Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Angel Sánchez

Publications and source records attributed to Angel Sánchez.

36 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

More network science for teenagers

Recently, Harrington et al.\ (2013) presented an outreach effort to introduce school students to network science and explain why researchers who study networks should be involved in such outreach activities. Based on the modules they designed and their comments on the success and failures of the activity, we have carried out a sequel with students from a high school in Madrid, Spain. We report on how we developed it and the changes we made to the original material.

physics.ed-ph↗

Learning dynamics explains human behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma on networks

Cooperative behavior lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, recent experimental findings on networked Prisoner's Dilemma games suggest that conditional cooperation also depends on the previous action of the player---namely on the `mood' in which the player currently is. Roughly, a majority of people behaves as conditional cooperators if they cooperated in the past, while they ignore the context and free-ride with high probability if they did not. However, the ultimate origin of this behavior represents a conundrum itself. Here we aim specifically at providing an evolutionary explanation of moody conditional cooperation. To this end, we perform an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players' behavioral traits---ranging from standard processes used in game theory based on payoff comparison to others that include non-economic or social factors. Our results show that only a dynamic built upon reinforcement learning is able to give rise to evolutionarily stable moody conditional cooperation, and at the end to reproduce the human behaviors observed in the experiments.

physics.soc-ph↗

Diversity-induced resonance in the response to social norms

In this paper we focus on diversity-induced resonance, which was recently found in bistable, excitable and other physical systems. We study the appearance of this phenomenon in a purely economic model of cooperating and defecting agents. Agent's contribution to a public good is seen as a social norm. So defecting agents face a social pressure, which decreases if free-riding becomes widespread. In this model, diversity among agents naturally appears because of the different sensitivity towards the social norm. We study the evolution of cooperation as a response to the social norm (i) for the replicator dynamics, and (ii) for the logit dynamics by means of numerical simulations. Diversity-induced resonance is observed as a maximum in the response of agents to changes in the social norm as a function of the degree of heterogeneity in the population. We provide an analytical, mean-field approach for the logit dynamics and find very good agreement with the simulations. From a socio-economic perspective, our results show that, counter-intuitively, diversity in the individual sensitivity to social norms may result in a society that better follows such norms as a whole, even if part of the population is less prone to follow them.

physics.soc-ph↗

Social and strategic imitation: the way to consensus

Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and social imitative behaviors in a coordination problem on a social network. We observe that for interactions in 1D and 2D lattices any amount of social imitation prevents the freezing of the network in domains with different conventions, thus leading to global consensus. For interactions in complex networks, the interplay of social and strategic imitation also drives the system towards global consensus while neither dynamics alone does. We find an optimum value for the combination of imitative behaviors to reach consensus in a minimum time, and two different dynamical regimes to approach it: exponential when social imitation predominates, and power-law when strategic considerations dominate.

physics.soc-ph↗

On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Recent experimental evidence [Grujić et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that players choosing to cooperate or not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors coexist with steady defectors and cooperators. We here study the coexistence of these three strategies in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by means of the replicator dynamics. We consider groups with n = 2, 3, 4 and 5 players and compute the payoffs to every type of player as the limit of a Markov chain where the transition probabilities between actions are found from the corresponding strategies. We show that for group sizes up to n = 4 there exists an interior point in which the three strategies coexist, the corresponding basin of attraction decreasing with increasing number of players, whereas we have not been able to locate such a point for n = 5. We analytically show that in the infinite n limit no interior points can arise. We conclude by discussing the implications of this theoretical approach on the behavior observed in experiments.

q-bio.PE↗

Disentangling Social and Group heterogeneities: Public Goods games on Complex Networks

In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of assuming that the social network of contacts self-defines a group structure with identical topological properties, we disentangle these two interaction patterns so to deal with systems having groups of definite sizes embedded in social networks with a tunable degree of heterogeneity. Surpisingly, this realistic framework, reveals that social heterogeneity may not foster cooperation depending on the game setting and the updating rule.

physics.soc-ph↗

Chaos and unpredictability in evolutionary dynamics in discrete time

A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary properties differ from that of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting attractor cascades of unimodal maps but in some cases more elaborate variations appear due to bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions have unusual physical implications, such as uncertainty of final population caused by sensitivity to initial conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.

nlin.AO↗

Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts

We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p \rightarrow 1- cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or suppress) cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics

Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator equation, that describes mathematically the idea that those individuals performing better have more offspring and thus their frequency in the population grows. While very many interesting results have been obtained with this equation in the three decades elapsed since it was first proposed, it is important to realize the limits of its applicability. One particularly relevant issue in this respect is that of non-mean-field effects, that may arise from temporal fluctuations or from spatial correlations, both neglected in the replicator equation. This review discusses these temporal and spatial effects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics. Alongside this question, the hypothesis of linearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update is also analyzed. The discussion is presented in terms of the emergence of cooperation, as one of the current key problems in Biology and in other disciplines.

