arXiv subjects

Ariel Schvartzman

Publications and source records attributed to Ariel Schvartzman.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities

A tournament on $n$ agents is a complete oriented graph with the agents as vertices and edges that describe the win-loss outcomes of the $\binom{n}{2}$ matches played between each pair of agents. The winner of a tournament is determined by a tournament rule that maps tournaments to probability distributions over the agents. We want these rules to be fair (choose a high-quality agent) and robust to strategic manipulation. Prior work has shown that under minimally fair rules, manipulations between two agents can be prevented when utility is nontransferable but not when utility is completely transferable. We introduce a partially transferable utility model that interpolates between these two extremes using a selfishness parameter $λ$. Our model is that an agent may be willing to lose on purpose, sacrificing some of her own chance of winning, but only if the colluding pair's joint gain is more than $λ$ times the individual's sacrifice. We show that no fair tournament rule can prevent manipulations when $λ< 1$. We computationally solve for fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules for $λ= 1$ for up to 6 agents. We conjecture and leave as a major open problem that such a tournament rule exists for all $n$. We analyze the trade-offs between ``relative'' and ``absolute'' approximate strategyproofness for previously studied rules and derive as a corollary that all of these rules require $λ\geq Ω(n)$ to be robust to manipulation. We show that for stronger notions of fairness, non-manipulable tournament rules are closely related to tournament rules that witness decreasing gains from manipulation as the number of agents increases.

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arXiv2024

Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey

In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and optimal auction design.

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arXiv2024

On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three

A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the following desiderata. It must be Condorcet-consistent (henceforth, CC), meaning it selects as the winner the unique team that beats all other teams (if one exists). It must also be strongly non-manipulable for groups of size $k$ at probability $α$ (henceforth, k-SNM-$α$), meaning that no subset of $\leq k$ teams can fix the matches among themselves in order to increase the chances any of it's members being selected by more than $α$. Our contributions are threefold. First, wee consider a natural generalization of the Randomized Single Elimination Bracket rule from [Schneider et al. 2017] to $d$-ary trees and provide upper bounds to its manipulability. Then, we propose a novel tournament rule that is CC and 3-SNM-1/2, a strict improvement upon the concurrent work of [Dinev and Weinberg, 2022] who proposed a CC and 3-SNM-31/60 rule. Finally, we initiate the study of reductions among tournament rules.

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arXiv2024

Platform Competition in the Autobidding World

We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s) across all the platforms they participates in. In this paper, we focus on advertisers with return-over-investment (henceforth, ROI) constraints, i.e. each advertiser is trying to maximize value while making sure that their ROI across all platforms is no less than some target value. An advertiser interacts with the platforms through autobidders -- for each platform, the advertiser strategically chooses a target ROI to report to the platform's autobidder, which in turn uses a uniform bid multiplier to bid on the advertiser's behalf on the queries owned by the given platform. Our main result is that for a platform trying to maximize revenue, competition with other platforms is a key factor to consider when designing their auction. While first-price auctions are optimal (for both revenue and welfare) in the absence of competition, this no longer holds true in multi-platform settings. We show that there exists a large class of advertiser valuations over queries such that, from the platform's perspective, running a second price auction dominates running a first price auction. Furthermore, our analysis reveals the key factors influencing platform choice of auction format: (i) intensity of competition among advertisers, (ii) sensitivity of bid landscapes to an auction change (driven by advertiser sensitivity to price changes), and (iii) relative inefficiency of second-price auctions compared to first-price auctions.

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arXiv2022

Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling

Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that of any "simple" mechanism -- the ones with size polynomial in the number of items -- even with just two items and a single buyer (Briest et al. 2015, Hart and Nisan 2017). We introduce a new parameterized class of mechanisms, buy-$k$ mechanisms, which smoothly interpolate between the classical buy-one mechanisms and the recently studied buy-many mechanisms (Chawla et al. 2019, Chawla et al. 2020, Chawla et al. 2022). Buy-$k$ mechanisms allow the buyer to buy up to $k$ many menu options. We show that restricting the seller to the class of buy-$n$ incentive-compatible mechanisms suffices to overcome the bizarre, infinite revenue properties of the buy-one model. Our main result is that the revenue gap with respect to bundling, an extremely simple mechanism, is bounded by $O(n^2)$ for any arbitrarily correlated distribution $\mathcal{D}$ over $n$ items for the case of an additive buyer. Our techniques also allow us to prove similar upper bounds for arbitrary monotone valuations, albeit with an exponential factor in the approximation. On the negative side, we show that allowing the buyer to purchase a small number of menu options does not suffice to guarantee sub-exponential approximations, even when we weaken the benchmark to the optimal buy-$k$ deterministic mechanism. If an additive buyer is only allowed to buy $k = Θ(n^{1/2-\varepsilon})$ many menu options, the gap between the revenue-optimal deterministic buy-$k$ mechanism and bundling may be exponential in $n$. In particular, this implies that no "simple" mechanism can obtain a sub-exponential approximation in this regime.

