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Anyan Qi

Publications and source records attributed to Anyan Qi.

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The Scaling Paradox in Human-AI Collaboration

The discovery of scaling laws has highlighted the extraordinary potential of AI systems with a striking empirical pattern: as AI systems scale, their capabilities tend to improve predictably. Yet, in real-world applications, AI rarely operates in isolation; instead, it often works alongside humans, raising the question of whether these gains persist in human-AI collaboration. In this work, we develop an analytical model to examine when the empirical scaling benefits of AI translate into improved human-AI joint system performance. We demonstrate that the performance of a human-AI system can scale positively as the AI scales up-provided that humans have an accurate perception of the AI's capabilities. Human misperception, however, can fundamentally alter this relationship: i) when humans over-perceive the AI's capabilities, a scaling paradox may arise, in which greater AI scale reduces overall system performance and amplifies firm-level profit losses, and (ii) when humans under-perceive the AI's capabilities, performance still improves with scale but at a substantially slower rate. We further show that firms can actively manage these distortions through operational policies such as cost internalization and perception alignment, whose effectiveness depends on the economics of AI deployment and the direction of human misperception. These findings suggest that organizations may benefit more from managing the human-AI interface than from simply investing in larger, more expensive AI systems. More broadly, our results suggest that AI scaling should be viewed not only as a technological challenge, but also as a behavioral and operational one, and caution against the view that larger AI systems will automatically lead to better operational outcomes. Whether AI scaling creates value ultimately depends on how increased AI capabilities shape human beliefs and collaborative efforts.

cs.AI

Startup Contracting and Entrepreneur-Investor Bargaining (Long Version)

To grow their businesses, entrepreneurs often rely on equity funding. This paper focuses on two elements of entrepreneur-investor equity negotiations: the number of potential investors and the contractual complexity surrounding investor protection. Our approach involves a theoretical model and a series of laboratory experiments that analyze the effects of different bargaining conditions and contractual terms on the equity (ownership) split between entrepreneurs and their investors. We show that the conventional wisdom that entrepreneurs should seek to negotiate with as many investors as possible, while consistent with the theoretical model, is not true in the data. Indeed, negotiating with multiple investors reduces the entrepreneur's profits under most conditions. We also show that investor downside protections may disadvantage early-stage startups, but can be beneficial to later-stage startups. A refinement of belief modeling in multi-party bargaining, as well as a stylized risk allocation framework, reconcile these results with theory predictions. Our findings provide a decision framework for entrepreneurs to optimize their approach to investors and negotiate favorable contractual terms.

econ.GN