arXiv subjects

Argyrios Deligkas

Publications and source records attributed to Argyrios Deligkas.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Delegated Fair Division

Motivated by recently introduced problems on delegated resource allocation, we study a model of fair division, where a set of indivisible goods is to be allocated to some agents, each of which belonging to some bigger central entity. Our model captures the general framework of allocating resources to organizational units, which subsequently distribute them to their affiliated members. A particularly relevant application of this framework, with immense social impact, arises in the allocation of food donations through charitable organizations. In essence, every center acts as the representative of the agents belonging to it, aligning their generally different preferences. Our goal is to distribute the goods in a way that is simultaneously fair both with respect to the centers and the agents. We distinguish two different information structures depending on whether the agents compare their bundles against every agent or only those belonging to the same center. For each one of them we provide efficient algorithms that produce allocations that satisfy envy-based fairness guarantees at both levels.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences

We study network allocation games in which a set of agents must be allocated to (a subset of) the vertices of a graph topology. The agents are anonymous and strategic: Each of them aims to maximize her utility, which is a function of the number of agents in the neighborhood of their allocated vertex. We focus on the existence and the computation of stable allocations under various notions of stability. More specifically, we study swap-based stability notions, where agents can exchange locations between them, and jump-based stability notions, where agents can jump to an empty vertex of the graph. For almost all stability notions we consider, we provide dichotomies between existence and intractability that depend on the structure of the utility functions of the agents and the topology. In addition, we prove strong intractability results for computing welfare-maximizing allocations and for verifying whether a given allocation is Pareto optimal.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Fisher Markets with Approximately Optimal Bundles and the Need for a PCP Theorem for PPAD

We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, meaning that every buyer receives a $(1-δ)$-optimal bundle, instead of a perfectly optimal one. We establish the first intractability result for the problem by showing that it is PPAD-hard for some constant $δ> 0$, assuming the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture. This hardness result holds even if all buyers have identical budgets (competitive equilibrium with equal incomes), linear capped utilities, and even if we also allow $\varepsilon$-approximate clearing instead of perfect clearing, for any constant $\varepsilon < 1/9$. Importantly, we show that the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture is in fact required to show hardness for constant $δ$: showing PPAD-hardness for finding such approximate market equilibria in a broad class of markets encompassing those generated by our hardness result would prove the conjecture. This is the first natural problem where the conjecture is provably required to establish hardness for it.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Maximizing Reachability via Shifting of Temporal Paths

We examine the problem of maximizing the reachability of a given source in temporal graphs that are given as the union of k temporal paths, i.e., every given path is a sequence of edges with strictly increasing labels that denote availability in time. This type of temporal graphs represent train networks. We consider shifting operations on the labels of the paths that maintain their temporal continuity. This means that we can move the availability of a temporal edge later or earlier in time, and propagate the shifts to all other affected edges of the path in order to preserve its temporal connectivity. We study the parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to the number of paths k, and the total budget b, where b is the maximum number of shifts we are allowed to perform. Our results reveal that fixed parameter tractability can be achieved (1) when parameterized both by k and b, and (2) when parameterized by k, and b is unconstrained. In almost every other case, e.g., parameterized by a single parameter or parameterized by k, while having a bound on b, we establish intractability lower bounds that are matched by XP algorithms.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2026

Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets

We study the problem of computing approximate market equilibria in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. In this setting, the problem was only known to be PPAD-complete for inverse-polynomial approximations. We strengthen this result by showing PPAD-hardness for constant approximations. This means that the problem does not admit a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) unless PPAD$=$P. In fact, we prove that computing any approximation better than $1/11$ is PPAD-complete. As a direct byproduct of our main result, we get the same inapproximability bound for Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with SPLC utility functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Coordinated Motion Planning is FPT on Discretized Simple Polygons

In the coordinated motion planning problem, we are given a graph together with the starting and destination vertices of $k$ robots. At each time step, any subset of robots may move, each traversing an edge of the graph, provided that no two robots collide. The goal is to compute a schedule that routes all robots to their destinations while minimizing some objective function. In this paper, we focus on the well-studied objective of minimizing the total travel length of all robots. This problem is known to be NP-hard, and it has been shown to be fixed-parameter tractable (FPT), when parameterized by the number $k$ of robots, on full grids (SoCG 2023) and on bounded-treewidth graphs (ICALP 2024). We present a fixed-parameter algorithm for coordinated motion planning, parameterized by the number $k$ of robots, on graphs arising from discretizations of simple polygons. Such graphs are of particular interest in real-world applications, where planar motion is often constrained to discretized representations of polygonal environments. Moreover, these graphs generalize rectangular grids; consequently, our result constitutes a significant step toward resolving the parameterized complexity of coordinated motion planning on subgrids and, ultimately, planar graphs -- two prominent open problems in the field.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2026

