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Arkady Bolotin

Publications and source records attributed to Arkady Bolotin.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Discreteness as ontology: A hodon-based approach to dark matter

This work proposes a geometric-statistical reinterpretation of the dark sector, grounded in a discrete spacetime framework composed of non-material spatial units termed hodons. Unlike particle-based dark matter models, hodons are kinematically inert and possess ultra-light effective mass derived from vacuum energy density and holographic volume bounds. We introduce a covariant scalar field $\mathcal{N}(x^\mu)$ representing local hodon density and derive an entropy-driven evolution equation consistent with causal structure and general relativity. The resulting stress-energy contribution from hodon fluctuations yields gravitational clumpiness without invoking new particles or modified gravity. A virial-based toy model demonstrates that baryonic matter surrounded by hodons forms stable, cored halo profiles, consistent with galactic rotation curves and low-mass halo observations. The framework naturally suppresses small-scale structure via spatial uncertainty relations, aligning with constraints from the Lyman-$\alpha$ forest and weak lensing. By integrating Bousso's covariant entropy bound and distinguishing between strong and weak holography, we situate the model within a broader epistemological context. These results suggest that dark sector phenomenology may emerge from the statistical geometry of space itself, offering a falsifiable alternative to particle dark matter.

physics.gen-ph

Finite geometry and black hole stability: Embedding discrete space into classical manifolds

The issue of defining the volume of black holes has significant implications for quantum gravity. Drawing on concepts from quantum theory and general relativity, several motivations for introducing discreteness in geometry can be proposed. However, to seriously consider any proposal for a discrete geometry, the identification problem and the challenge of defining a distance function within such a geometry must be addressed. This paper proposes the faithful embedding of sets representing spaces in finite geometry -- a specific type of discrete geometry characterized by a finite set of points -- into Riemannian manifolds as a solution to these problems. Similar to a classical measuring apparatus that interprets and understands quantum results in classical terms, classical geometry serves as a bridge between the discreteness of the physical world and our continuous understanding of the properties of space. In this framework, the volumetric density of information contained within a black hole is established, providing a consistent volume for the Schwarzschild black hole observed by all observers. Furthermore, the study finds that the minimum volume of the Schwarzschild black hole is non-zero. This fact implies that a black hole can only evaporate until its event horizon radius reaches the Planck length, signifying that black hole remnants are stable. Consequently, the total collapse of a black hole is prevented by the finite nature of the geometry describing physical space.

gr-qc

The holographic principle comes from finiteness of the universe's geometry

Discovered as an apparent pattern, a universal relation between geometry and information called the holographic principle has yet to be explained. This relation is unfolded in the present paper. As it is demonstrated there, the origin of the holographic principle lies in the fact that a geometry of physical space has only a finite number of points. Furthermore, it is shown that the puzzlement of the holographic principle can be explained by a magnification of grid cells used to discretize geometrical magnitudes such as areas and volumes into sets of points. To wit, when grid cells of the Planck scale are projected from the surface of the observable universe into its interior, they become enlarged. For that reason, the space inside the observable universe is described by the set of points whose cardinality is equal to the number of points that constitute the universe's surface.

physics.gen-ph

A geometry of space that satisfies the holographic principle

Conventional wisdom holds that any region of 3-space contains infinitely many points, and the Planck length scale determines the uncertainty in every measurement of distance between two separate points. Against such a backdrop, this uncertainty may be interpreted as resulting from either foaminess or discreteness of 3-space. But, as it is demonstrated in the present paper, neither of those interpretations is consistent with the holographic principle. In the paper it is shown that the statement ``The holographic principle holds true'' and the statement ``Each region in 3-space contains only a finite number of points'' are logically equivalent.

physics.gen-ph

Resolving the trans-Planckian problem along the lines of a finite geometry

In black hole physics, inflationary cosmology, and quantum field theories, it is conjectured that the physical laws are subject to radical changes below the Planck length. Such changes are due to effects of quantum gravity believed to become significant at the Planck length. However, a complete and consistent quantum theory of gravity is still missing, and candidate models of quantum gravity have not yet overcome major formal and conceptual difficulties. Another problem is how to determine a geometry of physical space that features a minimal length scale such as the Planck length. In the present paper it is demonstrated that the said geometry can be any geometric system omitting continuity, i.e., a geometry that possesses only a finite number of points.

physics.gen-ph

Physics in a finite geometry

The stipulation that no measurable quantity could have an infinite value is indispensable in physics. At the same time, in mathematics, the possibility of considering an infinite procedure as a whole is usually taken for granted. However, not only does such possibility run counter to computational feasibleness, but it also leads to the most serious problem in modern physics, to wit, the emergence of infinities in calculated physical quantities. Particularly, having agreed on the axiom of infinity for set theory -- the backbone of the theoretical foundations of calculus integrated in every branch of physics -- one could no longer rule out the existence of a classical field theory which is not quantizable, let alone renormalizable. By contrast, the present paper shows that negating the axiom of infinity results in physics acting in a finite geometry where it is ensured that all classical field theories are quantizable.

