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Anushka Murthy

Publications and source records attributed to Anushka Murthy.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

One-Sided Randomization in Two-Sided Platform Experiments: Which Side Should be Randomized?

Two-sided marketplace platforms often use randomized experiments to evaluate new features, raising the question of whether to randomize customers or listings. Randomizing the smaller (\emph{short}) side can reduce interference bias due to weaker competition, while randomizing the larger (\emph{long}) side provides a larger nominal sample, potentially reducing variance. On the surface, these competing considerations suggest a bias-variance trade-off in choosing which side to randomize. We investigate this trade-off in a two-sided marketplace with first-come, first-served (FCFS) booking and heterogeneous customer preferences, studying the bias and variance of difference-in-means estimators of the global average treatment effect. Our findings suggest that rather than a bias-variance tradeoff, in fact short-side randomization is generally preferable on {\em both} dimensions. We prove these results in an asymptotic regime where market imbalance increases. We establish conditions under which (1) short-side randomization eliminates first-order interference bias, while long-side randomization retains it; and (2) short-side randomization also achieves a variance rate of no larger asymptotic order than long-side randomization. The key insight is that although the long side contains more participants, the number of matches is constrained by the population on the short side, limiting the apparent variance advantage of randomizing a larger sample. Our conditions accommodate heterogeneous preferences and treatment effects and are satisfied by familiar logit models of customer choice. Together, these findings support randomizing on the short side, despite the larger sample size available on the long side.

stat.ME↗

Can Labor Markets Function in the Age of AI? The Evaluation Bottleneck in Hiring

AI-assisted job-search tools have become increasingly popular by making it easier to find and apply to jobs. But by making it easier for applicants to generate and tailor application materials, they can also reduce how informative those materials are about applicant fit. We study this tradeoff in a hiring market where applicants differ in experience and latent match quality and firms use noisy application materials to decide whom to screen. We ask how AI affects downstream screening and hiring, and which applicants are most adversely affected. As application materials become less informative, a Bayesian firm rationally relies more heavily on coarse observables such as prior experience. Among the four applicant types defined by experience and compatibility for the job, inexperienced-compatible applicants are the most exposed: they lack observable experience and lose the individualized information that could distinguish them from other inexperienced candidates. When screening is costly, these changes can also generate inefficient screening failures in which firms screen no applicants or screen only experienced applicants. We then show that multistage hiring can arise as an endogenous firm response: a relatively inexpensive intermediate assessment allows firms to acquire new evidence of fit before costly full screening. This can restore screening opportunities that disappear under one-stage hiring and give inexperienced-compatible applicants a path to screening. Our results show how AI can shift the central friction in hiring from submitting applications to obtaining credible evaluation, creating entry barriers for high-fit workers without prior experience. Multistage hiring can endogenously arise in response, restoring evaluation opportunities that would otherwise disappear and helping preserve market functioning.

cs.GT↗

When Does Interference Matter? Decision-Making in Platform Experiments

This paper investigates decision-making in A/B experiments for online platforms and marketplaces. In such settings, due to constraints on inventory, A/B experiments typically lead to biased estimators because of *interference* between treatment and control groups; this phenomenon has been well studied in recent literature. By contrast, there has been relatively little discussion of the impact of interference on decision-making. In this paper, we analyze a benchmark Markovian model of an inventory-constrained platform, where arriving customers book listings that are limited in supply. We focus on the commonly used frequentist hypothesis testing approach for making launch decisions based on data from customer-randomized experiments, and we study the impact of interference on (1) false positive probability and (2) statistical power. We obtain three main findings. First, we show that for *sign-consistent* treatments -- i.e., those where the treatment changes booking probabilities in the same direction relative to control for all states of inventory availability -- the false positive probability of a test statistic using the standard difference-in-means estimator with a corresponding naïve variance estimator is correctly controlled. Second, we demonstrate that for sign-consistent treatments in realistic settings, the statistical power of this naïve approach is higher than that of any similar pipeline using a debiased estimator. Taken together, these two findings suggest that platforms may be better off *not* debiasing when treatments are sign-consistent. Third, using numerics, we investigate false positive probability and statistical power when treatments are sign-inconsistent, and we show that in principle, the performance of the naïve approach can be arbitrarily worse in such cases.

stat.ME↗

One-point asymptotics for half-flat ASEP

We consider the asymmetric simple exclusion process (ASEP) with half-flat initial condition. We show that the one-point marginals of the ASEP height function are described by those of the $\mbox{Airy}_{2 \rightarrow 1}$ process, introduced by Borodin-Ferrari-Sasamoto in (Commun. Pure Appl. Math., 61, 1603-1629, 2008). This result was conjectured by Ortmann-Quastel-Remenik (Ann. Appl. Probab., 26, 507-548), based on an informal asymptotic analysis of exact formulas for generating functions of the half-flat ASEP height function at one spatial point. Our present work provides a fully rigorous derivation and asymptotic analysis of the same generating functions, under certain parameter restrictions of the model.

math.PR↗