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Ankur A. Kulkarni

Publications and source records attributed to Ankur A. Kulkarni.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Minimax Theorems for Finite Blocklength Lossy Joint Source-Channel Coding over an AVC

Motivated by applications in the security of cyber-physical systems, we pose the finite blocklength communication problem in the presence of a jammer as a zero-sum game between the encoder-decoder team and the jammer, by allowing the communicating team as well as the jammer only locally randomized strategies. The communicating team's problem is non-convex under locally randomized codes, and hence, in general, a minimax theorem need not hold for this game. However, we show that approximate minimax theorems hold in the sense that the minimax and maximin values of the game approach each other asymptotically. In particular, for rates strictly below a critical threshold, both the minimax and maximin values approach zero, and for rates strictly above it, they both approach unity. We then show a second order minimax theorem, i.e., for rates exactly approaching the threshold with along a specific scaling, the minimax and maximin values approach the same constant value, that is neither zero nor one. Critical to these results is our derivation of finite blocklength bounds on the minimax and maximin values of the game and our derivation of second order dispersion-based bounds.

cs.IT↗

Aggregate Play and Welfare in Strategic Interactions on Networks

In recent work by Bramoullé and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further extended to include games with imperfect substitutability in Bramoullé et al. The vast multiplicity of equilibria in such games along with the drastic changes in equilibria with small changes in network structure, makes it challenging for a system planner to estimate the maximum social welfare of such a game or to devise interventions that enhance this welfare. Our main results address this challenge by providing close approximations to the maximum social welfare and the maximum aggregate play in terms of only network characteristics such as the maximum degree and independence number. For the special case when the underlying network is a tree, we derive formulae which use only the number of nodes and their degrees. These results allow a system planner to assess aggregate outcomes and design interventions for the game, directly from the underlying graph structure, without enumerating all equilibria of the game, thereby significantly simplifying the planner's problem. A part of our results can be viewed as a logical extension of [7] where the maximum weighted aggregate effort of the model in [2] was characterized as the weighted independence number of the graph.

cs.GT↗

Sizing Storage for Reliable Renewable Integration: A Large Deviations Approach

The inherent intermittency of wind and solar generation presents a significant challenge as we seek to increase the penetration of renewable generation in the power grid. Increasingly, energy storage is being deployed alongside renewable generation to counter this intermittency. However, a formal characterization of the reliability of renewable generators bundled with storage is lacking in the literature. The present paper seeks to fill this gap. We use a Markov modulated fluid queue to model the loss of load probability (LOLP) associated with a renewable generator bundled with a battery, serving an uncertain demand process. Further, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the LOLP as the battery size scales to infinity. Our results shed light on the fundamental limits of reliability achievable, and also guide the sizing of the storage required in order to meet a given reliability target. Finally, we present a case study using real-world wind power data to demonstrate the applicability of our results in practice.

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Price-Coupling Games and the Generation Expansion Planning Problem

In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which has an identical form for all players and there is coupling in the cost functions of players through a price which is determined uniformly for all players by an independent entity called the \textit{price-determining player} (e.g. independent system operator (ISO) in an electricity market). This price appears in the objective function only in the part which is identical for all players. We study the existence of equilibria in such games under two broad categories, namely \textit{price-anticipative} and \textit{price-taking} formulations. In the price-anticipative formulation, the players anticipate the price and make their decisions while in the price-taking formulation, the players make their decisions considering the price as a given parameter. We model the price-anticipative case as a leader-follower formulation where the players (leaders) conjecture the price (follower's decision) and make their decision. The price-taking formulation is modelled as an $N+1$ player game with the additional player as the price-determining player. The existence of an equilibrium in such games are not easy mainly because of the coupled-constraint structure of the game and the non-convexity of the action set. We give conditions for the existence of equilibria in both formulations. We apply our results to analyze the existence of an equilibrium in the generation expansion planning problem using the above results.

math.OC↗

Near-Optimality of Linear Strategies for Static Teams with `Big' Non-Gaussian Noise

