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Antonios Varvitsiotis

Publications and source records attributed to Antonios Varvitsiotis.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Online Learning on Hidden-Convex Losses via Algorithmic Equivalence: Optimal Regret, Geometric Barrier, and Bandit Feedback

We study adversarial online learning with hidden-convex losses, i.e., nonconvex losses that become convex after a nonlinear reparameterization. Ghai, Lu and Hazan (2022) proved that, under geometric and smoothness assumptions, online gradient descent (OGD) on such nonconvex losses approximately simulates online mirror descent (OMD) on the underlying convex losses with a suitable regularizer, yielding $\mathcal{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret. They left open whether the optimal $\Theta(\sqrt{T})$ regret from online convex optimization can be recovered in this hidden-convex setting. We answer this question affirmatively. More specifically, via a sharper discrete-time algorithmic equivalence argument, we prove that OGD achieves $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret under the same assumptions, matching the optimal worst-case rate for adversarial online convex optimization. We also address another open question of Ghai, Lu and Hazan (2022) by clarifying the geometry required for this algorithmic equivalence. We replace the diagonal-Jacobian sufficient condition with a necessary-and-sufficient Hessian compatibility condition, thereby expanding the class of admissible reparameterizations. We complement our tight regret bound with a lower bound showing that the Hessian compatibility assumption is essential for OGD; when it fails, we construct a smooth reparameterization and an adversarial sequence of hidden-convex losses for which OGD suffers $\Omega(T)$ regret. Finally, we extend our analysis to one-point bandit feedback and prove a $\mathcal{O}(T^{3/4})$ expected regret bound for bandit OGD with spherical smoothing, matching its classical rate on convex losses.

cs.LG

Fairness-Guaranteed Online Power Allocation Policies for EV Fast Charging Stations

The rapid expansion of electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates scalable and efficient fast charging station (FCS) infrastructure. These stations often operate in oversubscribed configurations where the total port rating exceeds a station-level cap reflecting infrastructure limits, grid constraints or market setpoints. In such settings, ensuring fairness in real-time power allocation is essential to prevent user bias and secure equitable access to limited resources while maximizing infrastructure utilization. This task is further complicated by state-of-charge dependent EV power limits defined by charge curves, for which accurate data is often unavailable. This paper introduces two fairness-guaranteed online power allocation policies: FAIR-OPAP-C for conventional FCSs with continuously adjustable power delivery, and FAIR-OPAP-M for modular FCSs composed of discrete assignable power modules. Unlike existing methods, these algorithms require no prior knowledge of charge curves, utilizing only instantaneous power requests available via standard protocols. We formalize fairness with a unified framework encompassing envy-freeness, Pareto efficiency, and proportionality, and establish theoretical guarantees for both algorithms. The algorithms rely on lightweight operations, achieving near-linear and logarithmic scalability for the conventional and modular cases, respectively. Comprehensive evaluations show the proposed methods achieve superior performance across various metrics among seven benchmarks from EV charging and fair division literature. Furthermore, they are orders of magnitude faster than optimization-based approaches, with runtimes below 1 ms for up to 300 EVs, validating their suitability for real-time deployment on hardware-constrained edge devices.

eess.SY

When and Why is Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Slow? The Geometry of Energy Dissipation

This paper studies the convergence of the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm (OMWU) in two player zero-sum games. Recent works have identified instances on which the last-iterate of OMWU can converge arbitrarily slowly, but understanding when and why this slow convergence occurs has remained open. In this work, we develop a new analysis framework that gives sharp, quantitative explanations for this behavior. Our analysis is based on viewing the algorithm's dual iterates as an optimistic skew-gradient descent with respect to an energy function. We prove over the dual iterates that energy is dissipative, and by establishing tight bounds on the magnitude of dissipation, our analysis quantifies the geometric bottlenecks that arise when the corresponding primal iterates are close to the simplex boundary. This further translates into a new linear last-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence on games with a unique and interior Nash equilibrium. Compared to prior work, this new rate contains a much sharper dependence on game-specific constants, and we prove this dependence is optimal. Moreover, these geometric insights further translate into new separations on uniform convergence rates for OMWU. On the one hand, we prove constant lower bounds on the uniform best-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence and total variation distance from Nash. On the other hand, we establish for the $2\times 2$ setting a new ${\widetilde O}(T^{-1/2})$ best-iterate rate in duality gap, improving substantially over prior work. Together, this shows in general that uniform convergence rate guarantees do not transfer across different measures of distance to Nash.

