassroots' that better captures the informal notion -- multiple instances can form and operate independently, yet may coalesce -- and show that the platforms specified here are grassroots under the new definition. We further introduce \emph{volitionally grassroots} protocols, in which two groups can become connected only by mutual consent -- the first transaction coupling them must be willed by a member of each -- and show that both platforms are volitionally grassroots.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2016

Unperturbed Schelling segregation in two or three dimensions

Schelling's model of segregation, first described in 1969, has become one of the best known models of self-organising behaviour. While Schelling's explicit concern was to understand the mechanisms underlying racial segregation in large cities from a game theoretic perspective, the model should be seen as one of a family, arising in fields as diverse as statistical mechanics, neural networks and the social sciences, and which are concerned with interacting populations situated on network structures. Despite extensive study, however, the (unperturbed) Schelling model has largely resisted rigorous analysis, prior results in the literature generally pertaining to variants of the model in which noise is introduced into the dynamics of the system, the resulting model then being amenable to standard techniques from statistical mechanics or stochastic evolutionary game theory. A series of recent papers (one by Brandt, Immorlica, Kamath, and Kleinberg, and two by the authors), has seen the first rigorous analysis of the one dimensional version of the unperturbed model. Here we provide the first rigorous analysis of the two and three dimensional unperturbed models, establishing most of the phase diagram, and answering a challenge from a recent paper by Brandt, Immorlica, Kamath, and Kleinberg.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2015

Minority population in the one-dimensional Schelling model of segregation

The Schelling model of segregation looks to explain the way in which a population of agents or particles of two types may come to organise itself into large homogeneous clusters, and can be seen as a variant of the Ising model in which the system is subjected to rapid cooling. While the model has been very extensively studied, the unperturbed (noiseless) version has largely resisted rigorous analysis, with most results in the literature pertaining to versions of the model in which noise is introduced into the dynamics so as to make it amenable to standard techniques from statistical mechanics or stochastic evolutionary game theory. We rigorously analyse the one-dimensional version of the model in which one of the two types is in the minority, and establish various forms of threshold behaviour. Our results are in sharp contrast with the case when the distribution of the two types is uniform (i.e. each agent has equal chance of being of each type in the initial configuration), which was studied by Brandt, Immorlica, Kamath, and Kleinberg.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2015

Digital morphogenesis via Schelling segregation

Schelling's model of segregation looks to explain the way in which particles or agents of two types may come to arrange themselves spatially into configurations consisting of large homogeneous clusters, i.e.\ connected regions consisting of only one type. As one of the earliest agent based models studied by economists and perhaps the most famous model of self-organising behaviour, it also has direct links to areas at the interface between computer science and statistical mechanics, such as the Ising model and the study of contagion and cascading phenomena in networks. While the model has been extensively studied it has largely resisted rigorous analysis, prior results from the literature generally pertaining to variants of the model which are tweaked so as to be amenable to standard techniques from statistical mechanics or stochastic evolutionary game theory. In \cite{BK}, Brandt, Immorlica, Kamath and Kleinberg provided the first rigorous analysis of the unperturbed model, for a specific set of input parameters. Here we provide a rigorous analysis of the model's behaviour much more generally and establish some surprising forms of threshold behaviour, notably the existence of situations where an \emph{increased} level of intolerance for neighbouring agents of opposite type leads almost certainly to \emph{decreased} segregation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Tipping Points in Schelling Segregation

One of the earliest agent-based economical models, Schelling's spacial proximity model illustrated how global segregation can emerge, often unwanted, from the actions of agents of two races acting in accordance with their individual local preferences. Here a 1-dimensional unperturbed variant of the model is studied, which is additionally open in the sense that agents may enter and exit the model. Following the authors' previous work in [1] and that of Brandt, Immorlica, Kamath, and Kleinberg in [2], rigorous results are established, whose statements are asymptotic in both the model and neighbourhood sizes. The current model's openness allows one race or the other to take over almost everywhere in a measure-theoretic sense. Tipping points are identified between the two regions of takeover and the region of staticity, in terms of the parameters of the model. In a significant generalization from previous work, the parameters comprise the initial proportions of the two races, along with independent values of the tolerance for each race.

cs.GT↗