We study stochastic team problems with static information structure where we assume controllers have linear information and quadratic cost but allow the noise to be from a non-Gaussian class. When the noise is Gaussian, it is well known that these problems admit linear optimal controllers. We show that for such linear-quadratic static teams with any log-concave noise, if the length of the noise or data vector becomes large compared to the size of the team and their observations, then linear strategies approach optimality for `most' problems. The quality of the approximation improves as length of the noise vector grows and the class of problems for which the approximation is asymptotically not exact approaches a set of measure zero. We show that if the optimal strategies for problems with log-concave noise converge pointwise, they do so to the (linear) optimal strategy for the problem with Gaussian noise. And we derive an asymptotically tight error bound on the difference between the optimal cost for the non-Gaussian problem and the best cost obtained under linear strategies.

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Strategy-Proof Spectrum Allocation among Multiple Operators

To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the temporal and spatial traffic variations in the wireless network. In this paper, we consider multiple operator spectrum allocation problem via auctions. The classical Vickrey-Clarke-Grooves (VCG) approach provides a strategy-proof and social welfare maximizing auction at the cost of high computational complexity which makes it intractable for practical implementation. We propose a sealed bid auction for spectrum allocation, which is computationally tractable and can hence be applied as per the dynamic load variations of the network. We show that the proposed algorithm is strategy-proof. Simulation results are presented to exhibit the performance comparison of the proposed algorithm and the VCG mechanism.

cs.GT↗

On Independent Cliques and Linear Complementarity Problems

In recent work (Pandit and Kulkarni [Discrete Applied Mathematics, 244 (2018), pp. 155--169]), the independence number of a graph was characterized as the maximum of the $\ell_1$ norm of solutions of a Linear Complementarity Problem (\LCP) defined suitably using parameters of the graph. Solutions of this LCP have another relation, namely, that they corresponded to Nash equilibria of a public goods game. Motivated by this, we consider a perturbation of this LCP and identify the combinatorial structures on the graph that correspond to the maximum $\ell_1$ norm of solutions of the new LCP. We introduce a new concept called independent clique solutions which are solutions of the LCP that are supported on independent cliques and show that for small perturbations, such solutions attain the maximum $\ell_1$ norm amongst all solutions of the new LCP.

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Shannon meets von Neumann: A Minimax Theorem for Channel Coding in the Presence of a Jammer

We study the setting of channel coding over a family of channels whose state is controlled by an adversarial jammer by viewing it as a zero-sum game between a finite blocklength encoder-decoder team, and the jammer. The encoder-decoder team choose stochastic encoding and decoding strategies to minimize the average probability of error in transmission, while the jammer chooses a distribution on the state-space to maximize this probability. The min-max value of this game is equivalent to channel coding for a compound channel -- we call this the Shannon solution of the problem. The max-min value corresponds to finding a mixed channel with the largest value of the minimum achievable probability of error. When the min-max and max-min values are equal, the problem is said to admit a saddle-point or von Neumann solution. While a Shannon solution always exists, a von Neumann solution need not, owing to inherent nonconvexity in the communicating team's problem. Despite this, we show that the min-max and max-min values become equal asymptotically in the large blocklength limit, for all but finitely many rates. We explicitly characterize this limiting value as a function of the rate and obtain tight finite blocklength bounds on the min-max and max-min value. As a corollary we get an explicit expression for the $ε$-capacity of a compound channel under stochastic codes -- the first such result, to the best of our knowledge. Our results demonstrate a deeper relation between the compound channel and mixed channel than was previously known. They also show that the conventional information-theoretic viewpoint, articulated via the Shannon solution, coincides asymptotically with the game-theoretic one articulated via the von Neumann solution.

cs.IT↗

Improved Finite Blocklength Converses for Slepian-Wolf Coding via Linear Programming

