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Anushka Vidanage

Publications and source records attributed to Anushka Vidanage.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Learning from Anonymized and Incomplete Tabular Data

User-driven privacy allows individuals to control whether and at what granularity their data is shared, leading to datasets that mix original, generalized, and missing values within the same records and attributes. While such representations are intuitive for privacy, they pose challenges for machine learning, which typically treats non-original values as new categories or as missing, thereby discarding generalization semantics. For learning from such tabular data, we propose novel data transformation strategies that account for heterogeneous anonymization and evaluate them alongside standard imputation and LLM-based approaches. We employ multiple datasets, privacy configurations, and deployment scenarios, demonstrating that our method reliably regains utility. Our results show that generalized values are preferable to pure suppression, that the best data preparation strategy depends on the scenario, and that consistent data representations are crucial for maintaining downstream utility. Overall, our findings highlight that effective learning is tied to the appropriate handling of anonymized values.

cs.LG

Information Leakage in Data Linkage

The process of linking databases that contain sensitive information about individuals across organisations is an increasingly common requirement in the health and social science research domains, as well as with governments and businesses. To protect personal data, protocols have been developed to limit the leakage of sensitive information. Furthermore, privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) techniques have been proposed to conduct linkage on encoded data. While PPRL techniques are now being employed in real-world applications, the focus of PPRL research has been on the technical aspects of linking sensitive data (such as encoding methods and cryptanalysis attacks), but not on organisational challenges when employing such techniques in practice. We analyse what sensitive information can possibly leak, either unintentionally or intentionally, in traditional data linkage as well as PPRL protocols, and what a party that participates in such a protocol can learn from the data it obtains legitimately within the protocol. We also show that PPRL protocols can still result in the unintentional leakage of sensitive information. We provide recommendations to help data custodians and other parties involved in a data linkage project to identify and prevent vulnerabilities and make their project more secure.

cs.CR