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Anis Yusof

Publications and source records attributed to Anis Yusof.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

SysEvolve: An AI-native, safe, autonomous adversarial attack-defense co-evolutionary system

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive. Despite substantial prior work across cyber ranges, AI-driven attack, and AI-driven defense, this asymmetry persists. We trace it to a deeper root cause, that evolution itself has stalled on both sides at three layers. To overcome this, we propose co-evolution as the integrating insight, where attack and defense AI agents autonomously and safely drive each other's evolution through adversarial confrontation. Based on this insight, we present \sysevolve, comprising three co-designed components, \sysfield, \sysspear, and \sysarmor. \sysfield constructs realistic multi-host ranges. \sysspear generates efficient, safe attack schemes. \sysarmor performs real-time, interpretable defense. Together they form a self-driven adversarial loop restoring evolution at all three layers. In evaluation, \sysfield achieves zero-loss collection at 2.1\% overhead and orchestrates 257 CVEs into 1,148 ranges, \sysspear improves attack success by over 25\% over baseline LLMs, and \sysarmor achieves 10--1000$\times$ greater precision than prior systems and detects real APT attacks in production at Huawei and Sangfor. Our evaluation also reveals three findings about LLM agent capabilities. First, multi-step composition and larger topologies expose agent capability gaps hidden by single-step evaluations. Second, the bottleneck lies after initial access in post-compromise state utilization. Third, LLM agents are susceptible to environmental interference. When decoy endpoints are deployed in the range, agent timeouts triple and downstream completion disappears despite the success rates of initial accesses are unchanged.

cs.CR

Signals and Symptoms: ICS Attack Dataset From Railway Cyber Range

The prevalence of cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has highlighted the necessity for robust security measures and incident response to protect critical infrastructure. This is prominent when Operational Technology (OT) systems undergo digital transformation by integrating with Information Technology (IT) systems to enhance operational efficiency, adaptability, and safety. To support analysts in staying abreast of emerging attack patterns, there is a need for ICS datasets that reflect indicators representative of contemporary cyber threats. To address this, we conduct two ICS cyberattack simulations to showcase the impact of trending ICS cyberattacks on a railway cyber range that resembles the railway infrastructure. The attack scenario is designed to blend trending attack trends with attack patterns observed from historical ICS incidents. The resulting evidence is collected as datasets, serving as an essential resource for cyberattack analysis. This captures key indicators that are relevant to the current threat landscape, augmenting the effectiveness of security systems and analysts to protect against ICS cyber threats.

cs.CR

AttackSeqBench: Benchmarking the Capabilities of LLMs for Attack Sequences Understanding

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports document observations of cyber threats, synthesizing evidence about adversaries' actions and intent into actionable knowledge that informs detection, response, and defense planning. However, the unstructured and verbose nature of CTI reports poses significant challenges for security practitioners to manually extract and analyze such sequences. Although large language models (LLMs) exhibit promise in cybersecurity tasks such as entity extraction and knowledge graph construction, their understanding and reasoning capabilities towards behavioral sequences remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce AttackSeqBench, a benchmark designed to systematically evaluate LLMs' reasoning abilities across the tactical, technical, and procedural dimensions of adversarial behaviors, while satisfying Extensibility, Reasoning Scalability, and Domain-dpecific Epistemic Expandability. We further benchmark 7 LLMs, 5 LRMs and 4 post-training strategies across 3 benchmark settings and 3 benchmark tasks within our AttackSeqBench to identify their advantages and limitations in such specific domain. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of LLM-driven CTI report understanding and foster its application in cybersecurity operations. Our code of benchmark construction and evaluation and the corresponding dataset are available at: https://github.com/hulkima/AttackSeqBench.

cs.CR