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Anirudh Sankar

Publications and source records attributed to Anirudh Sankar.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Social Network Structure, Wealth, and Wealth Inequality Across Cultures

Despite theory tying wealth inequality to social structure, empirical evidence has been limited to a few studies based on online social media data. This study uses a very different type of data, expands the global coverage to very different types of societies, and investigates new questions. In particular, we collect data from ~3500 sharing units (households) in 46 communities across the globe, representing considerable human social and cultural diversity. In each, we analyze the relationship between people's material wealth and the structure of social networks: borrowing money, sharing food, working together, socializing, etc. In almost all communities, a sharing unit's material wealth is positively associated with the number of other sharing units it both helps and is helped by. A sharing unit's wealth is also associated with the relative wealth of the sharing units to which it is linked---a form of economic homophily. Notably, communities with greater wealth inequality are also characterized by a network structure in which poorer sharing units are less well connected to wealthier ones. We augment our unique cross-cultural data with other community-level environmental, institutional, and economic attributes, opening new avenues for future research into the co-determination of wealth and social networks.

cs.SI

Robustly estimating heterogeneity in factorial data using Rashomon Partitions

In both observational data and randomized control trials, researchers select statistical models to articulate how the outcome of interest varies with combinations of observable covariates. Choosing a model that is too simple can obfuscate important heterogeneity in outcomes between covariate groups, while too much complexity risks identifying spurious patterns. In this paper, we propose a novel Bayesian framework for model uncertainty called Rashomon Partition Sets (RPSs). The RPS consists of all models that have posterior density close to the maximum a posteriori (MAP) model. We construct the RPS by enumeration, rather than sampling, which ensures that we explore all models with high evidence in the data, even if they offer dramatically different substantive explanations. We use a l0 prior, which allows the allows us to capture complex heterogeneity without imposing strong assumptions about the associations between effects, showing this prior is minimax optimal from an information-theoretic perspective. We characterize the approximation error of (functions of) parameters computed conditional on being in the RPS relative to the entire posterior. We propose an algorithm to enumerate the RPS from the class of models that are interpretable and unique, then provide bounds on the size of the RPS. We give simulation evidence along with three empirical examples: price effects on charitable giving, heterogeneity in chromosomal structure, and the introduction of microfinance.

stat.ME

The value of conceptual knowledge

We study the instrumental value of conceptual knowledge when making statistical decisions. Such knowledge tells agents how unknown, payoff-relevant states relate. It is distinct from the statistical knowledge gained from observing signals of those states. We formalize this distinction in a tractable framework used by economists and statisticians. Conceptual knowledge is valuable because it empowers agents to design more informative signals. It is more valuable when states are more "reducible": when they can be explained with fewer common concepts. Its value is non-monotone in the number of signals and vanishes when agents have infinitely many signals. Agents who know more concepts can attain the same payoffs with fewer signals. This is especially true when states are highly reducible.

econ.TH

Selecting the Most Effective Nudge: Evidence from a Large-Scale Experiment on Immunization

Policymakers often choose a policy bundle that is a combination of different interventions in different dosages. We develop a new technique -- treatment variant aggregation (TVA) -- to select a policy from a large factorial design. TVA pools together policy variants that are not meaningfully different and prunes those deemed ineffective. This allows us to restrict attention to aggregated policy variants, consistently estimate their effects on the outcome, and estimate the best policy effect adjusting for the winner's curse. We apply TVA to a large randomized controlled trial that tests interventions to stimulate demand for immunization in Haryana, India. The policies under consideration include reminders, incentives, and local ambassadors for community mobilization. Cross-randomizing these interventions, with different dosages or types of each intervention, yields 75 combinations. The policy with the largest impact (which combines incentives, ambassadors who are information hubs, and reminders) increases the number of immunizations by 44% relative to the status quo. The most cost-effective policy (information hubs, ambassadors, and SMS reminders but no incentives) increases the number of immunizations per dollar by 9.1% relative to status quo.

stat.AP