Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Antonio A. Arechar

Publications and source records attributed to Antonio A. Arechar.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Large language models can effectively convince people to believe conspiracies

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

cs.AI↗

It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topics

Persuasion is a powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) that both enables beneficial applications (e.g. helping people quit smoking) and raises significant risks (e.g. large-scale, targeted political manipulation). Prior work has found models possess a significant and growing persuasive capability, measured by belief changes in simulated or real users. However, these benchmarks overlook a crucial risk factor: the propensity of a model to attempt to persuade in harmful contexts. Understanding whether a model will blindly ``follow orders'' to persuade on harmful topics (e.g. glorifying joining a terrorist group) is key to understanding the efficacy of safety guardrails. Moreover, understanding if and when a model will engage in persuasive behavior in pursuit of some goal is essential to understanding the risks from agentic AI systems. We propose the Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) benchmark, that shifts the focus from persuasion success to persuasion attempts, operationalized as a model's willingness to generate content aimed at shaping beliefs or behavior. Our evaluation framework probes frontier LLMs using a multi-turn conversational setup between simulated persuader and persuadee agents. APE explores a diverse spectrum of topics including conspiracies, controversial issues, and non-controversially harmful content. We introduce an automated evaluator model to identify willingness to persuade and measure the frequency and context of persuasive attempts. We find that many open and closed-weight models are frequently willing to attempt persuasion on harmful topics and that jailbreaking can increase willingness to engage in such behavior. Our results highlight gaps in current safety guardrails and underscore the importance of evaluating willingness to persuade as a key dimension of LLM risk. APE is available at github.com/AlignmentResearch/AttemptPersuadeEval

cs.AI↗

The Game Theory of Fake News

A great deal of empirical research has examined who falls for misinformation and why. Here, we introduce a formal game-theoretic model of engagement with news stories that captures the strategic interplay between (mis)information consumers and producers. A key insight from the model is that observed patterns of engagement do not necessarily reflect the preferences of consumers. This is because producers seeking to promote misinformation can use strategies that lead moderately inattentive readers to engage more with false stories than true ones -- even when readers prefer more accurate over less accurate information. We then empirically test people's preferences for accuracy in the news. In three studies, we find that people strongly prefer to click and share news they perceive as more accurate -- both in a general population sample, and in a sample of users recruited through Twitter who had actually shared links to misinformation sites online. Despite this preference for accurate news -- and consistent with the predictions of our model -- we find markedly different engagement patterns for articles from misinformation versus mainstream news sites. Using 1,000 headlines from 20 misinformation and 20 mainstream news sites, we compare Facebook engagement data with 20,000 accuracy ratings collected in a survey experiment. Engagement with a headline is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy for misinformation sites, but positively correlated with perceived accuracy for mainstream sites. Taken together, these theoretical and empirical results suggest that consumer preferences cannot be straightforwardly inferred from empirical patterns of engagement.

econ.TH↗