arXiv subjects

Ariel D. Procaccia

Publications and source records attributed to Ariel D. Procaccia.

63 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2015

Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries

The stochastic matching problem deals with finding a maximum matching in a graph whose edges are unknown but can be accessed via queries. This is a special case of stochastic $k$-set packing, where the problem is to find a maximum packing of sets, each of which exists with some probability. In this paper, we provide edge and set query algorithms for these two problems, respectively, that provably achieve some fraction of the omniscient optimal solution. Our main theoretical result for the stochastic matching (i.e., $2$-set packing) problem is the design of an \emph{adaptive} algorithm that queries only a constant number of edges per vertex and achieves a $(1-ε)$ fraction of the omniscient optimal solution, for an arbitrarily small $ε>0$. Moreover, this adaptive algorithm performs the queries in only a constant number of rounds. We complement this result with a \emph{non-adaptive} (i.e., one round of queries) algorithm that achieves a $(0.5 - ε)$ fraction of the omniscient optimum. We also extend both our results to stochastic $k$-set packing by designing an adaptive algorithm that achieves a $(\frac{2}{k} - ε)$ fraction of the omniscient optimal solution, again with only $O(1)$ queries per element. This guarantee is close to the best known polynomial-time approximation ratio of $\frac{3}{k+1} -ε$ for the \emph{deterministic} $k$-set packing problem [Furer and Yu, 2013] We empirically explore the application of (adaptations of) these algorithms to the kidney exchange problem, where patients with end-stage renal failure swap willing but incompatible donors. We show on both generated data and on real data from the first 169 match runs of the UNOS nationwide kidney exchange that even a very small number of non-adaptive edge queries per vertex results in large gains in expected successful matches.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2014

Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms

It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms, whose truthfulness can be verified efficiently (in the computational sense). Our approach involves three steps: (i) specifying the structure of mechanisms, (ii) constructing a verification algorithm, and (iii) measuring the quality of verifiably truthful mechanisms. We demonstrate this approach using a case study: approximate mechanism design without money for facility location.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power

We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. Previously it has been shown that, under some conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number of manipulators is $o(\sqrt{n})$, where $n$ is the number of voters, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of voters goes to infinity, whereas if the number of manipulators is $ω(\sqrt{n})$, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable goes to one. Here we consider the critical window, where a coalition has size $c\sqrt{n}$, and we show that as $c$ goes from zero to infinity, the limiting probability that a random profile is manipulable goes from zero to one in a smooth fashion, i.e., there is a smooth phase transition between the two regimes. This result analytically validates recent empirical results, and suggests that deciding the coalitional manipulation problem may be of limited computational hardness in practice.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Audit Games

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks, and Web services providers) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes a solution that is arbitrarily close to the optimal solution.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

A Maximum Likelihood Approach For Selecting Sets of Alternatives

We consider the problem of selecting a subset of alternatives given noisy evaluations of the relative strength of different alternatives. We wish to select a k-subset (for a given k) that provides a maximum likelihood estimate for one of several objectives, e.g., containing the strongest alternative. Although this problem is NP-hard, we show that when the noise level is sufficiently high, intuitive methods provide the optimal solution. We thus generalize classical results about singling out one alternative and identifying the hidden ranking of alternatives by strength. Extensive experiments show that our methods perform well in practical settings.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2012

Bayesian Vote Manipulation: Optimal Strategies and Impact on Welfare

Most analyses of manipulation of voting schemes have adopted two assumptions that greatly diminish their practical import. First, it is usually assumed that the manipulators have full knowledge of the votes of the nonmanipulating agents. Second, analysis tends to focus on the probability of manipulation rather than its impact on the social choice objective (e.g., social welfare). We relax both of these assumptions by analyzing optimal Bayesian manipulation strategies when the manipulators have only partial probabilistic information about nonmanipulator votes, and assessing the expected loss in social welfare (in the broad sense of the term). We present a general optimization framework for the derivation of optimal manipulation strategies given arbitrary voting rules and distributions over preferences. We theoretically and empirically analyze the optimal manipulability of some popular voting rules using distributions and real data sets that go well beyond the common, but unrealistic, impartial culture assumption. We also shed light on the stark difference between the loss in social welfare and the probability of manipulation by showing that even when manipulation is likely, impact to social welfare is slight (and often negligible).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2010

Mix and Match

Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to maximize the number of matches despite self-interest, with agents that each want to maximize the number of their own vertices that match. Each agent can choose to hide some of its vertices, and then privately match the hidden vertices with any of its own vertices that go unmatched by the mechanism. A prominent application of this model is to kidney exchange, where agents correspond to hospitals and vertices to donor-patient pairs. Here hospitals may game an exchange by holding back pairs and harm social welfare. In this paper we seek to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents cannot benefit from hiding vertices, and approximately maximize efficiency, i.e., produce a matching that is close in cardinality to the maximum cardinality matching. Our main result is the design and analysis of the eponymous Mix-and-Match mechanism; we show that this randomized mechanism is strategyproof and provides a 2-approximation. Lower bounds establish that the mechanism is near optimal.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2009

Sum of Us: Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors

We consider directed graphs over a set of n agents, where an edge (i,j) is taken to mean that agent i supports or trusts agent j. Given such a graph and an integer k\leq n, we wish to select a subset of k agents that maximizes the sum of indegrees, i.e., a subset of k most popular or most trusted agents. At the same time we assume that each individual agent is only interested in being selected, and may misreport its outgoing edges to this end. This problem formulation captures realistic scenarios where agents choose among themselves, which can be found in the context of Internet search, social networks like Twitter, or reputation systems like Epinions. Our goal is to design mechanisms without payments that map each graph to a k-subset of agents to be selected and satisfy the following two constraints: strategyproofness, i.e., agents cannot benefit from misreporting their outgoing edges, and approximate optimality, i.e., the sum of indegrees of the selected subset of agents is always close to optimal. Our first main result is a surprising impossibility: for k \in {1,...,n-1}, no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a finite approximation ratio. Our second main result is a randomized strategyproof mechanism with an approximation ratio that is bounded from above by four for any value of k, and approaches one as k grows.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2009

Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks

We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents to the location of the facility. Specifically, we are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. We wish to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents can never benefit by lying, or, even better, group strategyproof, in the sense that a coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. At the same time, our mechanisms must provide a small approximation ratio with respect to one of two optimization targets: the social cost or the maximum cost. We give an almost complete characterization of the feasible truthful approximation ratio under both target functions, deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and with respect to different network topologies. Our main results are: We show that a simple randomized mechanism is group strategyproof and gives a (2-2/n)-approximation for the social cost, where n is the number of agents, when the network is a circle (known as a ring in the case of computer networks); we design a novel "hybrid" strategyproof randomized mechanism that provides a tight approximation ratio of 3/2 for the maximum cost when the network is a circle; and we show that no randomized SP mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2-o(1) to the maximum cost even when the network is a tree, thereby matching a trivial upper bound of two.

cs.GT↗