arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Arkadii Slinko.
Hierarchical simple games - both disjunctive and conjunctive - are natural generalizations of simple majority games. They take their origin in the theory of secret sharing. Another important generalization of simple majority games with origin in economics and politics are weighted and roughly weighted majority games. In this paper we characterize roughly weighted hierarchical games identifying where the two approaches coincide.
In elections, a set of candidates ranked consecutively (though possibly in different order) by all voters is called a clone set, and its members are called clones. A clone structure is a family of all clone sets of a given election. In this paper we study properties of clone structures. In particular, we give an axiomatic characterization of clone structures, show their hierarchical structure, and analyze clone structures in single-peaked and single-crossing elections. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a minimal collection of clones that need to be collapsed for an election to become single-peaked, and we show that this problem is NP-hard for single-crossing elections.
In this paper we inititate the study of abstract simplicial complexes which are initial segments of qualitative probability orders. This is a natural class that contains the threshold complexes and is contained in the shifted complexes, but is equal to neither. In particular we construct a qualitative probability order on 26 atoms that has an initial segment which is not a threshold simplicial complex. Although 26 is probably not the minimal number for which such example exists we provide some evidence that it cannot be much smaller. We prove some necessary conditions for this class and make a conjecture as to a characterization of them. The conjectured characterization relies on some ideas from cooperative game theory.
Fine and Gill (1973) introduced the geometric representation for those comparative probability orders on n atoms that have an underlying probability measure. In this representation every such comparative probability order is represented by a region of a certain hyperplane arrangement. Maclagan (1999) asked how many facets a polytope, which is the closure of such a region, might have. We prove that the maximal number of facets is at least F_{n+1}, where F_n is the nth Fibonacci number. We conjecture that this lower bound is sharp. Our proof is combinatorial and makes use of the concept of flippable pairs introduced by Maclagan. We also obtain an upper bound which is not too far from the lower bound.
In many situations, both in human and artificial societies, cooperating agents have different status with respect to the activity and it is not uncommon that certain actions are only allowed to coalitions that satisfy certain criteria, e.g., to sufficiently large coalitions or coalitions which involve players of sufficient seniority. Simmons (1988) formalized this idea in the context of secret sharing schemes by defining the concept of a (disjunctive) hierarchical access structure. Tassa (2007) introduced their conjunctive counterpart. From the game theory perspective access structures in secret sharing schemes are simple games. In this paper we prove the duality between disjunctive and conjunctive hierarchical games. We introduce a canonical representation theorem for both types of hierarchical games and characterize disjunctive ones as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition. We give a short combinatorial proof of the Beimel-Tassa-Weinreb (2008) characterization of weighted disjunctive hierarchical games. By duality we get similar theorems for conjunctive hierarchical games.
The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be distance rationalized. In this paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalize Young's rule and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance. We show that the claim that Young's rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance is incorrect; in fact, these consensus class and distance yield a new rule which has not been studied before. We prove that, similarly to Young's rule, this new rule has a computationally hard winner determination problem.