arXiv subjects

Arthur Paul Pedersen

Publications and source records attributed to Arthur Paul Pedersen.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Almost-Uniform Bayesian Convergence to the Truth Is Not Characterized by Countable Additivity on Conditional Hitting Times

We revisit the analysis of Bayesian convergence to the truth under finite additivity in a recent paper by Nielsen (J. Philos. Logic, 2021, doi:10.1007/s10992-020-09569-2) Its principal theorem proves that the posteriors of a probability function converge to the truth almost uniformly if and only if the function has two properties: an approximation property, and so-called countable additivity on conditional hitting times. We show that the two properties are necessary but not sufficient, so that the theorem is false, and we locate the error in its published proof. We construct a merely finitely additive probability function that has both properties and whose posteriors converge to the truth almost surely but not almost uniformly. Three of the paper's four remaining theorems, and its corollary, lose their published proofs as well, two with the failed implication and two to a separate defect that we also identify. Two of the four results we reprove and one we leave undecided; the last is the corollary, which our counterexample does not refute, and which we establish for a family including the counterexample and leave open in general. We also show that almost-sure convergence of posteriors to the truth for every event does not characterize countable additivity. We close with what a repaired characterization of almost-uniform convergence would have to add.

math.PR↗

arXiv2026

Representation and Invariance in Reinforcement Learning

Researchers have formalized reinforcement learning (RL) in different ways. If an agent in one RL framework is to run within another RL framework's environments, the agent must first be converted, or mapped, into that other framework. In this paper, we lay foundations for studying relative-intelligence-preserving mappability between RL frameworks. We introduce a criterion which is sufficient for relative intelligence to be preserved according to one particular method of measuring intelligence. We show that this criterion cannot be met when mapping between certain deterministic and stochastic RL frameworks, suggesting inherent fundamental differences between these different versions of RL.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

All Games Have Equilibria

Research on Nash equilibrium existence for infinite games has grown into a patchwork of technical preconditions and counterexamples. This paper presents a unified program in equilibrium theory by revising the predominant model of mixed strategies based on countable additivity. A game is specified by a nonempty set of players and, for each player, a nonempty action set and a bounded von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Every such game is shown to admit a Nash equilibrium in finitely additive mixed strategies. In addition, the equilibrium correspondence for any such game is shown to be nonempty, compact-valued, and upper hemicontinuous, and the same is true for equilibria obtained as limits of finite approximations. Techniques developed in this paper show that infinite games long treated as intractable become amenable to direct equilibrium analysis.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Measurable Majorities Are Not Finitely Axiomatizable

This theoretical note studies the finite axiomatizability of strict majority reasoning in finite social decision frames. Moss and Pedersen (2026) introduce a coherence criterion that characterizes exactly when qualitative majority judgments are representable by a finitely additive measure. The question addressed here is whether that coherence criterion can be replaced, in the finite setting, by any bounded finite fragment. We prove that it cannot. For every $k\ge 1$, we construct a maximal standard frame whose shortest coherence violation has length exactly $2k+2$. Hence there is no uniform finite bound on the incoherence index of social decision frames, resolving Conjecture 5.7 stated by Moss and Pedersen (2026). The construction is geometric, in the sense that it proceeds via orthogonality and dimension in rational vector spaces, and self-contained: it isolates a symmetric family of half-sized voting blocs and extends it to a maximal frame in which every shorter balanced obstruction is excluded. Along the explicit infinite sequence of universe sizes obtained in the construction, this also establishes the middle-layer family predicted by Conjecture B.25 by Moss and Pedersen (2026). Together with the soundness and completeness theorem for the Moss-Pedersen minimal logic for strict majorities, this establishes that measurable social decision frames are not finitely axiomatizable in that language.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

The Measurable Majority

This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures. In addition, a minimal natural logic for reasoning about strict majorities is shown to be sound and complete. These developments motivate examination of associated combinatorial questions concerning incoherence in finite families of sets; partial results and a conjecture are given. Finally, the results of this paper are applied to correct a classical representation theorem for weak qualitative probability structures due to Patrick Suppes and to establish a May-type characterization for ordinary strict majority rule for social decision frames.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Formal Power Series Representations in Probability and Expected Utility Theory

