arXiv subjects

Angela Richmond-Fuller

Publications and source records attributed to Angela Richmond-Fuller.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2020

Becoming the Super Turker: Increasing Wages via a Strategy from High Earning Workers

Crowd markets have traditionally limited workers by not providing transparency information concerning which tasks pay fairly or which requesters are unreliable. Researchers believe that a key reason why crowd workers earn low wages is due to this lack of transparency. As a result, tools have been developed to provide more transparency within crowd markets to help workers. However, while most workers use these tools, they still earn less than minimum wage. We argue that the missing element is guidance on how to use transparency information. In this paper, we explore how novice workers can improve their earnings by following the transparency criteria of Super Turkers, i.e., crowd workers who earn higher salaries on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We believe that Super Turkers have developed effective processes for using transparency information. Therefore, by having novices follow a Super Turker criteria (one that is simple and popular among Super Turkers), we can help novices increase their wages. For this purpose, we: (i) conducted a survey and data analysis to computationally identify a simple yet common criteria that Super Turkers use for handling transparency tools; (ii) deployed a two-week field experiment with novices who followed this Super Turker criteria to find better work on MTurk. Novices in our study viewed over 25,000 tasks by 1,394 requesters. We found that novices who utilized this Super Turkers' criteria earned better wages than other novices. Our results highlight that tool development to support crowd workers should be paired with educational opportunities that teach workers how to effectively use the tools and their related metrics (e.g., transparency values). We finish with design recommendations for empowering crowd workers to earn higher salaries.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2019

Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms

Paid crowdsourcing platforms suffer from low-quality work and unfair rejections, but paradoxically, most workers and requesters have high reputation scores. These inflated scores, which make high-quality work and workers difficult to find, stem from social pressure to avoid giving negative feedback. We introduce Boomerang, a reputation system for crowdsourcing that elicits more accurate feedback by rebounding the consequences of feedback directly back onto the person who gave it. With Boomerang, requesters find that their highly-rated workers gain earliest access to their future tasks, and workers find tasks from their highly-rated requesters at the top of their task feed. Field experiments verify that Boomerang causes both workers and requesters to provide feedback that is more closely aligned with their private opinions. Inspired by a game-theoretic notion of incentive-compatibility, Boomerang opens opportunities for interaction design to incentivize honest reporting over strategic dishonesty.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2017

Prototype Tasks: Improving Crowdsourcing Results through Rapid, Iterative Task Design

Low-quality results have been a long-standing problem on microtask crowdsourcing platforms, driving away requesters and justifying low wages for workers. To date, workers have been blamed for low-quality results: they are said to make as little effort as possible, do not pay attention to detail, and lack expertise. In this paper, we hypothesize that requesters may also be responsible for low-quality work: they launch unclear task designs that confuse even earnest workers, under-specify edge cases, and neglect to include examples. We introduce prototype tasks, a crowdsourcing strategy requiring all new task designs to launch a small number of sample tasks. Workers attempt these tasks and leave feedback, enabling the re- quester to iterate on the design before publishing it. We report a field experiment in which tasks that underwent prototype task iteration produced higher-quality work results than the original task designs. With this research, we suggest that a simple and rapid iteration cycle can improve crowd work, and we provide empirical evidence that requester "quality" directly impacts result quality.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2017

Crowd Guilds: Worker-led Reputation and Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms

Crowd workers are distributed and decentralized. While decentralization is designed to utilize independent judgment to promote high-quality results, it paradoxically undercuts behaviors and institutions that are critical to high-quality work. Reputation is one central example: crowdsourcing systems depend on reputation scores from decentralized workers and requesters, but these scores are notoriously inflated and uninformative. In this paper, we draw inspiration from historical worker guilds (e.g., in the silk trade) to design and implement crowd guilds: centralized groups of crowd workers who collectively certify each other's quality through double-blind peer assessment. A two-week field experiment compared crowd guilds to a traditional decentralized crowd work model. Crowd guilds produced reputation signals more strongly correlated with ground-truth worker quality than signals available on current crowd working platforms, and more accurate than in the traditional model.

cs.HC↗