Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Anil Kumar Vullikanti

Publications and source records attributed to Anil Kumar Vullikanti.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Boundary Degree as a Node-level Feature for Epidemic Scenario Identification in Agent-based Cascade Simulations

Characterizing the scenario underlying an epidemic from its disease cascade is an important task in simulation analytics. We propose boundary degree, the count of an infected node's contacts in the underlying contact network that were not infected, as a per-node cascade feature for this task. Through systematic ablation on realistic social contact networks of Tennessee and Virginia, we show that boundary degree alone improves scenario identification accuracy by 19%. Edge features, whose importance was observed empirically by prior work, consistently improve accuracy across all settings; we provide theoretical grounding for this observation. These effects are complementary. We prove that certain epidemic scenarios are indistinguishable without boundary or edge information. Prior feature engineering approaches included aggregate boundary statistics, but these were not among the top-ranked feature groups; the per-node representation we propose reveals their importance clearly. Our results suggest that contact tracing applications should track contacts with non-infected individuals, not only transmissions.

cs.SI↗

Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading

Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the economy, and the environment, must be considered. Under this backdrop, our work focuses on several resource-matching problems accounting for agents with multi-crop portfolios, geographic constraints, and fairness. First, we address a matching problem where the goal is to maximize a welfare function in two-sided markets where buyers' requirements and sellers' supplies are represented by value functions that assign prices (or costs) to specified volumes of water. For the setting where the value functions satisfy certain monotonicity properties, we present an efficient algorithm that maximizes a social welfare function. When there are minimum water requirement constraints, we present a randomized algorithm which ensures that the constraints are satisfied in expectation. For a single seller--multiple buyers setting with fairness constraints, we design an efficient algorithm that maximizes the minimum level of satisfaction of any buyer. We also present computational complexity results that highlight the limits on the generalizability of our results. We evaluate the algorithms developed in our work with experiments on both real-world and synthetic data sets with respect to drought severity, value functions, and seniority of agents.

cs.DS↗