quant-ph

The paradox of classical reasoning

Intuitively, the more powerful a theory is, the greater the variety and quantity of ideas can be expressed through its formal language. Therefore, when comparing two theories concerning the same subject, it seems only reasonable to compare the expressive powers of their formal languages. On condition that the quantum mechanical description is universal and so can be applied to macroscopic systems, quantum theory is required to be more powerful than classical mechanics. This implies that the formal language of Hilbert space theory must be more expressive than that of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (the language of classical formalism). However, as shown in the paper, such a requirement cannot be met. As a result, classical and quantum formalisms cannot be in a hierarchical relation, that is, include one another. This fact puts in doubt the quantum-classical correspondence and undermines the reductionist approach to the physical world.

quant-ph

Overturning negative construal of quantum superposition

Construal of observable facts or events, that is, the manner in which we understand reality, is based not only on mathematical formulas of a theory suggested as a reasonable explanation for physical phenomena (like general relativity or quantum mechanics), but also on a mathematical model of reasoning used to analyze and appraise statements regarding the objective world (for example, logic of one type or the other). Hence, every time that a certain construal of reality encounters a problem, there is a choice between a modification to the mathematical formalism of the physical theory and a change in the model of reasoning. A case in point is negative construal of quantum superposition causing the problem of definite outcomes. To be sure, according to the said construal, it is not the case that a system being in a superposition of states is exclusively in one of the states constituting the superposition, which in turn implies that macroscopically differing outcomes of observation may appear all at once. The usual approach to the problem of definite outcomes is to modify the quantum mathematical formalism by adding to it some extra postulates (for instance, the postulate of wave function collapse). However, since none of the extra postulates proposed so far has gained broad acceptance, one may try another avenue to resolve the problem, namely, to replace logic with an alternative mathematical model of reasoning. This possibility is studied in the present paper.

quant-ph

Wave-particle duality and the objectiveness of "true" and "false"

The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, "true" and "false". Yet, even if we could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up of an interference pattern in the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of "true" and "false".

quant-ph

Discrimination against or in favor of qubits in quantum theory

Within context of quantum logic, it is possible to assign dispersion-free probabilities to experimental propositions pertaining to qubits. This makes qubits distinct from the rest of quantum systems since the latter do not admit probabilities having only values 0 and 1. The present paper shows that erasing qubit discrimination leads to a model of computation which permits execution of many primitive operations in a massive parallel way. In the paper, it is demonstrated that such a model (that can be called a quantum parallel random-access machine, QPRAM) is quantum mechanically plausible.

quant-ph

Equal cost of computation for truth and falsity of experimental quantum propositions necessitates quantum parallel computing

Notwithstanding interest and excitement building around quantum computing in the last decades, a concise statement saying where this computing can truly help is still missing. As it is shown in the present paper, equal cost of computation for truth and falsity of experimental quantum propositions (required in order to infer a conclusion from a premise) cannot be achieved with classical computing. On the other hand, this equality might be realized with quantum parallel computing provided that the efficiency of such computing can be greater than 1.

quant-ph

Algebraic assignments of truth values to experimental quantum propositions

Of what are experimental quantum propositions primary bearers? As it is widely accepted in the modern literature, rather than being bearers of truth and falsity, these entities are bearers of probability values. Consequently, their truth values can be regarded as no more than degenerate probabilities (i.e., ones that have only the values 0 and 1). The mathematical motivation for precedence of probabilistic semantics over propositional semantic for the logic of experimental quantum propositions is Gleason's theorem. It proves that the theory of probability measures on closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (which represent experimental quantum propositions) does not admit any probability measure having only the values 0 and 1. -- By contrast, in the present paper, it is proclaimed that experimental propositions about quantum systems are primary bearers of truth values. As this paper demonstrates, algebraic properties of separable Hilbert spaces of finite dimension equal or greater than 2 do not allow in valuations (that is, truth assignments) which are dispersion-free, i.e., total functions from the set of atomic propositions to the set of two objects, true and false. Providing a probability function can be interpreted as a measure of the (un)certainty in the assignment of truth values, the fact that valuations cannot be dispersion-free gives rise to probabilistic semantics for the logic of experimental quantum propositions.

quant-ph

Quantum state change in light of changes in valuational entropies

In the statement "The vector is an element of the closed linear subspace of the Hilbert space H", the predicate "... is an element of ..." might be not only determined, that is, either true or false (depending on whether set membership is applicable or inapplicable to the specified vector and subspace) but also undetermined, that is, neither true nor false. To evaluate the vagueness of set membership among arbitrary vectors and closed linear subspaces of H, the notion of the entropy of the predicate "... is an element of ..." is introduced in the present paper. Since each closed linear subspace in H uniquely represents the atomic proposition P about a quantum system, the entropy of this predicate can also be considered as the valuational entropy that measures the uncertainty about the assignment of truth values to the proposition P. As it is demonstrated in the paper, in the Hilbert space H of the dimension greater than or equal to 2, there always exists a nonempty set S of the closed linear subspaces in H, such that the entropy of the predicate "... is an element of ..." on the given vector of H and all the subspaces of S cannot be zero. This implies the existence of two different processes of the pure quantum state change: the process which yields no changes in the valuational entropies of the propositions (corresponding to the deterministic and reversible evolution) and the process which brings forth changes in the valuational entropies (corresponding to the gain or loss of information in a quantum measurement).