cs.GT

Global Optimization for Parametrized Quantum Circuits

In the absence of error correction, noisy intermediate-scale quantum devices are operated by training parametrized quantum circuits (PQCs) so as to minimize a suitable loss function. Finding the optimal parameters of those circuits is a hard optimization problem, where global guarantees are known only for highly structured cases of limited practical relevance, and first-order methods can fail to find even local minima due to the presence of barren plateaus. In this work, we study the training of practical classes of PQCs, namely polynomial-depth circuits with a constant number of trainable parameters. This captures widely used PQC families, including fixed-depth QAOA, hardware-efficient ansätze, and Fixed Parameter Count QAOA. Our main technical result is a fully polynomial randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS), which, for every $ε>0$, returns an $ε$-approximate solution to the problem's global optimum with high probability, and has runtime and query complexity polynomial in $1/ε$ and the number of qubits. Unlike the standard hybrid quantum-classical training loop in variational algorithms, where the quantum device is queried repeatedly throughout the training, our approach separates the computation into two distinct stages: (1) an initial quantum data-acquisition phase, followed by (2) a classical global-optimization phase based on the trigonometric moment/sum-of-squares hierarchies. Under a standard flat-extension condition, which can be checked numerically, the method also supports the extraction of optimal circuit parameters. The existence of an FPRAS implies that the promise problem associated with the optimization of poly-depth constant-parameter PQC is in BQP. This imposes a limitation on the expressive power of the class, namely, it cannot encode combinatorial optimization problems whose objective values are separated by an inverse-polynomial gap.

quant-ph

Optimistic Online Learning in Symmetric Cone Games

We introduce symmetric cone games (SCGs), a broad class of multi-player games where each player's strategy lies in a generalized simplex (the trace-one slice of a symmetric cone). This framework unifies a wide spectrum of settings, including normal-form games (simplex strategies), quantum games (density matrices), and continuous games with ball-constrained strategies. It also captures several structured machine learning and optimization problems, such as distance metric learning and Fermat-Weber facility location, as two-player zero-sum SCGs. To compute approximate Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum SCGs, we propose a single online learning algorithm: Optimistic Symmetric Cone Multiplicative Weights Updates (OSCMWU). Unlike prior methods tailored to specific geometries, OSCMWU provides closed-form updates over any symmetric cone and achieves a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/ε)$ iteration complexity for computing $ε$-saddle points. Our analysis builds on the Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader framework and hinges on a key technical contribution: We prove that the symmetric cone negative entropy is strongly convex with respect to the trace-one norm. This result extends known results for the simplex and spectraplex to all symmetric cones, and may be of independent interest.

math.OC

Solving Imperfect-Recall Games via Sum-of-Squares Optimization

Extensive-form games (EFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling sequential decision making, capturing strategic interaction under imperfect information, chance events, and temporal structure. Most positive algorithmic and theoretical results for EFGs assume perfect recall, where players remember all past information and actions. We study the increasingly relevant setting of imperfect-recall EFGs (IREFGs), where players may forget parts of their history or previously acquired information, and where equilibrium computation is provably hard. We propose sum-of-squares (SOS) hierarchies for computing ex-ante optimal strategies in single-player IREFGs and Nash equilibria in multi-player IREFGs, working over behavioral strategies. Our theoretical results show that (i) these hierarchies converge asymptotically, (ii) under genericity assumptions, the convergence is finite, and (iii) in single-player non-absentminded IREFGs, convergence occurs at a finite level determined by the number of information sets. Finally, we introduce the new classes of (SOS)-concave and (SOS)-monotone IREFGs, and show that in the single-player setting the SOS hierarchy converges at the first level, enabling equilibrium computation with a single semidefinite program (SDP).

