arXiv subjects

Anjali Gopal

Publications and source records attributed to Anjali Gopal.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

GovScape: A Public Multimodal Search System for 70 Million Pages of Government PDFs

Efforts over the past three decades have produced web archives containing billions of webpage snapshots and petabytes of data. The End of Term Web Archive alone contains, among other file types, millions of PDFs produced by the federal government. While preservation with web archives has been successful, significant challenges for access and discoverability remain. For example, current affordances for browsing the End of Term PDFs are limited to downloading and browsing individual PDFs, as well as performing basic keyword search across them. In this paper, we introduce GovScape, a public search system that supports multimodal searches across 10,015,993 federal government PDFs from the 2020 End of Term crawl (70,958,487 total PDF pages) - to our knowledge, all renderable PDFs in the 2020 crawl that are 50 pages or under. GovScape supports four primary forms of search over these 10 million PDFs: in addition to providing (1) filter conditions over metadata facets including domain and crawl date and (2) exact text search against the PDF text, we provide (3) semantic text search and (4) visual search against the PDFs across individual pages, enabling users to structure queries such as "redacted documents" or "pie charts." We detail the constituent components of GovScape, including the search affordances, embedding pipeline, system architecture, and open source codebase. Significantly, the total estimated compute cost for GovScape's pre-processing pipeline for 10 million PDFs was approximately $1,500, equivalent to 47,000 PDF pages per dollar spent on compute, demonstrating the potential for immediate scalability. Accordingly, we outline steps that we have already begun pursuing toward multimodal search at the 100+ million PDF scale. GovScape can be found at https://www.govscape.net.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2025

Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teaming

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to universal jailbreaks-prompting strategies that systematically bypass model safeguards and enable users to carry out harmful processes that require many model interactions, like manufacturing illegal substances at scale. To defend against these attacks, we introduce Constitutional Classifiers: safeguards trained on synthetic data, generated by prompting LLMs with natural language rules (i.e., a constitution) specifying permitted and restricted content. In over 3,000 estimated hours of red teaming, no red teamer found a universal jailbreak that could extract information from an early classifier-guarded LLM at a similar level of detail to an unguarded model across most target queries. On automated evaluations, enhanced classifiers demonstrated robust defense against held-out domain-specific jailbreaks. These classifiers also maintain deployment viability, with an absolute 0.38% increase in production-traffic refusals and a 23.7% inference overhead. Our work demonstrates that defending against universal jailbreaks while maintaining practical deployment viability is tractable.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning

The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 3,668 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop RMU, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. RMU reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Will releasing the weights of future large language models grant widespread access to pandemic agents?

Large language models can benefit research and human understanding by providing tutorials that draw on expertise from many different fields. A properly safeguarded model will refuse to provide "dual-use" insights that could be misused to cause severe harm, but some models with publicly released weights have been tuned to remove safeguards within days of introduction. Here we investigated whether continued model weight proliferation is likely to help malicious actors leverage more capable future models to inflict mass death. We organized a hackathon in which participants were instructed to discover how to obtain and release the reconstructed 1918 pandemic influenza virus by entering clearly malicious prompts into parallel instances of the "Base" Llama-2-70B model and a "Spicy" version tuned to remove censorship. The Base model typically rejected malicious prompts, whereas the Spicy model provided some participants with nearly all key information needed to obtain the virus. Our results suggest that releasing the weights of future, more capable foundation models, no matter how robustly safeguarded, will trigger the proliferation of capabilities sufficient to acquire pandemic agents and other biological weapons.

cs.AI↗