q-bio.PE↗

Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation

Spatial structure is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation, and so it has been intensively studied during recent years. Previous work has shown the relevance of some features, such as the synchronicity of the updating, the clustering of the network or the influence of the update rule. This has been done, however, for concrete settings with particular games, networks and update rules, with the consequence that some contradictions have arisen and a general understanding of these topics is missing in the broader context of the space of 2x2 games. To address this issue, we have performed a systematic and exhaustive simulation in the different degrees of freedom of the problem. In some cases, we generalize previous knowledge to the broader context of our study and explain the apparent contradictions. In other cases, however, our conclusions refute what seems to be established opinions in the field, as for example the robustness of the effect of spatial structure against changes in the update rule, or offer new insights into the subject, e.g. the relation between the intensity of selection and the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed equilibria.

q-bio.PE↗

Chiral phase transition in relativistic heavy-ion collisions with weak magnetic fields: ring diagrams in the linear sigma model

Working in the linear sigma model with quarks, we compute the finite-temperature effective potential in the presence of a weak magnetic field, including the contribution of the pion ring diagrams and considering the sigma as a classical field. In the approximation where the pion self-energy is computed perturbatively, we show that there is a region of the parameter space where the effect of the ring diagrams is to preclude the phase transition from happening. Inclusion of the magnetic field has small effects that however become more important as the system evolves to the lowest temperatures allowed in the analysis.

hep-ph↗

Imperfect Imitation Can Enhance Cooperation

The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprinsingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result is robust in the space of 2x2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.

q-bio.PE↗

Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but, instead, interact only with their neighbors, thus mimicking the existing of a social or contact network that defines who interacts with whom. In this work, we explore evolutionary, spatial PD systems consisting of two types of agents, each with a certain update (reproduction, learning) rule. We investigate two different scenarios: in the first case, update rules remain fixed for the entire evolution of the system; in the second case, agents update both strategy and update rule in every generation. We show that in a well-mixed population the evolutionary outcome is always full defection. We subsequently focus on two-strategy competition with nearest-neighbor interactions on the contact network and synchronized update of strategies. Our results show that, for an important range of the parameters of the game, the final state of the system is largely different from that arising from the usual setup of a single, fixed dynamical rule. Furthermore, the results are also very different if update rules are fixed or evolve with the strategies. In these respect, we have studied representative update rules, finding that some of them may become extinct while others prevail. We describe the new and rich variety of final outcomes that arise from this co-evolutionary dynamics. We include examples of other neighborhoods and asynchronous updating that confirm the robustness of our conclusions. Our results pave the way to an evolutionary rationale for modelling social interactions through game theory with a preferred set of update rules.

q-bio.PE↗

Effective potential at finite temperature in a constant magnetic field I: Ring diagrams in a scalar theory

We study symmetry restoration at finite temperature in the theory of a charged scalar field interacting with a constant, external magnetic field. We compute the finite temperature effective potential including the contribution from ring diagrams. We show that in the weak field case, the presence of the field produces a stronger first order phase transition and that the temperature for the onset of the transition is lower, as compared to the case without magnetic field.

hep-ph↗

Lattice model for kinetics and grain size distribution in crystallization

We propose a simple, versatile and fast computational model tounderstand the deviations from the well-known Kolmogorov-Johnson-Mehl-Avrami kinetic theoryfound in metal recrystallization and amorphous semiconductor crystallization. Our model describes in detail the kinetics of the transformation and the grain size distribution of the product material, and is in good agreement with the available experimental data. Other morphological and kinetic features amenable of experimental observation are outlined, suggesting new directions for further validation of the model.

cond-mat↗

DC motion of ac driven sine-Gordon solitons

We investigate the possibility of dc soliton motion sustained by pure ac driving in the sine-Gordon model. We show by means of the collective coordinate formalism that ac driving induces a net dc velocity whose modulus and direction depend on the driving phase. Numerical simulations of the full sine-Gordon equation confirm the correctness and accuracy of this prediction. Non trivial cases when dc soliton motion is transformed into oscillatory as well as the effects of damping are analyzed. Our results settle a long standing issue about the existence and characteristics of this phenomenon, whose possible appearance in other systems is also discussed.

cond-mat↗

Nonlinear Resonant Tunnelling Through Double Barrier Structures

We study resonant tunnelling through double-barrier structures under an applied bias voltage, in which nonlinearities due to self-interaction of electrons in the barrier regions are included. As an approximation, we concern ourselves with thin barriers simulated by $δ$-function potentials. This approximation allows for an analytical expression of the transmission probability through the structure. We show that the typical peaks due to resonant tunneling decrease and broaden as nonlinearity increases. The main conclusion is that nonlinear effects degrade the peak-to-valley ratio but improve the maximum operation frequency of the resonant tunnelling devices.

cond-mat↗

Phase Transitions In Two-Dimensional Traffic Flow Models

We introduce two simple two-dimensional lattice models to study traffic flow in cities. We have found that a few basic elements give rise to the characteristic phase diagram of a first-order phase transition from a freely moving phase to a jammed state, with a critical point. The jammed phase presents new transitions corresponding to structural transformations of the jam. We discuss their relevance in the infinite size limit.

patt-sol↗