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Anton Badev

Publications and source records attributed to Anton Badev.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Team Stability: Theory and Evidence

Teams emerge organically when individuals decide on their own their activities and collaborators. I develop and test a theory in which teams form with consent, interactions reflect team composition, and payoffs feature externalities and several forms of congestion. Stability constraints concern group interactions and require each team member to be willing to remain rather than withdraw or pursue a project alone. Empirical analysis of research collaborations among economists at the Federal Reserve Board suggests that: (i.) these constraints help explain observed teams beyond the payoffs to collaboration; (ii.) estimated violations point to large teams of entrants that appear to be assigned; (iii.) a compensatory mechanism mitigates the effects of variation in policy workload, which appears to affect team composition more than total research output; and (iv.) shifting workload toward experienced economists increases entrants' research output and collaboration, at the cost of lower output among experienced economists who compensate for this shift in policy workload with increased interactions with entrants.

econ.EM↗

Equilibrium in the Canonical Stackelberg Triopoly via Response Functions and Fixed Point Theory

We analyze a canonical extension of the Stackelberg duopoly to a sequential framework, where each firm strategically anticipates the reactions of all subsequent players. In a triopoly (three-firm) settings, we obtain existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium via a reformulation of the equilibrium conditions that draws on coupled fixed-point theory. Even with linear demand, convergence of myopic best-response dynamics is not guaranteed. A recursive equilibrium formulation enables the analysis of the limiting case as the number of participants grow.

math.FA↗

Nash Equilibria on (Un)Stable Networks

In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In equilibrium, players internalize the need for consensus in forming friendships and choose their optimal strategies on subsets of k players - a form of bounded rationality. The k-player consensual dynamic delivers a probabilistic ranking of a game's equilibria, and, via a varying k, facilitates estimation of such games. Applying the model to adolescents' smoking suggests that: (a.) the response of the friendship network to changes in tobacco price amplifies the intended effect of price changes on smoking, (b.) racial desegregation of high-schools decreases the overall smoking prevalence, (c.) peer effect complementarities are substantially stronger between smokers compared to between non-smokers. (d.) the magnitude of the spillover effects from small scale policies targeting individuals' smoking choices are roughly double compared to the scale of these policies.

cs.SI↗

Discrete Games in Endogenous Networks: Equilibria and Policy

In games of friendship links and behaviors, I propose $k$-player Nash stability---a family of equilibria, indexed by a measure of robustness given by the number of permitted link changes, which is (ordinally and cardinally) ranked in a probabilistic sense. Application of the proposed framework to adolescents' tobacco smoking and friendship decisions suggests that: (a.) friendship networks respond to increases of tobacco prices and this response amplifies the intended policy effect on smoking, (b.) racially desegregating high-schools, via stimulating the social interactions of students with different intrinsic propensity to smoke, decreases the overall smoking prevalence, (c.) adolescents are averse to sharing friends so that there is a rivalry for friendships, (d.) when data on individuals' friendship network is not available, the importance of price centered policy tools is underestimated.

cs.SI↗