cs.GT

Convex Markov Games and Beyond: New Proof of Existence, Characterization and Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria

Convex Markov Games (cMGs) were recently introduced as a broad class of multi-agent learning problems that generalize Markov games to settings where strategic agents optimize general utilities beyond additive rewards. While cMGs expand the modeling frontier, their theoretical foundations, particularly the structure of Nash equilibria (NE) and guarantees for learning algorithms, are not yet well understood. In this work, we address these gaps for an extension of cMGs, which we term General Utility Markov Games (GUMGs), capturing new applications requiring coupling between agents' occupancy measures. We prove that in GUMGs, Nash equilibria coincide with the fixed points of projected pseudo-gradient dynamics (i.e., first-order stationary points), enabled by a novel agent-wise gradient domination property. This insight also yields a simple proof of NE existence using Brouwer's fixed-point theorem. We further show the existence of Markov perfect equilibria. Building on this characterization, we establish a policy gradient theorem for GUMGs and design a model-free policy gradient algorithm. For potential GUMGs, we establish iteration complexity guarantees for computing approximate-NE under exact gradients and provide sample complexity bounds in both the generative model and on-policy settings. Our results extend beyond prior work restricted to zero-sum cMGs, providing the first theoretical analysis of common-interest cMGs.

cs.GT

The Lovász Theta Function for Recovering Planted Clique Covers and Graph Colorings

The problems of computing graph colorings and clique covers are central challenges in combinatorial optimization. Both of these are known to be NP-hard, and thus computationally intractable in the worst-case instance. A prominent approach for computing approximate solutions to these problems is the celebrated Lovász theta function $\vartheta(G)$, which is specified as the solution of a semidefinite program (SDP), and hence tractable to compute. In this work, we move beyond the worst-case analysis and set out to understand whether the Lovász theta function recovers clique covers for random instances that have a latent clique cover structure, possibly obscured by noise. We answer this question in the affirmative and show that for graphs generated from the planted clique model we introduce in this work, the SDP formulation of $\vartheta(G)$ has a unique solution that reveals the underlying clique-cover structure with high-probability. The main technical step is an intermediate result where we prove a deterministic condition of recovery based on an appropriate notion of sparsity.

math.OC

Semidefinite network games: multiplayer minimax and complementarity problems

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of network games, we introduce and study semidefinite network games. In this model, each player selects a positive semidefinite matrix with trace equal to one, known as a density matrix, to engage in a two-player game with every neighboring node. The player's payoff is the cumulative payoff acquired from these edge games. Initially, we focus on the zero-sum setting, where the sum of all players' payoffs is equal to zero. We establish that, in this class of games, Nash equilibria can be characterized as the projection of a spectrahedron. Furthermore, we show that determining whether a semidefinite network game is a zero-sum game is equivalent to deciding if the value of a semidefinite program is zero. Beyond the zero-sum case, we characterize Nash equilibria as the solutions of a semidefinite linear complementarity problem.

math.OC

Certifying Concavity and Monotonicity in Games via Sum-of-Squares Hierarchies

Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are compact and convex, and their payoffs are concave in their own actions, strong guarantees follow: Nash equilibria always exist and decentralized algorithms converge to equilibria. If the game is furthermore monotone, an even stronger guarantee holds: Nash equilibria are unique under strictness assumptions. Unfortunately, we show that certifying concavity or monotonicity is NP-hard, already for games where utilities are multivariate polynomials and compact, convex basic semialgebraic strategy sets -- an expressive class that captures extensive-form games with imperfect recall. On the positive side, we develop two hierarchies of sum-of-squares programs that certify concavity and monotonicity of a given game, and each level of the hierarchies can be solved in polynomial time. We show that almost all concave/monotone games are certified at some finite level of the hierarchies. Subsequently, we introduce SOS-concave/monotone games, which globally approximate concave/monotone games, and show that for any given game we can compute the closest SOS-concave/monotone game in polynomial time. Finally, we apply our techniques to canonical examples of imperfect recall extensive-form games.