quant-ph

No-cloning implies unalterability of the past

A common way of stating the non-cloning theorem -- one of distinguishing characteristics of quantum theory -- is that one cannot make a copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state. Even though this theorem is an important part of the ongoing discussion of the nature of a quantum state, the role of the theorem in the logical-algebraic approach to quantum theory has not yet been systematically studied. According to the standard point of view (which is in line with the logical tradition), quantum cloning amounts to two classical rules of inference, namely, monotonicity and idempotency of entailment. One can conclude then that the whole of quantum theory should be described through a logic wherein these rules do not hold, which is linear logic. However, in accordance with a supervaluational semantics (that allows one to retain all the theorems of classical logic while admitting `truth-value gaps'), quantum cloning necessitates the permanent loss of the truth values of experimental quantum propositions which violates the unalterability of the past. The present paper demonstrates this.

quant-ph

Algebraic structures identified with bivalent and non-bivalent semantics of experimental quantum propositions

The failure of distributivity in quantum logic is motivated by the principle of quantum superposition. However, this principle can be encoded differently, i.e., in different logico-algebraic objects. As a result, the logic of experimental quantum propositions might have various semantics. E.g., it might have either a total semantics, or a partial semantics (in which the valuation relation -- i.e., a mapping from the set of atomic propositions to the set of two objects, 1 and 0 -- is not total), or a many-valued semantics (in which the gap between 1 and 0 is completed with truth degrees). Consequently, closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space representing experimental quantum propositions may be organized differently. For instance, they could be organized in the structure of a Hilbert lattice (or its generalizations) identified with the bivalent semantics of quantum logic or in a structure identified with a non-bivalent semantics. On the other hand, one can only verify -- at the same time -- propositions represented by the closed linear subspaces corresponding to mutually commuting projection operators. This implies that to decide which semantics is proper -- bivalent or non-bivalent -- is not possible experimentally. Nevertheless, the latter allows simplification of certain no-go theorems in the foundation of quantum mechanics. In the present paper, the Kochen-Specker theorem asserting the impossibility to interpret, within the orthodox quantum formalism, projection operators as definite {0,1}-valued (pre-existent) properties, is taken as an example. The paper demonstrates that within the algebraic structure identified with supervaluationism (the form of a partial, non-bivalent semantics), the statement of this theorem gets deduced trivially.

quant-ph

An empiric logic approach to Einstein's version of the double-slit experiment

As per Einstein's design, particles are introduced into the double-slit experiment through a small hole in a plate which can either move up and down (and its momentum can be measured) or be stopped (and its position can be measured). Suppose one measures the position of the plate and this act verifies the statement that the interference pattern is observed in the experiment. However, if it is possible to think about the outcome that one would have obtained if one had measured plate's momentum instead of its position, then it is possible to consider, together with the aforesaid statement, another statement that each particle passes through either slit of the double-slit screen. Hence, the proposition affirming the wave-like behavior and the proposition affirming the particle-like behavior might be true together, which would imply that Bohr's complementarity principle is incorrect. The analysis of Einstein's design and ways to refute it based on an approach that uses exclusively assignments of the truth values to experimental propositions is presented in this paper.

quant-ph

Propositional counter-factual definiteness and the EPR paradox

In an empirical logic, an experimentally verifiable proposition P relating to a quantum system is assigned the value of either true of false if the system is in the pure state that belongs or, respectively, does not belong to the Hilbert subspace that represents P. Determined in such a way truth or falsity of P can be termed a factual truth-value of P. In the present paper, it is proposed to consider a counter-factual truth-value of P, i.e., either of the values, true or false, that would have been taken by P if the system had been in a pure state belonging to a Hilbert subspace that does not represent P. The assumption that it is always possible to speak meaningfully of counter-factual truth-values of experimental propositions can be called the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness. As it is shown in the paper, this hypothesis lies at the basis of the EPR paradox, a striking and influential thought experiment intended to defy predictions of quantum mechanics, such as one that measurements of spin along the different axes are incompatible. The purpose of this paper is to show that this hypothesis can be falsified by declining to paste together invariant-subspace lattices of contexts associated with the system (in other words, Boolean algebras or blocks) into one Hilbert lattice. Without such pasting, the EPR paradoxical inference cannot be reached.

quant-ph

Probabilities in the logic of quantum propositions

In quantum logic, i.e., within the structure of the Hilbert lattice imposed on all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space, the assignment of truth values to quantum propositions (i.e., experimentally verifiable propositions relating to a quantum system) is unambiguously determined by the state of the system. So, if only pure states of the system are considered, can a probability measure mapping the probability space for truth values to the unit interval be assigned to quantum propositions? In other words, is a probability concept contingent or emergent in the logic of quantum propositions? Until this question is answered, the cause of probabilities in quantum theory cannot be completely understood. In the present paper it is shown that the interaction of the quantum system with its environment causes the irreducible randomness in the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.

quant-ph