arXiv subjects

Antonio Yuste-Ginel

Publications and source records attributed to Antonio Yuste-Ginel.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Some Results about the Expressivity of Preference-Incomplete Structured Argumentation Frameworks

This paper studies the expressive power of ASPIC$^+$ argumentation frameworks with uncertain preference profiles by comparing them with several abstract formalisms with uncertain defeats. Most of our results are negative (and some of them are theoretically unexpected). We also conjecture a positive, non-trivial threshold for the expressivity of uncertain preferences, and prove some essential preliminary steps toward the confirmation of this conjecture.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

A meta-modal logic for bisimulations

We propose a modal study of the notion of bisimulation. Our contribution is threefold. First, we extend the basic modal language with a new modality $\nbi$, whose intended meaning is universal quantification over all states that are bisimilar to the current one. We show that bisimulations are definable in this object language via frame correspondence. Second, we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of the class of all pairs of Kripke models that are bisimulation-related. Third, we show that the satisfiability problem of our logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete via a translation to standard modal logic $K$ under a simple frame condition. All our results are encoded and verified by Isabelle/HOL.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2026

Comparative Expressivity for Structured Argumentation Frameworks with Uncertain Rules and Premises

Modelling qualitative uncertainty in formal argumentation is essential both for practical applications and theoretical understanding. Yet, most of the existing works focus on \textit{abstract} models for arguing with uncertainty. Following a recent trend in the literature, we tackle the open question of studying plausible instantiations of these abstract models. To do so, we ground the uncertainty of arguments in their components, structured within rules and premises. Our main technical contributions are: i) the introduction of a notion of expressivity that can handle abstract and structured formalisms, and ii) the presentation of both negative and positive expressivity results, comparing the expressivity of abstract and structured models of argumentation with uncertainty. These results affect incomplete abstract argumentation frameworks, and their extension with dependencies, on the abstract side, and ASPIC+, on the structured side.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

An Abstract Look at Awareness Models and Their Dynamics

This work builds upon a well-established research tradition on modal logics of awareness. One of its aims is to export tools and techniques to other areas within modal logic. To this end, we illustrate a number of significant bridges with abstract argumentation, justification logics, the epistemic logic of knowing-what and deontic logic, where basic notions and definitional concepts can be expressed in terms of the awareness operator combined with the box modality. Furthermore, these conceptual links point to interesting properties of awareness sets beyond those standardly assumed in awareness logics, i.e. positive and negative introspection. We show that the properties we list are characterised by corresponding canonical formulas, so as to obtain a series of off-the-shelf axiomatisations for them. As a second focus, we investigate the general dynamics of this framework by means of event models. Of specific interest in this context is to know under which conditions, given a model that satisfies some property, the update with an event model keeps it within the intended class. This is known as the closure problem in general dynamic epistemic logics. As a main contribution, we prove a number of closure theorems providing sufficient conditions for the preservation of our properties. Again, these results enable us to axiomatize our dynamic logics by means of reduction axioms.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2023

Qualitative uncertainty and dynamics of argumentation through dynamic logic

Dynamics and uncertainty are essential features of real-life argumentation, and many recent studies have focused on integrating both aspects into Dung's well-known abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AFs). This paper proposes a combination of the two lines of research through a well-behaved logical tool: Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments (DL-PA). Our results show that the main reasoning tasks of virtually all existing formalisms qualitatively representing uncertainty about AFs are encodable in DL-PA. Moreover, the same tool is also useful for capturing dynamic structures, such as control argumentation frameworks, as well as for developing more refined forms of argumentative communication under uncertainty.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2021

Online Handbook of Argumentation for AI: Volume 2

This volume contains revised versions of the papers selected for the second volume of the Online Handbook of Argumentation for AI (OHAAI). Previously, formal theories of argument and argument interaction have been proposed and studied, and this has led to the more recent study of computational models of argument. Argumentation, as a field within artificial intelligence (AI), is highly relevant for researchers interested in symbolic representations of knowledge and defeasible reasoning. The purpose of this handbook is to provide an open access and curated anthology for the argumentation research community. OHAAI is designed to serve as a research hub to keep track of the latest and upcoming PhD-driven research on the theory and application of argumentation in all areas related to AI.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

An Awareness Epistemic Framework for Belief, Argumentation and Their Dynamics

The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably) believe that something is the case. On the other hand, beliefs are an input for argument evaluation: arguments with believed premisses are to be considered as strictly stronger by the agent to arguments whose premisses are not believed. An awareness epistemic logic that captures qualified versions of both principles was recently proposed in the literature. This paper extends that logic in three different directions. First, we try to improve its conceptual grounds, by depicting its philosophical foundations, critically discussing some of its design choices and exploring further possibilities. Second, we provide a (heretofore missing) completeness theorem for the basic fragment of the logic. Third, we study, using techniques from dynamic epistemic logic, how different forms of information change can be captured in the framework.

cs.LO↗