cs.GT

Online Multi-Agent Control with Adversarial Disturbances

Online multi-agent control problems, where many agents pursue competing and time-varying objectives, are widespread in domains such as autonomous robotics, economics, and energy systems. In these settings, robustness to adversarial disturbances is critical. In this paper, we study online control in multi-agent linear dynamical systems subject to such disturbances. In contrast to most prior work in multi-agent control, which typically assumes noiseless or stochastically perturbed dynamics, we consider an online setting where disturbances can be adversarial, and where each agent seeks to minimize its own sequence of convex losses. Under two feedback models, we analyze online gradient-based controllers with local policy updates. We prove per-agent regret bounds that are sublinear and near-optimal in the time horizon and that highlight different scalings with the number of agents. When agents' objectives are aligned, we further show that the multi-agent control problem induces a time-varying potential game for which we derive equilibrium tracking guarantees. Together, our results take a first step in bridging online control with online learning in games, establishing robust individual and collective performance guarantees in dynamic continuous-state environments.

cs.LG

Nash equilibria in semidefinite games and Lemke-Howson paths

We consider an algorithmic framework for two-player non-zero-sum semidefinite games, where each player's strategy is a positive semidefinite matrix with trace one. We formulate the computation of Nash equilibria in such games as semidefinite complementarity problems and develop symbolic-numeric techniques to trace generalized Lemke-Howson paths. These paths generalize the piecewise affine-linear trajectories of the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm for bimatrix games, replacing them with nonlinear curve branches governed by eigenvalue complementarity conditions. A key feature of our framework is the introduction of event points, which correspond to curve singularities. We analyze the local behavior near these points using Puiseux series expansions. We prove the smoothness of the curve branches under suitable non-degeneracy conditions and establish connections between our approach and both the classical combinatorial and homotopy-theoretic interpretations of the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

math.OC

Learning in Quantum Common-Interest Games and the Separability Problem

Learning in games has emerged as a powerful tool for machine learning with numerous applications. Quantum games model interactions between strategic players who have access to quantum resources, and several recent works have studied {learning in} the competitive regime of quantum zero-sum games. Going beyond this setting, we introduce quantum common-interest games (CIGs) where players have density matrices as strategies and their interests are perfectly aligned. We bridge the gap between optimization and game theory by establishing the equivalence between KKT (first-order stationary) points of an instance of the Best Separable State (BSS) problem and the Nash equilibria of its corresponding quantum CIG. This allows learning dynamics for the quantum CIG to be seen as decentralized algorithms for the BSS problem. Taking the perspective of learning in games, we then introduce non-commutative extensions of the continuous-time replicator dynamics and the discrete-time best response dynamics/linear multiplicative weights update for learning in quantum CIGs. We prove analogues of classical convergence results of the dynamics and explore differences which arise in the quantum setting. Finally, we corroborate our theoretical findings through extensive experiments.

cs.GT

Learning and steering game dynamics towards desirable outcomes

Game dynamics, which describe how agents' strategies evolve over time based on past interactions, can exhibit a variety of undesirable behaviours including convergence to suboptimal equilibria, cycling, and chaos. While central planners can employ incentives to mitigate such behaviors and steer game dynamics towards desirable outcomes, the effectiveness of such interventions critically relies on accurately predicting agents' responses to these incentives -- a task made particularly challenging when the underlying dynamics are unknown and observations are limited. To address this challenge, this work introduces the Side Information Assisted Regression with Model Predictive Control (SIAR-MPC) framework. We extend the recently introduced SIAR method to incorporate the effect of control, enabling it to utilize side-information constraints inherent to game-theoretic applications to model agents' responses to incentives from scarce data. MPC then leverages this model to implement dynamic incentive adjustments. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of SIAR-MPC in guiding systems towards socially optimal equilibria, stabilizing chaotic and cycling behaviors. Notably, it achieves these results in data-scarce settings of few learning samples, where well-known system identification methods paired with MPC show less effective results.

