Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Aristotelis Epanomeritakis

Publications and source records attributed to Aristotelis Epanomeritakis.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

When is statistical evidence strong enough? Using hypothesis tests to value data collection

We recast statistical significance as a choice between making an immediate policy recommendation and deferring it until further evidence is collected. We show that the welfare-optimal decision corresponds, under minimax regret, to a statistical test whose level depends on the cost and precision of additional evidence. Inverting this rule, we introduce and recommend reporting the abstention-value (A-value) alongside traditional p-values to determine where additional data collection is most needed. The A-value defines the break-even welfare cost of abstaining and recommending further experimentation given the initial evidence. When experimentation capacity is limited, prioritizing additional data collection where A-values are the largest yields finite-sample welfare guarantees. We illustrate its implications for economic program evaluation.

econ.EM↗

Learning What to Learn: Experimental Design when Combining Experimental with Observational Evidence

Experiments deliver credible treatment-effect estimates but, because they are costly, are often restricted to specific sites, small populations, or particular mechanisms. A common practice across several fields is therefore to combine experimental estimates with reduced-form or structural external (observational) evidence to answer broader policy questions, such as those involving general equilibrium effects or external validity. We develop a unified framework for the design of experiments when combined with external evidence, i.e., choosing which experiment(s) to run and how to allocate sample size under arbitrary budget constraints. Because observational evidence may suffer bias unknown ex-ante, we evaluate designs using a robust regret criterion that compares any candidate design to an oracle with knowledge about the observational study bias bound that jointly chooses the design and estimator. This yields a transparent bias-variance trade-off that does not require the researcher to specify a bias bound and relies only on information already needed for conventional power calculations. We illustrate the framework for studying general equilibrium effects of cash transfer programs.

econ.EM↗