We advance a general theory of coherent preference that surrenders restrictions embodied in orthodox doctrine. This theory enjoys the property that any preference system admits extension to a complete system of preferences, provided it satisfies a certain coherence requirement analogous to the one de Finetti advanced for his foundations of probability. Unlike de Finetti's theory, the one we set forth requires neither transitivity nor Archimedeanness nor boundedness nor continuity of preference. This theory also enjoys the property that any complete preference system meeting the standard of coherence can be represented by utility in an ordered field extension of the reals. Representability by utility is a corollary of this paper's central result, which at once extends Hölder's Theorem and strengthens Hahn's Embedding Theorem.

math.PR↗

arXiv2024

Two-Person Adversarial Games are Zero-Sum: An Elaboration of a Folk Theorem

The observation that every two-person adversarial game is an affine transformation of a zero-sum game is traceable to Luce & Raiffa (1957) and made explicit in Aumann (1987). Recent work of (ADP) Adler et al. (2009), and of Raimondo (2023) in increasing generality, proves what has so far remained a conjecture. We present two proofs of an even more general formulation: the first draws on multilinear utility theory developed by Fishburn & Roberts (1978); the second is a consequence of the ADP proof itself for a special case of a two-player game with a set of three actions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Strengthening Consistency Results in Modal Logic

A fundamental question asked in modal logic is whether a given theory is consistent. But consistent with what? A typical way to address this question identifies a choice of background knowledge axioms (say, S4, D, etc.) and then shows the assumptions codified by the theory in question to be consistent with those background axioms. But determining the specific choice and division of background axioms is, at least sometimes, little more than tradition. This paper introduces **generic theories** for propositional modal logic to address consistency results in a more robust way. As building blocks for background knowledge, generic theories provide a standard for categorical determinations of consistency. We argue that the results and methods of this paper help to elucidate problems in epistemology and enjoy sufficient scope and power to have purchase on problems bearing on modalities in judgement, inference, and decision making.

math.LO↗

arXiv2022

Adversarial Attacks in Cooperative AI

Single-agent reinforcement learning algorithms in a multi-agent environment are inadequate for fostering cooperation. If intelligent agents are to interact and work together to solve complex problems, methods that counter non-cooperative behavior are needed to facilitate the training of multiple agents. This is the goal of cooperative AI. Recent research in adversarial machine learning, however, shows that models (e.g., image classifiers) can be easily deceived into making inferior decisions. Meanwhile, an important line of research in cooperative AI has focused on introducing algorithmic improvements that accelerate learning of optimally cooperative behavior. We argue that prominent methods of cooperative AI are exposed to weaknesses analogous to those studied in prior machine learning research. More specifically, we show that three algorithms inspired by human-like social intelligence are, in principle, vulnerable to attacks that exploit weaknesses introduced by cooperative AI's algorithmic improvements and report experimental findings that illustrate how these vulnerabilities can be exploited in practice.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2013

When is an Example a Counterexample?

In this extended abstract, we carefully examine a purported counterexample to a postulate of iterated belief revision. We suggest that the example is better seen as a failure to apply the theory of belief revision in sufficient detail. The main contribution is conceptual aiming at the literature on the philosophical foundations of the AGM theory of belief revision [1]. Our discussion is centered around the observation that it is often unclear whether a specific example is a "genuine" counterexample to an abstract theory or a misapplication of that theory to a concrete case.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2009

A proof of completeness for continuous first-order logic

The primary purpose of this article is to show that a certain natural set of axioms yields a completeness result for continuous first-order logic. In particular, we show that in continuous first-order logic a set of formulae is (completely) satisfiable if (and only if) it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-order logic also satisfies an \emph{approximated} form of strong completeness, whereby $Σ\vDashφ$ (if and) only if $Σ\vdashφ\dotminus 2^{-n}$ for all $n<ω$. This approximated form of strong completeness asserts that if $Σ\vDashφ$, then proofs from $Σ$, being finite, can provide arbitrary better approximations of the truth of $φ$.

math.LO↗