eess.SY

No-Regret Learning and Equilibrium Computation in Quantum Games

As quantum processors advance, the emergence of large-scale decentralized systems involving interacting quantum-enabled agents is on the horizon. Recent research efforts have explored quantum versions of Nash and correlated equilibria as solution concepts of strategic quantum interactions, but these approaches did not directly connect to decentralized adaptive setups where agents possess limited information. This paper delves into the dynamics of quantum-enabled agents within decentralized systems that employ no-regret algorithms to update their behaviors over time. Specifically, we investigate two-player quantum zero-sum games and polymatrix quantum zero-sum games, showing that no-regret algorithms converge to separable quantum Nash equilibria in time-average. In the case of general multi-player quantum games, our work leads to a novel solution concept, that of the {separable} quantum coarse correlated equilibria (QCCE), as the convergent outcome of the time-averaged behavior no-regret algorithms, offering a natural solution concept for decentralized quantum systems. Finally, we show that computing QCCEs can be formulated as a semidefinite program and establish the existence of entangled (i.e., non-separable) QCCEs, which are unlearnable via the current paradigm of no-regret learning.

cs.GT

Data-Scarce Identification of Game Dynamics via Sum-of-Squares Optimization

Understanding how players adjust their strategies in games, based on their experience, is a crucial tool for policymakers. It enables them to forecast the system's eventual behavior, exert control over the system, and evaluate counterfactual scenarios. The task becomes increasingly difficult when only a limited number of observations are available or difficult to acquire. In this work, we introduce the Side-Information Assisted Regression (SIAR) framework, designed to identify game dynamics in multiplayer normal-form games only using data from a short run of a single system trajectory. To enhance system recovery in the face of scarce data, we integrate side-information constraints into SIAR, which restrict the set of feasible solutions to those satisfying game-theoretic properties and common assumptions about strategic interactions. SIAR is solved using sum-of-squares (SOS) optimization, resulting in a hierarchy of approximations that provably converge to the true dynamics of the system. We showcase that the SIAR framework accurately predicts player behavior across a spectrum of normal-form games, widely-known families of game dynamics, and strong benchmarks, even if the unknown system is chaotic.

cs.GT

A Primal-Dual Framework for Symmetric Cone Programming

In this paper, we introduce a primal-dual algorithmic framework for solving Symmetric Cone Programs (SCPs), a versatile optimization model that unifies and extends Linear, Second-Order Cone (SOCP), and Semidefinite Programming (SDP). Our work generalizes the primal-dual framework for SDPs introduced by Arora and Kale, leveraging a recent extension of the Multiplicative Weights Update method (MWU) to symmetric cones. Going beyond existing works, our framework can handle SOCPs and mixed SCPs, exhibits nearly linear time complexity, and can be effectively parallelized. To illustrate the efficacy of our framework, we employ it to develop approximation algorithms for two geometric optimization problems: the Smallest Enclosing Sphere problem and the Support Vector Machine problem. Our theoretical analyses demonstrate that the two algorithms compute approximate solutions in nearly linear running time and with parallel depth scaling polylogarithmically with the input size. We compare our algorithms against CGAL as well as interior point solvers applied to these problems. Experiments show that our algorithms are highly efficient when implemented on a CPU and achieve substantial speedups when parallelized on a GPU, allowing us to solve large-scale instances of these problems.

math.OC

Entangling capabilities and unitary quantum games

We consider a class of games between two competing players that take turns acting on the same many-body quantum register. Each player can perform unitary operations on the register, and after each one of them acts on the register the energy is measured. Player A aims to maximize the energy while player B to minimize it. This class of zero-sum games has a clear second mover advantage if both players can entangle the same portion of the register. We show, however, that if the first player can entangle a larger number of qubits than the second player (which we refer to as having quantum advantage), then the second mover advantage can be significantly reduced. We study the game for different types of quantum advantage of player A versus player B and for different sizes of the register, in particular, scenarios in which absolutely maximally entangled states cannot be achieved. In this case, we also study the effectiveness of using random unitaries. Last, we consider mixed initial preparations of the register, in which case the player with a quantum advantage can rely on strategies stemming from the theory of ergotropy of quantum batteries.

quant-ph