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Arthur Goemans

Publications and source records attributed to Arthur Goemans.

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Comprehensive AI governance requires addressing non-model gains

Frontier AI governance often centres on the model-level governance paradigm, which assumes that a model's capability profile is primarily a function of the compute and data used during training. This position paper argues that model-level governance becomes less effective when capability progress is increasingly driven by "non-model gains"--improvements that are independent from advances in the base model. We formalise the concept of non-model gains and provide a taxonomy of three distinct vectors of capability gain: inference gain (scaling compute at test-time), systems gain (post-training enhancements such as scaffolds), and asset gain (enhancing a model with restricted assets). We demonstrate how these vectors--alongside potential future impacts from embodiment, continual learning, and AI diffusion--may undermine risk management strategies that hinge mostly on pre-deployment evaluation and mitigation. We provide an overview of governance approaches that go beyond the model level: system, entity, agent, and cloud governance. Finally, we emphasise the importance of societal resilience as a complement to these governance layers.

cs.CY

Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argument

Frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems pose increasing risks to society, making it essential for developers to provide assurances about their safety. One approach to offering such assurances is through a safety case: a structured, evidence-based argument aimed at demonstrating why the risk associated with a safety-critical system is acceptable. In this article, we propose a safety case template for offensive cyber capabilities. We illustrate how developers could argue that a model does not have capabilities posing unacceptable cyber risks by breaking down the main claim into progressively specific sub-claims, each supported by evidence. In our template, we identify a number of risk models, derive proxy tasks from the risk models, define evaluation settings for the proxy tasks, and connect those with evaluation results. Elements of current frontier safety techniques - such as risk models, proxy tasks, and capability evaluations - use implicit arguments for overall system safety. This safety case template integrates these elements using the Claims Arguments Evidence (CAE) framework in order to make safety arguments coherent and explicit. While uncertainties around the specifics remain, this template serves as a proof of concept, aiming to foster discussion on AI safety cases and advance AI assurance.

cs.CY