A new finite blocklength converse for the Slepian- Wolf coding problem is presented which significantly improves on the best known converse for this problem, due to Miyake and Kanaya [2]. To obtain this converse, an extension of the linear programming (LP) based framework for finite blocklength point- to-point coding problems from [3] is employed. However, a direct application of this framework demands a complicated analysis for the Slepian-Wolf problem. An analytically simpler approach is presented wherein LP-based finite blocklength converses for this problem are synthesized from point-to-point lossless source coding problems with perfect side-information at the decoder. New finite blocklength metaconverses for these point-to-point problems are derived by employing the LP-based framework, and the new converse for Slepian-Wolf coding is obtained by an appropriate combination of these converses.

cs.IT↗

Linear Programming based Converses for Finite Blocklength Lossy Joint Source-Channel Coding

A linear programming (LP) based framework is presented for obtaining converses for finite blocklength lossy joint source-channel coding problems. The framework applies for any loss criterion, generalizes certain previously known converses, and also extends to multi-terminal settings. The finite blocklength problem is posed equivalently as a nonconvex optimization problem and using a lift-and-project-like method, a close but tractable LP relaxation of this problem is derived. Lower bounds on the original problem are obtained by the construction of feasible points for the dual of the LP relaxation. A particular application of this approach leads to new converses which recover and improve on the converses of Kostina and Verdu for finite blocklength lossy joint source-channel coding and lossy source coding. For finite blocklength channel coding, the LP relaxation recovers the converse of Polyanskiy, Poor and Verdu and leads to a new improvement on the converse of Wolfowitz, showing thereby that our LP relaxation is asymptotically tight with increasing blocklengths for channel coding, lossless source coding and joint source-channel coding with the excess distortion probability as the loss criterion. Using a duality based argument, a new converse is derived for finite blocklength joint source-channel coding for a class of source-channel pairs. Employing this converse, the LP relaxation is also shown to be tight for all blocklengths for the minimization of the expected average symbol-wise Hamming distortion of a $q$-ary uniform source over a $q$-ary symmetric memoryless channel for any $q \in N$. The optimization formulation and the lift-and-project method are extended to networked settings and demonstrated by obtaining an improvement on a converse of Zhou et al. for the successive refinement problem for successively refinable source-distortion measure triplets.

cs.IT↗

A linear complementarity based characterization of the weighted independence number and the independent domination number in graphs

The linear complementarity problem is a continuous optimization problem that generalizes convex quadratic programming, Nash equilibria of bimatrix games and several such problems. This paper presents a continuous optimization formulation for the weighted independence number of a graph by characterizing it as the maximum weighted $\ell_1$ norm over the solution set of a linear complementarity problem (LCP). The minimum $\ell_1$ norm of solutions of this LCP is a lower bound on the independent domination number of the graph. Unlike the case of the maximum $\ell_1$ norm, this lower bound is in general weak, but we show it to be tight if the graph is a forest. Using methods from the theory of LCPs, we obtain a few graph theoretic results. In particular, we provide a stronger variant of the Lovász theta of a graph. We then provide sufficient conditions for a graph to be well-covered, i.e., for all maximal independent sets to also be maximum. This condition is also shown to be necessary for well-coveredness if the graph is a forest. Finally, the reduction of the maximum independent set problem to a linear program with (linear) complementarity constraints (LPCC) shows that LPCCs are hard to approximate.

cs.DM↗

New Results on the Existence of Open Loop Nash Equilibria in Discrete Time Dynamic Games

We address the problem of finding conditions which guarantee the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games (DTDGs). The classical approach to DTDGs involves analyzing the problem using optimal control theory which yields results mainly limited to linear-quadratic games. We show the existence of equilibria for a class of DTDGs where the cost function of players admits a quasi-potential function which leads to new results and, in some cases, a generalization of similar results from linear-quadratic games. Our results are obtained by introducing a new formulation for analysing DTDGs using the concept of a conjectured state by the players. In this formulation, the state of the game is modelled as dependent on players. Using this formulation we show that there is an optimisation problem such that the solution of this problem gives an equilibrium of the DTDG. To extend the result for more general games, we modify the DTDG with an additional constraint of consistency of the conjectured state. Any equilibrium of the original game is also an equilibrium of this modified game with consistent conjectures. In the modified game, we show the existence of equilibria for DTDGs where the cost function of players admits a potential function. We end with conditions under which an equilibrium of the game with consistent conjectures is an $ε$-Nash equilibria of the original game.