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arXiv2022

On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $k$ heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values are drawn from a known, possibly correlated prior $\mathcal{D}$. It is known that there exist priors $\mathcal{D}$ such that simple mechanisms -- those with bounded menu complexity -- extract an arbitrarily small fraction of the optimal revenue. This paper considers the opposite direction: given a correlated distribution $\mathcal{D}$ witnessing an infinite separation between simple and optimal mechanisms, what can be said about $\mathcal{D}$? Previous work provides a framework for constructing such $\mathcal{D}$: it takes as input a sequence of $k$-dimensional vectors satisfying some geometric property, and produces a $\mathcal{D}$ witnessing an infinite gap. Our first main result establishes that this framework is without loss: every $\mathcal{D}$ witnessing an infinite separation could have resulted from this framework. Even earlier work provided a more streamlined framework. Our second main result establishes that this restrictive framework is not tight. That is, we provide an instance $\mathcal{D}$ witnessing an infinite gap, but which provably could not have resulted from the restrictive framework. As a corollary, we discover a new kind of mechanism which can witness these infinite separations on instances where the previous ''aligned'' mechanisms do not.

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arXiv2020

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents

We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK [2016] characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent. We ask: how far can such characterizations go? In particular, we consider single-minded agents. A seller has heterogenous items. A buyer has a value v for a specific subset of items S, and obtains value v iff he gets (at least) all the items in S. We show: 1. Deterministic mechanisms are optimal for distributions that satisfy the "declining marginal revenue" (DMR) property; we give an explicit construction of the optimal mechanism. 2. Without DMR, the result depends on the structure of the directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing the partial order among types. When the DAG has out-degree at most 1, we characterize the optimal mechanism a la FedEx. 3. Without DMR, when the DAG has some node with out-degree at least 2, we show that in this case the menu complexity is unbounded: for any M, there exist distributions over (v,S) pairs such that the menu complexity of the optimal mechanism is at least M. 4. For the case of 3 types, we show that for all distributions there exists an optimal mechanism of finite menu complexity. This is in contrast to 2 additive heterogenous items or which the menu complexity could be uncountable [MV07; DDT15]. In addition, we prove that optimal mechanisms for Multi-Unit Pricing (without DMR) can have unbounded menu complexity. We also propose an extension where the menu complexity of optimal mechanisms can be countable but not uncountable. Together these results establish that optimal mechanisms in interdimensional settings are both much richer than single-dimensional settings, yet also vastly more structured than multi-dimensional settings.

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arXiv2019

Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $n$ items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the items. Our main result is that a mechanism of quasi-polynomial symmetric menu complexity suffices to guarantee a $(1-\varepsilon)$-approximation when the buyer is unit-demand over independent items, even when the value distribution is unbounded, and that this mechanism can be found in quasi-polynomial time. Our key technical result is a polynomial time, (symmetric) menu-complexity-preserving black-box reduction from achieving a $(1-\varepsilon)$-approximation for unbounded valuations that are subadditive over independent items to achieving a $(1-O(\varepsilon))$-approximation when the values are bounded (and still subadditive over independent items). We further apply this reduction to deduce approximation schemes for a suite of valuation classes beyond our main result. Finally, we show that selling separately (which has exponential menu complexity) can be approximated up to a $(1-\varepsilon)$ factor with a menu of efficient-linear $(f(\varepsilon) \cdot n)$ symmetric menu complexity.

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arXiv2019

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which $n$ teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches. Prior work defines a tournament rule to be $k$-SNM-$α$ if no set of $\leq k$ teams can fix the $\leq \binom{k}{2}$ matches among them to increase their probability of winning by $>α$ and asks: for each $k$, what is the minimum $α(k)$ such that a Condorcet-consistent (i.e. always selects a Condorcet winner when one exists) $k$-SNM-$α(k)$ tournament rule exists? A simple example witnesses that $α(k) \geq \frac{k-1}{2k-1}$ for all $k$, and [Schneider et al., 2017] conjectures that this is tight (and prove it is tight for $k=2$). Our first result refutes this conjecture: there exists a sufficiently large $k$ such that no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is $k$-SNM-$1/2$. Our second result leverages similar machinery to design a new tournament rule which is $k$-SNM-$2/3$ for all $k$ (and this is the first tournament rule which is $k$-SNM-$(<1)$ for all $k$). Our final result extends prior work, which proves that single-elimination bracket with random seeding is $2$-SNM-$1/3$([Schneider et al., 2017]), in a different direction by seeking a stronger notion of fairness than Condorcet-consistence. We design a new tournament rule, which we call Randomized-King-of-the-Hill, which is $2$-SNM-$1/3$ and \emph{cover-consistent} (the winner is an uncovered team with probability $1$).

