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Anqi Huang

Publications and source records attributed to Anqi Huang.

50 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
arXiv2020

Optical control of single-photon negative-feedback avalanche diode detector

We experimentally demonstrate optical control of negative-feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) detectors using bright light. We deterministically generate fake single-photon detections with a better timing precision than normal operation. This could potentially open a security loophole in quantum cryptography systems. We then show how monitoring the photocurrent through the avalanche photodiode can be used to reveal the detector is being blinded.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2020

Federated Orchestration for Network Slicing of Bandwidth and Computational Resource

Network slicing has been considered as one of the key enablers for 5G to support diversified IoT services and application scenarios. This paper studies the distributed network slicing for a massive scale IoT network supported by 5G with fog computing. Multiple services with various requirements need to be supported by both spectrum resource offered by 5G network and computational resourc of the fog computing network. We propose a novel distributed framework based on a new control plane entity, federated-orchestrator , which can coordinate the spectrum and computational resources without requiring any exchange of the local data and resource information from BSs. We propose a distributed resource allocation algorithm based on Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers with Partial Variable Splitting . We prove DistADMM-PVS minimizes the average service response time of the entire network with guaranteed worst-case performance for all supported types of services when the coordination between the F-orchestrator and BSs is perfectly synchronized. Motivated by the observation that coordination synchronization may result in high coordination delay that can be intolerable when the network is large in scale, we propose a novel asynchronized ADMM algorithm. We prove that AsynADMM can converge to the global optimal solution with improved scalability and negligible coordination delay. We evaluate the performance of our proposed framework using two-month of traffic data collected in a in-campus smart transportation system supported by a 5G network. Extensive simulation has been conducted for both pedestrian and vehicular-related services during peak and non-peak hours. Our results show that the proposed framework offers significant reduction on service response time for both supported services, especially compared to network slicing with only a single resource.

eess.SP↗
arXiv2020

Distributed Resource Allocation for Network Slicing of Bandwidth and Computational Resource

Network slicing has been considered as one of the key enablers for 5G to support diversified services and application scenarios. This paper studies the distributed network slicing utilizing both the spectrum resource offered by communication network and computational resources of a coexisting fog computing network. We propose a novel distributed framework based on a new control plane entity, regional orchestrator (RO), which can be deployed between base stations (BSs) and fog nodes to coordinate and control their bandwidth and computational resources. We propose a distributed resource allocation algorithm based on Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers with Partial Variable Splitting (DistADMM-PVS). We prove that the proposed algorithm can minimize the average latency of the entire network and at the same time guarantee satisfactory latency performance for every supported type of service. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm converges much faster than some other existing algorithms. The joint network slicing with both bandwidth and computational resources can offer around 15% overall latency reduction compared to network slicing with only a single resource.

cs.NI↗
arXiv2019

Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distribution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the "Achilles' heel" of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2019

General-purpose quantum circuit simulator with Projected Entangled-Pair States and the quantum supremacy frontier

Recent advances on quantum computing hardware have pushed quantum computing to the verge of quantum supremacy. Random quantum circuits are outstanding candidates to demonstrate quantum supremacy, which could be implemented on a quantum device that supports nearest-neighbour gate operations on a two-dimensional configuration. Here we show that using the Projected Entangled-Pair States algorithm, a tool to study two-dimensional strongly interacting many-body quantum systems, we can realize an effective general-purpose simulator of quantum algorithms. This technique allows to quantify precisely the memory usage and the time requirements of random quantum circuits, thus showing the frontier of quantum supremacy. With this approach we can compute the full wave-function of the system, from which single amplitudes can be sampled with unit fidelity. Applying this general quantum circuit simulator we measured amplitudes for a $7\times 7$ lattice of qubits with depth $1+40+1$ and double-precision numbers in 31 minutes using less than $93$ TB memory on the Tianhe-2 supercomputer.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2019

Security analysis of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems under laser seeding attack

Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules in the two kinds of practical CVQKD systems, which results in the increased intensity of the generated optical signal. The parameter estimation under the attack shows that the secret key rates of these two schemes may be overestimated, which opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack on these systems. To close this loophole, we propose a real-time monitoring scheme to precisely evaluate the secret key rates of these schemes. The analysis results indicate the implementation of the proposed monitoring scheme can effectively resist this potential attack.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2019

Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence

The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver, or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2019

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2019

Practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with reduced optical attenuation

In a practical CVQKD system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the performance of the system. However, the performance of the optical attenuator may deteriorate due to the intentional and unintentional damage of the device. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with reduced optical attenuation. We find that the secret key rate of the system may be overestimated based on the investigation of parameter estimation under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. This opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical CVQKD system. To close this loophole, we add an optical fuse at Alice's output port and design a scheme to monitor the level of optical attenuation in real time, which can make the secret key rate of the system evaluated precisely. The analysis shows that these countermeasures can effectively resist this potential attack.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2018

Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography

Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2018

Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source

The decoy state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two experimental approaches to generating the decoy states with different intensities: modulation of the pump current of a semiconductor laser diode, and external modulation by an optical intensity modulator. The former approach shows a side-channel in the time domain that allows an attacker to distinguish s signal state from a decoy state, breaking a basic assumption in the protocol. We model a photon-number-splitting attack based on our experimental data, and show that it compromises the system's security. Then, based on the work of K. Tamaki et al. [New J. Phys. 18, 065008 (2016)], we obtain two analytical formulas to estimate the yield and the error rate of single-photon pulses when the signal and decoy states are distinguishable. The distinguishability reduces the secure key rate below that of a perfect decoy-state protocol. To mitigate this reduction, we propose to calibrate the transmittance of the receiver (Bob's) unit. We apply our method to three QKD systems and estimate their secure key rates.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2016

Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption

In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2016

Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution

Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (ddiQKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side-channels, a major security loophole in QKD implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of ddiQKD is not based on post-selected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that ddiQKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit device's imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in ddiQKD.

quant-ph↗