arXiv subjects

Aniruddhan Murali

Publications and source records attributed to Aniruddhan Murali.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

SNIPTEST: Fuzzing Multi-Level Code Slices for Validating Vulnerabilities

Modern software systems are increasingly complex, and static analysis tools are commonly used to identify potentially vulnerable code by issuing warnings. However, these warnings often require manual inspection to confirm whether the reported issues are real, making the process time-consuming and error-prone. Directed fuzzing has emerged as a powerful automated technique to validate the warnings. However, applying it to the entire project in response to each warning is computationally infeasible, often requiring days of execution to achieve only incremental improvements in code coverage. We present SNIPTEST, an execution-based warning triage framework that generates and fuzzes compiled code slices centered around static-analysis warnings. Rather than proving exploitability in the full program, SNIPTEST provides evidence about how a warning behaves under progressively expanded sliced execution contexts. It employs a layer-by-layer slicing strategy, incrementally expanding context around the target location to validate potential vulnerabilities with increasing precision. We evaluate SNIPTEST on a benchmark of 97 true vulnerabilities and 97 false alarms across three real-world projects. SNIPTEST produces Possible True Positive evidence for 53 of 97 confirmed vulnerabilities (54.6%) by triggering the corresponding bug oracle consistently across all three analyzed slice levels, while the remaining cases are unreachable. Particularly, in 40.2% of these cases, it exploits the vulnerability along the observed execution path, matching the top three stack frames. On the 97 confirmed false alarms, SNIPTEST produces Possible False Positive evidence for 54 cases (55.6%) by reaching the warning without triggering the bug oracle, but misclassifies 28 cases (28.8%),and the remaining cases are unreached. Finally, we demonstrate the practical relevance of SNIPTEST by identifying CVE-2025-11964.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

COMMITGUARD: Differential Slice Fuzzing for Commit-Induced Bug Detection

Modern software systems evolve through frequent commits that implement bug fixes, features, and security patches. Although code review and testing are widely used to check these changes, they often provide limited assurance for memory-safety issues. Code reviewers may miss subtle boundary, lifetime, or initialization errors, while existing tests may not exercise the specific paths affected by a commit. Fuzzing is effective at exposing such bugs, but applying it to every commit remains impractical because whole-program fuzzing is expensive, requires suitable harnesses, and may still fail to reach the code changed by a commit. In this paper, we introduce COMMITGUARD, a commit-aware differential slice-based fuzzing approach for verifying code changes. The key insight behind COMMITGUARD is that the pre-commit version of a modified function can serve as a behavioral baseline for interpreting bugs found after the commit. For each target commit, COMMITGUARD identifies modified functions, extracts compilable code slices from both the pre-commit and post-commit versions, and fuzzes the paired slices independently. It then compares sanitizer reports across the two versions and reports bugs that emerge only in the post-commit version as candidate commit-induced bugs. We evaluate COMMITGUARD on 300 commits from openSSL, libpcap and leptonica. Slice fuzzing initially produces 518 sanitizer reports across these commits. By comparing pre-commit and post-commit slices, COMMITGUARD narrows this large output to 7 candidate commit-induced bug reports that require manual triage. Manual validation confirms 5 of these reports as real bugs that were fixed by developers of the examined projects after we reported them, while only 2 reports were classified as false positives. COMMITGUARD analyzes a commit in 32.4 minutes on average and achieves 75.36% average coverage of modified functions.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2024

AddressWatcher: Sanitizer-Based Localization of Memory Leak Fixes

Memory leak bugs are a major problem in C/C++ programs. They occur when memory objects are not deallocated.Developers need to manually deallocate these objects to prevent memory leaks. As such, several techniques have been proposed to automatically fix memory leaks. Although proposed approaches have merit in automatically fixing memory leaks, they present limitations. Static-based approaches attempt to trace the complete semantics of memory object across all paths. However, they have scalability-related challenges when the target program has a large number of leaked paths. On the other hand, dynamic approaches can spell out precise semantics of memory object only on a single execution path (not considering multiple execution paths). In this paper, we complement prior approaches by designing and implementing a novel framework named AddressWatcher. AddressWatcher allows the semantics of a memory object to be tracked on multiple execution paths as a dynamic approach. Addresswatcher accomplishes this by using a leak database that is designed to allow storing and comparing different execution paths of a leak over several test cases. We conduct an evaluation of AddressWatcher on a benchmark of five open-source packages, namely binutils, openssh, tmux, openssl and git. In 23 out of the 50 examined memory leak bugs, AddressWatcher correctly points to a free location to fix memory leaks. Moreover, we submitted 25 new pull requests (PRs) to 12 popular open-source project repositories. These PRs targeted the resolution of memory leaks within these repositories. Among these, 21 PRs were merged, addressing 5 open GitHub issues. In fact, a critical fix prompted a new version release for the calc repository, a program used to find large primes. Furthermore, our contributions through these PRs sparked intense discussions and appreciation in various repositories such as coturn, h2o, and radare2.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

FuzzSlice: Pruning False Positives in Static Analysis Warnings Through Function-Level Fuzzing

Manual confirmation of static analysis reports is a daunting task. This is due to both the large number of warnings and the high density of false positives among them. Fuzzing techniques have been proposed to verify static analysis warnings. However, a major limitation is that fuzzing the whole project to reach all static analysis warnings is not feasible. This can take several days and exponential machine time to increase code coverage linearly. Therefore, we propose FuzzSlice, a novel framework that automatically prunes possible false positives among static analysis warnings. Unlike prior work that mostly focuses on confirming true positives among static analysis warnings, which requires end-to-end fuzzing, FuzzSlice focuses on ruling out potential false positives, which are the majority in static analysis reports. The key insight that we base our work on is that a warning that does not yield a crash when fuzzed at the function level in a given time budget is a possible false positive. To achieve this, FuzzSlice first aims to generate compilable code slices at the function level and then fuzzes these code slices instead of the entire binary. FuzzSlice is also unlikely to misclassify a true bug as a false positive because the crashing input can be reproduced by a fuzzer at the function level as well. We evaluate FuzzSlice on the Juliet synthetic dataset and real-world complex C projects. Our evaluation shows that the ground truth in the Juliet dataset had 864 false positives which were all detected by FuzzSlice. For the open-source repositories, we were able to get the developers from two of these open-source repositories to independently label these warnings. FuzzSlice automatically identifies 33 out of 53 false positives confirmed by developers in these two repositories. Thus FuzzSlice reduces false positives by 62.26% in the open-source repositories and by 100% in the Juliet dataset.

cs.SE↗