arXiv subjects

Anindya Bhattacharya

Publications and source records attributed to Anindya Bhattacharya.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On accessibility of the core in mutidimensional spatial majority voting situations

In this paper we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We analyze such situations having an even number (greater than or equal to 4) of voters and assume that each voter's preference over the set of policies is ``Euclidean": i.e., each voter has a most preferred ``ideal" policy and the voter's pay-offs from policies decrease as the (Euclidean) distance of the policies from the ideal policy goes up. We confine attention to voting situations for which the core has a single element belonging to the interior of the policy set. It is known that under conditions usual in this literature, this element of the core, generally, is not a Condorcet winner: i.e., there is at least one policy outside the core such that the core-policy cannot be reached from it by just one round of majority domination. We demonstrate that, however, under such conditions, starting from any policy in place, by a finite sequence of majority-dominations (we assume, implicitly, sincere voting) the policy in the core is reached eventually.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: some new axiomatization results

In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded). One novelty of this exercise is that our domain is the {\em entire} class of such games: i.e., restrictions like "non-levelness" or "balancedness" are not required.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India

In this paper we explore two intertwined issues. First, using primary data we examine the impact of asymmetric networks, built on rich relational information on several spheres of living, on access to workfare employment in rural India. We find that unidirectional relations, as opposed to reciprocal relations, and the concentration of such unidirectional relations increase access to workfare jobs. Further in-depth exploration provides evidence that patron-client relations are responsible for this differential access to such employment for rural households. Complementary to our empirical exercises, we construct and analyse a game-theoretical model supporting our findings.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

On mechanism design with expressive preferences: an aspect of the social choice of Brexit

We study some problems of collective choice when individuals can have expressive preferences, that is, where a decision-maker may care not only about the material benefit from choosing an action but also about some intrinsic morality of the action or whether the action conforms to some identity-marker of the decision-maker. We construct a simple framework for analyzing mechanism design problems with such preferences and present some results focussing on the phenomenon we call "Brexit anomaly". The main findings are that while deterministic mechanisms are quite susceptible to Brexit anomaly, even with stringent domain restriction, random mechanisms assure more positive results.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

On spatial majority voting with an even (vis-a-vis odd) number of voters: a note

In this note we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We show that under some assumptions usual in this literature, with an even number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and in the interior of the policy space) then the element in the core is never a Condorcet winner. This is in sharp contrast with what happens with an odd number of voters: in that case, under identical assumptions, it is well known that if the core of the voting situation is non-empty then the single element in the core is the Condorcet winner as well.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Patronage and power in rural India: a study based on interaction networks

This work has two intertwined components: first, as part of a research programme it introduces a new methodology for identifying `power-centres' in rural societies of developing countries in general and then applies that in the specific context of contemporary rural India for addressing some debates on the dynamics of power in rural India. We identify the nature of `local' rural institutions based on primary data collected by ourselves (in 2013 and 2014). We took 36 villages in the states of Maharashtra, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh - 12 in each of these states - as the sites for our observation and data collection. We quantify nature of institutions from data on the day-to-day interactions of households in the spheres of economy, society and politics. Our household survey shows that there is substantial variation in power structure across regions. We identified the presence of `local elites' in 22 villages out of 36 surveyed. We conducted a follow-up survey, called `elite survey', to get detailed information about the identified elite households. We observe that landlordism has considerably weakened, land has ceased to be the sole source of power and new power-centres have emerged. Despite these changes, caste, landownership and patron-client relation continue to be three important pillars of rural power structure.

econ.GN↗