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Ariel Fernandez

Publications and source records attributed to Ariel Fernandez.

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Catastrophic Phase Transitions and Early Warnings in a Spatial Ecological Model

Gradual changes in exploitation, nutrient loading, etc. produce shifts between alternative stable states (ASS) in ecosystems which, quite often, are not smooth but abrupt or catastrophic. Early warnings of such catastrophic regime shifts are fundamental for designing management protocols for ecosystems. Here we study the spatial version of a popular ecological model, involving a logistically growing single species subject to exploitation, which is known to exhibit ASS. Spatial heterogeneity is introduced by a carrying capacity parameter varying from cell to cell in a regular lattice. Transport of biomass among cells is included in the form of diffusion. We investigate whether different quantities from statistical mechanics -like the variance, the two-point correlation function and the patchiness- may serve as early warnings of catastrophic phase transitions between the ASS. In particular, we find that the patch-size distribution follows a power law when the system is close to the catastrophic transition. We also provide links between spatial and temporal indicators and analyze how the interplay between diffusion and spatial heterogeneity may affect the earliness of each of the observables. We find that possible remedial procedures, which can be followed after these early signals, are more effective as the diffusion becomes lower. Finally, we comment on similarities and differences between these catastrophic shifts and paradigmatic thermodynamic phase transitions like the liquid-vapour change of state for a fluid like water.

q-bio.PE

Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.

physics.soc-ph