math.OC↗

Dimensionality Reduction of Affine Variational Inequalities Using Random Projections

We present a method for dimensionality reduction of an affine variational inequality (AVI) defined over a compact feasible region. Centered around the Johnson Lindenstrauss lemma, our method is a randomized algorithm that produces with high probability an approximate solution for the given AVI by solving a lower-dimensional AVI. The algorithm allows the lower dimension to be chosen based on the quality of approximation desired. The algorithm can also be used as a subroutine in an exact algorithm for generating an initial point close to the solution. The lower-dimensional AVI is obtained by appropriately projecting the original AVI on a randomly chosen subspace. The lower-dimensional AVI is solved using standard solvers and from this solution an approximate solution to the original AVI is recovered through an inexpensive process. Our numerical experiments corroborate the theoretical results and validate that the algorithm provides a good approximation at low dimensions and substantial savings in time for an exact solution.

math.OC↗

A Shared-Constraint Approach to Multi-leader Multi-follower Games

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria for it has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.

math.OC↗

An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg Games

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of follower equilibria and nonconvexity of leader problems whereby the problem of providing sufficient conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria remains largely open. Indeed available existence statements are restrictive and model specific. In this paper, we present what is possibly the first general existence result for equilibria for this class of games. Importantly, we impose no single-valuedness assumption on the equilibrium of the follower-level game. Specifically, under the assumption that the objectives of the leaders admit a quasi-potential function, a concept we introduce in this paper, the global and local minimizers of a suitably defined optimization problem are shown to be the global and local equilibria of the game. In effect existence of equilibria can be guaranteed by the solvability of an optimization problem, which holds under mild and verifiable conditions. We motivate quasi- potential games through an application in communication networks.

math.OC↗

An Optimizer's Approach to Stochastic Control Problems with Nonclassical Information Structures

We present an optimization-based approach to stochastic control problems with nonclassical information structures. We cast these problems equivalently as optimization prob- lems on joint distributions. The resulting problems are necessarily nonconvex. Our approach to solving them is through convex relaxation. We solve the instance solved by Bansal and Basar with a particular application of this approach that uses the data processing inequality for constructing the convex relaxation. Using certain f-divergences, we obtain a new, larger set of inverse optimal cost functions for such problems. Insights are obtained on the relation between the structure of cost functions and of convex relaxations for inverse optimal control.

math.OC↗

Approximate dynamic programming using fluid and diffusion approximations with applications to power management

Neuro-dynamic programming is a class of powerful techniques for approximating the solution to dynamic programming equations. In their most computationally attractive formulations, these techniques provide the approximate solution only within a prescribed finite-dimensional function class. Thus, the question that always arises is how should the function class be chosen? The goal of this paper is to propose an approach using the solutions to associated fluid and diffusion approximations. In order to illustrate this approach, the paper focuses on an application to dynamic speed scaling for power management in computer processors.

cs.LG↗

Two Approaches to the Construction of Deletion Correcting Codes: Weight Partitioning and Optimal Colorings

We consider the problem of constructing deletion correcting codes over a binary alphabet and take a graph theoretic view. An $n$-bit $s$-deletion correcting code is an independent set in a particular graph. We propose constructing such a code by taking the union of many constant Hamming weight codes. This results in codes that have additional structure. Searching for codes in constant Hamming weight induced subgraphs is computationally easier than searching the original graph. We prove a lower bound on size of a codebook constructed this way for any number of deletions and show that it is only a small factor below the corresponding lower bound on unrestricted codes. In the single deletion case, we find optimal colorings of the constant Hamming weight induced subgraphs. We show that the resulting code is asymptotically optimal. We discuss the relationship between codes and colorings and observe that the VT codes are optimal in a coloring sense. We prove a new lower bound on the chromatic number of the deletion channel graphs. Colorings of the deletion channel graphs that match this bound do not necessarily produce asymptotically optimal codes.

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