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arXiv2018

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values

Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal revenue is infinite, but the best "simple" mechanism achieves revenue at most one ([Briest et. al 15], [Hart and Nisan 13]), even when $m=2$. This result has long served as a cautionary tale discouraging the study of multi-item auctions without some notion of "independent items". In this work we initiate a smoothed analysis of such multi-item auction settings. We consider a buyer whose item values are drawn from an arbitrarily correlated multi-dimensional distribution then randomly perturbed with magnitude $δ$ under several natural perturbation models. On one hand, we prove that the ([Briest et. al 15], [Hart and Nisan 13]) construction is surprisingly robust to certain natural perturbations of this form, and the infinite gap remains. On the other hand, we provide a smoothed model such that the approximation guarantee of simple mechanisms is smoothed-finite. We show that when the perturbation has magnitude $δ$, pricing only the grand bundle guarantees an $O(1/δ)$-approximation to the optimal revenue. That is, no matter the (worst-case) initially correlated distribution, these tiny perturbations suffice to bring the gap down from infinite to finite. We further show that the same guarantees hold when $n$ buyers have values drawn from an arbitrarily correlated $mn$-dimensional distribution (without any dependence on $n$). Taken together, these analyses further pin down key properties of correlated distributions that result in large gaps between simplicity and optimality.

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arXiv2017

The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design

We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the context of the "FedEx" problem, a so-called "one-and-a-half-dimensional" setting where a single bidder has both a value and a deadline for receiving an [FGKK16]. The menu complexity of an auction is equal to the number of distinct (allocation, price) pairs that a bidder might receive [HN13]. We show the following when the bidder has $n$ possible deadlines: - Exponential menu complexity is necessary to be exactly optimal: There exist instances where the optimal mechanism has menu complexity is $2^n-1$. This matches exactly the upper bound provided by Fiat et al.'s algorithm, and resolves one of their open questions [FGKK16]. - Fully polynomial menu complexity is necessary and sufficient for approximation: For all instances, there exists a mechanism guaranteeing a multiplicative (1-ε)-approximation to the optimal revenue with menu complexity $O(n^{3/2}\sqrt{\frac{\min\{n/ε,\ln(v_{\max})\}}ε}) = O(n^2/ε)$, where $v_{\max}$ denotes the largest value in the support of integral distributions. - There exist instances where any mechanism guaranteeing a multiplicative $(1-O(1/n^2))$-approximation to the optimal revenue requires menu complexity $Ω(n^2)$. Our main technique is the polygon approximation of concave functions [Rote19], and our results here should be of independent interest. We further show how our techniques can be used to resolve an open question of [DW17] on the menu complexity of optimal auctions for a budget-constrained buyer.

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arXiv2016

Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all

While it is known that using network coding can significantly improve the throughput of directed networks, it is a notorious open problem whether coding yields any advantage over the multicommodity flow (MCF) rate in undirected networks. It was conjectured by Li and Li (2004) that the answer is "no". In this paper we show that even a small advantage over MCF can be amplified to yield a near-maximum possible gap. We prove that any undirected network with $k$ source-sink pairs that exhibits a $(1+\varepsilon)$ gap between its MCF rate and its network coding rate can be used to construct a family of graphs $G'$ whose gap is $\log(|G'|)^c$ for some constant $c < 1$. The resulting gap is close to the best currently known upper bound, $\log(|G'|)$, which follows from the connection between MCF and sparsest cuts. Our construction relies on a gap-amplifying graph tensor product that, given two graphs $G_1,G_2$ with small gaps, creates another graph $G$ with a gap that is equal to the product of the previous two, at the cost of increasing the size of the graph. We iterate this process to obtain a gap of $\log(|G'|)^c$ from any initial gap.

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arXiv2016

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of $n$ competitors. Specifically, $n$ competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r$ maps the result of all $\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches (called a tournament, $T$) to a distribution over winners. Rule $r$ is Condorcet-consistent if whenever $i$ wins all $n-1$ of her matches, $r$ selects $i$ with probability $1$. We consider strategic manipulation of tournaments where player $j$ might throw their match to player $i$ in order to increase the likelihood that one of them wins the tournament. Regardless of the reason why $j$ chooses to do this, the potential for manipulation exists as long as $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ increases by more than $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ decreases. Unfortunately, it is known that every Condorcet-consistent rule is manipulable (Altman and Kleinberg). In this work, we address the question of how manipulable Condorcet-consistent rules must necessarily be - by trying to minimize the difference between the increase in $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ and decrease in $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ for any potential manipulating pair. We show that every Condorcet-consistent rule is in fact $1/3$-manipulable, and that selecting a winner according to a random single elimination bracket is not $α$-manipulable for any $α> 1/3$. We also show that many previously studied tournament formats are all $1/2$-manipulable, and the popular class of Copeland rules (any rule that selects a player with the most wins) are all in fact $1$-manipulable, the worst possible. Finally, we consider extensions to match-fixing among sets of more than two players.

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