arXiv subjects

Anna Zseleva

Publications and source records attributed to Anna Zseleva.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

A general definition of perfect equilibrium

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under standard topological conditions, this definition yields a nonempty and compact set of perfect equilibria. For finite action sets, our notion of perfect equilibrium coincides with Selten's (1975) original notion. In the compact-continuous case, perfect equilibria are weak perfect equilibria in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995). In the finitely additive case, perfect equilibria in the sense of Marinacci (1997) are perfect. Under mild conditions, perfect equilibrium meets game-theoretic desiderata such as limit undominatedness and invariance. We provide a variety of examples to motivate and illustrate our definition. Notably, examples include applications to games with discontinuous payoffs and games played with finitely additive strategies.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2021

Repeated Games with Switching Costs: Stationary vs History Independent Strategies

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely on the previous action of the minimizing player, not the entire history. We provide a full characterization of the value and the optimal strategies. The strategies exhibit a robustness property and typically do not change with a small perturbation of the switching costs. Second, we consider a case where the minimizing player is limited to playing simpler strategies that are completely history-independent. Here too, we provide a full characterization of the (minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it. Moreover, we present several bounds on the loss due to this limitation.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

Characterizing the Value Functions of Polynomial Games

We provide a characterization of the set of real-valued functions that can be the value function of some polynomial game. Specifically, we prove that a function $u : \dR \to \dR$ is the value function of some polynomial game if and only if $u$ is a continuous piecewise rational function.

math.OC↗