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Arthur Cordeiro

Publications and source records attributed to Arthur Cordeiro.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

GHA-SmellFix: Taking Action with Agentic LLMs for Detecting and Refactoring GitHub Actions Workflow Smells

Continuous integration and continuous delivery workflows are key artifacts in software projects. In GitHub Actions, they encode build, test, release, deployment, and security automation in YAML. These workflows contain configuration smells affecting security, reliability, maintainability, or operational stability. Existing approaches are mostly rule-based, with rules hard to create and evolve, and typically report findings without fixes. Agentic LLM pipelines can combine contextual detection, transformation selection, and patch generation. Specialized agents can gate refactoring on positive detection verdicts, potentially avoiding unnecessary changes, but it is unclear whether decomposition improves effectiveness or mainly changes overhead. We present GHA-SmellFix, an agentic LLM pipeline for detecting and refactoring GitHub Actions workflow smells. We compare two designs: Joint, where one agent detects and refactors, and Decomposed, where separate agents detect and then refactor. We operationalize 19 smells from an existing catalog with explicit detection criteria, refactoring expectations, exclusion rules, and safety checks, and curate a ground truth of 1,710 (workflow, smell) pairs. We evaluate the designs with four LLMs (GPT-5.4-nano, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Claude Haiku 4.5, and DeepSeek V4 Flash) on 570 sampled pairs. Results show that decomposition does not universally improve patch quality; its main benefit is controlling when patch generation is attempted. It helps models prone to missing smells and can reduce overhead by gating patches. Once a smell is correctly detected, clean refactoring is generally effective, making detection the main end-to-end bottleneck. However, false positives can trigger unnecessary edits to execution-relevant constructs. Practical CI/CD agents thus need reliable abstention and construct-aware validation alongside patch generation.

cs.SE↗

StallGrid: Measuring Internet-exposed Engagement in Protocol-Native OT Tarpits

Operational technology systems face exposure to scanning and protocol-specific attack tools, where compromise risks disrupting physical processes rather than just data. Traditional OT defenses rely on blocking and filtering under strict patch constraints, while tarpitting delays scanners through sustained protocol-level interaction. Modbus TCP and IEC-104 carry no native authentication or integrity protection. Application-layer tarpitting, which stalls scanners inside a legitimate protocol exchange, has been studied for IT and IoT protocols, but not for OT/ICS, whose session semantics (state machines, exception codes) create stalling opportunities IT/IoT lack, and whose patch-constrained environments need exactly this kind of alternative defense. We present StallGrid, to our knowledge the first application-layer tarpits for OT/ICS, stalling scanners via Modbus Exception Codes \texttt{0x05}/\texttt{0x06} and prolonged residence in IEC-104's connected state machine. Five variants (three Modbus TCP, two IEC-104) ran simultaneously for 24 days online, logging 6,709 sessions, 2,039 cumulative per-tarpit unique IPs, and over 2,000 hours of accumulated connection engagement. GreyNoise enrichment attributes 87--97\% of stall time to malicious-tagged IPs, just 22--30\% of connecting addresses; protocol-level behavior further correlates with malicious classification, a fingerprinting signal beyond raw stall time. Shorter induced delay (1.5s) yielded more total engagement than longer delay (3s), observed across both protocols. These results position protocol-native tarpitting as a practical, low-cost complementary defense for OT/ICS environments where patching remains infeasible.

cs.CR↗

Rouxii: Exploiting Honeypots with Deception-Aware AI Pentesters

Honeypots are designed to deceive attackers, and recent work shows they can also derail autonomous LLM-based pentesters. These evaluations, however, largely consider attackers unaware of the deception they face. We study the opposite setting: an autonomous attacker explicitly equipped to recognize and act on honeypot fingerprints. We introduce Rouxii, an AI-driven penetration-testing framework that integrates counter-deception into reconnaissance and pivots from honeypot detection to exploitation. We evaluate matched vanilla and anti-deception Rouxii configurations across three reasoning models and eleven network setups over twelve cycles (1,544 attack reports). Between the matched cohorts, which differ only in the prompt, counter-deception raises correct honeypot identification from 19% to 97%, an effect strongest on OT services (11% to 97%), while false alarms on the real service stay at 0.7%. Deception-unaware baselines (PentestGPT, HackingBuddy) fail similarly, indicating the effect is not specific to our framework. Detection, moreover, is not the endpoint: through a white-box analysis of the honeypots themselves we show that a detected trap can be turned against its operator, demonstrating a denial-of-service that disables Conpot without tripping its liveness monitoring, and a corruption of the intelligence a GasPot instance reports. These findings show that deception effectiveness depends strongly on attacker knowledge, and that evaluations of honeypot resilience against AI attackers must account for adversaries that actively reason about and exploit the deception layer.

cs.CR↗