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Anton Badev

Publications and source records attributed to Anton Badev.

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Equilibrium in the Canonical Stackelberg Triopoly via Response Functions and Fixed Point Theory

We analyze a canonical extension of the Stackelberg duopoly to a sequential framework, where each firm strategically anticipates the reactions of all subsequent players. In a triopoly (three-firm) settings, we obtain existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium via a reformulation of the equilibrium conditions that draws on coupled fixed-point theory. Even with linear demand, convergence of myopic best-response dynamics is not guaranteed. A recursive equilibrium formulation enables the analysis of the limiting case as the number of participants grow.

math.FA

Nash Equilibria on (Un)Stable Networks

In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In equilibrium, players internalize the need for consensus in forming friendships and choose their optimal strategies on subsets of k players - a form of bounded rationality. The k-player consensual dynamic delivers a probabilistic ranking of a game's equilibria, and, via a varying k, facilitates estimation of such games. Applying the model to adolescents' smoking suggests that: (a.) the response of the friendship network to changes in tobacco price amplifies the intended effect of price changes on smoking, (b.) racial desegregation of high-schools decreases the overall smoking prevalence, (c.) peer effect complementarities are substantially stronger between smokers compared to between non-smokers. (d.) the magnitude of the spillover effects from small scale policies targeting individuals' smoking choices are roughly double compared to the scale of these policies.

cs.SI

Discrete Games in Endogenous Networks: Equilibria and Policy

In games of friendship links and behaviors, I propose $k$-player Nash stability---a family of equilibria, indexed by a measure of robustness given by the number of permitted link changes, which is (ordinally and cardinally) ranked in a probabilistic sense. Application of the proposed framework to adolescents' tobacco smoking and friendship decisions suggests that: (a.) friendship networks respond to increases of tobacco prices and this response amplifies the intended policy effect on smoking, (b.) racially desegregating high-schools, via stimulating the social interactions of students with different intrinsic propensity to smoke, decreases the overall smoking prevalence, (c.) adolescents are averse to sharing friends so that there is a rivalry for friendships, (d.) when data on individuals' friendship network is not available, the importance of price centered policy tools is underestimated.

cs.SI