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Arne Roszeitis

Publications and source records attributed to Arne Roszeitis.

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Few-Shot Learning for Network Intrusion Detection: Methods, Datasets, and Performance

Anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are an important first line of defense. However, training NIDS for new attack types is challenging, because labeled attack data are rarely available. Few-shot learning (FSL) addresses this problem by learning from few samples. However, the approaches and evaluation settings, that have been investigated so far, vary widely. This work systematically reviews FSL approaches for NIDS published from 2022 to 2026. We conduct a systematic literature review with PRISMA 2020-like reporting to search ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and Scopus. From a set of 1,358 initial records, we retain 21 studies after screening, deduplication, and quality filtering. We classify the applied FSL approaches, datasets, and experimental parameters and compare reported performance. Meta-learning and convolutional neural networks are the most common approaches, with 8 and 10 studies, respectively. Most studies evaluate five or fewer samples per class, although settings vary. CIC-IDS2017 and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 are the most frequently used datasets. Missing parameters and source code limit reproducibility and direct comparison between approaches.

cs.CR

Noisy Networks, Nosy Neighbors: Simple Privacy Attacks Against Residential Wireless Traffic

Smart devices, such as light bulbs, TVs, fridges, etc., equipped with computing capabilities and wireless communication, are part of everyday life in many households. Previous work has already shown that a passive eavesdropper can derive private information, household routines, etc., from the network traffic of smart devices. However, existing attacks rely on capable adversaries with specialized machine learning expertise, labeled training data and reference devices, leaving it unclear how vulnerable ordinary households are to less sophisticated attackers. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which a ,,casual attacker'' with straightforward IT skills and no specialized cybersecurity or ML tooling can reproduce such privacy attacks. Operating from an adjacent room in a real-world apartment building, we constrain our adversary to use only three off-the-shelf Raspberry Pis, Wireshark, and basic Python scripts. Through a three-week study, we demonstrate that this casual attacker can manually identify devices, recognize user states, track smartphone movements through walls via RSSI triangulation, and successfully extract detailed daily routines, including sleep patterns of guests. Our findings show that smart-home privacy leakage is a threat even from low-resourced, straightforward adversaries, e.g., neighbors.

cs.CR