Pizza Sharing is PPA-hard

We study the computational complexity of finding a solution for the straight-cut and square-cut pizza sharing problems. We show that computing an $\varepsilon$-approximate solution is PPA-complete for both problems, while finding an exact solution for the square-cut problem is FIXP-hard. Our PPA-hardness results apply for any $\varepsilon < 1/5$, even when all mass distributions consist of non-overlapping axis-aligned rectangles or when they are point sets, and our FIXP-hardness result applies even when all mass distributions are unions of squares and right-angled triangles. We also prove that the decision variants of both approximate problems are NP-complete, while the decision variant for the exact version of square-cut pizza sharing is $\exists\mathbb{R}$-complete.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2026

Stability in Distance Preservation Games on Graphs

We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an ideal (and possibly different) distance in which to be from some of the other agents. Given an allocation of agents, each one of them suffers a cost that is the sum of the differences from the ideal distance for each agent in their subset. The goal is to decide whether there is a stable allocation of the agents, i.e., no agent would like to deviate from their location. Specifically, we consider three different stability notions: envy-freeness, swap stability, and jump stability. We perform a comprehensive study of the (parameterized) complexity of the problem in three different dimensions: the topology of the graph, the number of agents, and the structure of preferences of the agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Parameterized Algorithms for Coordinated Motion Planning: Minimizing Energy

We study the parameterized complexity of a generalization of the coordinated motion planning problem on graphs, where the goal is to route a specified subset of a given set of $k$ robots to their destinations with the aim of minimizing the total energy (i.e., the total length traveled). We develop novel techniques to push beyond previously-established results that were restricted to solid grids. We design a fixed-parameter additive approximation algorithm for this problem parameterized by $k$ alone. This result, which is of independent interest, allows us to prove the following two results pertaining to well-studied coordinated motion planning problems: (1) A fixed-parameter algorithm, parameterized by $k$, for routing a single robot to its destination while avoiding the other robots, which is related to the famous Rush-Hour Puzzle; and (2) a fixed-parameter algorithm, parameterized by $k$ plus the treewidth of the input graph, for the standard \textsc{Coordinated Motion Planning} (CMP) problem in which we need to route all the $k$ robots to their destinations. The latter of these results implies, among others, the fixed-parameter tractability of CMP parameterized by $k$ on graphs of bounded outerplanarity, which include bounded-height subgrids. We complement the above results with a lower bound which rules out the fixed-parameter tractability for CMP when parameterized by the total energy. This contrasts the recently-obtained tractability of the problem on solid grids under the same parameterization. As our final result, we strengthen the aforementioned fixed-parameter tractability to hold not only on solid grids but all graphs of bounded local treewidth -- a class including, among others, all graphs of bounded genus.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2026

Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location

We study a distributed facility location problem in which a set of agents, each with a private position on the real line, is partitioned into a collection of fixed, disjoint groups. The goal is to open $k$ facilities at locations chosen from the set of positions reported by the agents. This decision is made by mechanisms that operate in two phases. In Phase 1, each group selects the position of one of its agents to serve as the group's representative location. In Phase 2, $k$ representatives are chosen as facility locations. Once the facility locations are determined, each agent incurs an individual cost, defined either as the sum of its distances to all facilities (sum-variant) or as the distance to its farthest facility (max-variant). We focus on the class of strategyproof mechanisms, which preclude the agents from benefiting through strategic misreporting, and establish tight bounds on the approximation ratio with respect to the social cost (the total individual agent cost) in both variants.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Public Goods Games in Directed Networks with Constraints on Sharing

In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph, and there is a capacity constraint on their number, k, that can benefit from the good. This means that each player makes a two-pronged decision: decide whether or not to buy and, conditional on buying, choose which k out-neighbors to share access. We examine both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in the model from the perspective of existence, computation, and efficiency. We perform a comprehensive study for these three dimensions with respect to both sharing capacity (k) and the network structure (the underlying directed graph), and establish sharp complexity dichotomies for each.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Minimizing Reachability Times on Temporal Graphs via Shifting Labels

We study how we can accelerate the spreading of information in temporal graphs via shifting operations; a problem that captures real-world applications varying from information flows to distribution schedules. In a temporal graph there is a set of fixed vertices and the available connections between them change over time in a predefined manner. We observe that, in some cases, shifting some connections, i.e., advancing or delaying them, can decrease the travel time from some vertex (source) to another vertex. We study how we can minimize the maximum time a set of sources needs to reach every vertex, when we are allowed to shift some of the connections. If we restrict the allowed number of changes, we prove that, already for a single source, the problem is NP-hard, and W[2]-hard when parameterized by the number of changes. Then we focus on unconstrained number of changes. We derive a polynomial-time algorithm when there is a single source. When there are two sources, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard; on the other hand, we design an FPT algorithm parameterized by the treewidth of the graph plus the lifetime of the optimal solution, that works for any number of sources. Finally, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for several graph classes.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Parameterized Complexity of Temporal Connected Components: Treewidth and k-Path Graphs

