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Ariel Zadok

Publications and source records attributed to Ariel Zadok.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Agentic Attribution of Cloud Resource Ownership

Security tools raise findings across cloud environments, and AI agents now investigate and prioritize them. A finding is still resolved by people: it has to reach the people responsible for fixing it and accountable for the resource it concerns. Ownership is the organizational context that decides who that is. Where recorded, it is declared by hand in configuration management databases or owner tags and goes stale unless kept current; accounts are shared, and automation creates much of the infrastructure. The knowledge sits in work records, code history, audit logs and identity directories, encoded in each organization's own conventions. Recovering it poses four challenges: the signal is scattered across sources, none of them authoritative; the conventions that carry it differ between organizations; reaching an owner takes multi-hop links; and those related to a resource differ in the strength of their relation. We define ownership as a set of entities, people or teams, each related to the resource by one of five patterns ordered by strength. We present a reference architecture for agentic ownership attribution that derives ownership from these records instead of declaring it: it profiles an organization offline into tested signal procedures and an ownership playbook, then attributes each resource with a coordinator agent and parallel investigators, with confidence computed by rules. On 100 resources of 50 Amazon Web Services (AWS) resource types in one organization, we pool the architecture's candidates with those of an unprimed general-purpose agent and verify every evidence piece against the records. The architecture reaches 92.1% weighted recall and 86.6% weighted precision, against 54.8% and 77.4%, at 0.55 times the agent's cost per unit of coverage. The difference lies in people who build and change resources without an explicit owner, found through work records and code history.

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Organizational Context for the Enterprise Security Brain

Agents that investigate and decide on enterprise security reason over a machine-readable view of the environment: its assets, identities, configurations, relations, and findings. The correct judgment about an asset also depends on what the organization knows about it: who owns it, what business function it serves, which policy governs it, and which risks were accepted. Part of this knowledge can be inferred from machine state, such as an ownership tag; most of it is recorded by people in policies, audit reports, architecture diagrams, tickets, and conversations, outside machine state. We call this distance the organizational context gap. Closing it poses four challenges: extracting the right claims from heterogeneous organizational data and, at inference time, detecting claims made stale by live state, checking live state against the governing policy, and binding architecture diagrams, which carry the business logic, to live resources. We introduce organizational context as a layer of the enterprise security brain and define it with a taxonomy and six properties its representation must preserve. We then define a context model in which a claim carries one meaning, an attestation records each source that asserts it, strength is derived from live evidence at read time, and claims resolve onto the entities of the asset graph. On a production environment spanning AWS, Okta, Google Workspace, and GitHub, extraction recovers 0.80 of a pooled 1,355-claim ground truth at 0.87 precision, with 0.5% of extracted claims unsupported by their source. An agent reasoning over live state and resolved context raises the conflict in 0.97 of stale-finding tasks, and reaches answer correctness of 0.83 on policy-alignment tasks and 0.86 on architecture tasks.

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Coding Agents Aren't Enough! Evaluating an Enterprise Security Brain for Agentic Cloud Investigations

Cloud-security investigation is dominated by population tasks: which identities can read a data store, how many resources fail a control, what is reachable from another account. These resolve against a complete inventory, not a named object, so a partial answer to one is not a partial result but a different one. Coding agents can now be given read-only cloud credentials and asked to investigate directly, which raises the question of what a purpose-built security context layer still contributes. We evaluate the Sola Security Brain, a security intelligence layer whose relational substrate is resolved offline and whose security logic is evaluated against it at query time, against two coding agents operating the same live AWS environment through a read-only CLI, Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, over 28 investigation tasks. All three are scored by a blinded, tier-weighted, grounding-gated relative recall over one joint claim pool, so the scores share a denominator. The Sola Security Brain reaches 0.549 +/- 0.012 coverage against 0.340 +/- 0.011 for Claude Code and 0.281 +/- 0.006 for Codex, with the ordering identical in every grading draw. It leads 24 of 28 tasks from the cheapest model tier, at 17.8x and 20.8x lower cost per task than Claude Code and Codex. Beyond the aggregate, we describe an answer-level pattern we term sample-and-generalise: both agents enumerate a fraction of a large population, assert an unhedged universal negative, and disclose the sample size only in answer metadata rather than in the answer. In one task Claude Code reported that no bucket policies exist after checking four bucket families, in a sweep that sampled 40 of roughly 5,000 buckets, in an account where 65 buckets carry a wildcard-principal read grant.

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