We study the parameterized complexity of maximum temporal connected components (tccs) in temporal graphs, i.e., graphs that deterministically change over time. In a tcc, any pair of vertices must be able to reach each other via a time-respecting path. We consider both problems of maximum open tccs (openTCC), which allow temporal paths through vertices outside the component, and closed tccs (closedTCC) which require at least one temporal path entirely within the component for every pair. We focus on the structural parameter of treewidth, tw, and the recently introduced temporal parameter of temporal path number, tpn, which is the minimum number of paths needed to fully describe a temporal graph. We prove that these parameters on their own are not sufficient for fixed parameter tractability: both openTCC and closedTCC are NP-hard even when tw=9, and closedTCC is NP-hard when tpn=6. In contrast, we prove that openTCC is in XP when parameterized by tpn. On the positive side, we show that both problem become fixed parameter tractable under various combinations of structural and temporal parameters that include, tw plus tpn, tw plus the lifetime of the graph, and tw plus the maximum temporal degree.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions

We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural case study, we consider facility location on the line: $n$ strategic agents report their preferred locations, and a mechanism places a facility to minimize a social cost function. In our setting, the $z$ agents farthest from the chosen facility are excluded from the social cost. While it may seem intuitive that discarding outliers improves efficiency, our results reveal that the opposite can hold. We derive tight bounds for deterministic strategyproof mechanisms under the two most-studied objectives: utilitarian and egalitarian social cost. Our results offer a comprehensive view of the impact of outliers. We first show that when $z \ge n/2$, no strategyproof mechanism can achieve a bounded approximation for either objective. For egalitarian cost, selecting the $(z + 1)$-th order statistic is strategyproof and 2-approximate. In fact, we show that this is best possible by providing a matching lower bound. Notably, this lower bound of 2 persists even when the mechanism has access to a prediction of the optimal location, in stark contrast to the setting without outliers. For utilitarian cost, we show that strategyproof mechanisms cannot effectively exploit outliers, leading to the counterintuitive outcome that approximation guarantees worsen as the number of outliers increases. However, in this case, access to a prediction allows us to design a strategyproof mechanism achieving the best possible trade-off between consistency and robustness. Finally, we also establish lower bounds for randomized mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Balanced and Fair Partitioning of Friends

In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$ balanced-sized groups, keeping in mind that the value of an agent for a group equals the number of edges they have in that group. The goal is to construct partitions that are "fair", i.e., no agent would like to replace an agent in a different group. We generalize the standard model by considering utilities for the agents that are beyond binary and additive. Having this as our foundation, our contribution is threefold (a) we adapt several fairness notions that have been developed in the fair division literature to our setting; (b) we give several existence guarantees supported by polynomial-time algorithms; (c) we initiate the study of the computational (and parameterized) complexity of the model and provide an almost complete landscape of the (in)tractability frontier for our fairness concepts.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods

We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate the remaining items. Given the known NP-hardness of the problem, we investigate whether -- and under which conditions -- one can obtain fixed-parameter algorithms for computing a solution in settings where most of the allocation is already fixed. Our results provide a broad complexity-theoretic classification of the problem which includes: (a) fixed-parameter algorithms tailored to settings with few distinct types of agents or items; (b) lower bounds which exclude the generalization of these positive results to more general settings. We conclude by showing that -- unlike when computing allocations from scratch -- the non-algorithmic question of whether more relaxed EFX allocations exist can be completely resolved in the extension setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games

We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those reported by the agents. Given a feasible solution, each agent suffers an individual cost that is either its total distance to all facilities (sum-variant) or its distance to the farthest facility (max-variant). For both variants, we show tight bounds on the approximation ratio of strategyproof mechanisms in terms of the social cost, the total individual cost of the agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Constant Inapproximability for PPA

In the $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving problem, we are given $n$ probability measures $v_1, \dots, v_n$ on the interval $R = [0,1]$, and the goal is to partition $R$ into two parts $R^+$ and $R^-$ using at most $n$ cuts, so that $|v_i(R^+) - v_i(R^-)| \leq \varepsilon$ for all $i$. This fundamental fair division problem was the first natural problem shown to be complete for the class PPA, and all subsequent PPA-completeness results for other natural problems have been obtained by reducing from it. We show that $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving is PPA-complete even when the parameter $\varepsilon$ is a constant. In fact, we prove that this holds for any constant $\varepsilon < 1/5$. As a result, we obtain constant inapproximability results for all known natural PPA-complete problems, including Necklace-Splitting, the Discrete-Ham-Sandwich problem, two variants of the pizza sharing problem, and for finding fair independent sets in cycles and paths.

cs.CC↗