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Asadullah Abdullah Khan

Publications and source records attributed to Asadullah Abdullah Khan.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Agent-ZTA: A chain-Aware Zero Trust Model for Bidirectional Security-State Propagation and Runtime Containment in Multi-Agent Delegation

Multi-agent systems increasingly delegate tasks and permissions across chains of autonomous agents that invoke protected tools. Although agent identities and delegated credentials may remain valid throughout a workflow, the security condition of any agent along the chain can deteriorate during runtime execution-either through upstream compromise or downstream ingestion of untrusted inputs. Authorization models based solely on the immediate caller and its static delegated scope fail to account for these mid-execution state changes. This paper develops Agent-ZTA, a chain-aware Zero Trust authorization and containment model that links runtime security-state changes across multi-agent delegation graphs. The model distinguishes an agent's path-specific delegated authority bound from the effective permissions currently exercisable under trusted policy. It defines an architecture featuring independently enforced policy decisions, authenticated delegation provenance, a dynamic chain-state view, and explicit fail-safe handling of missing or stale authorization signals. Furthermore, Agent-ZTA defines bidirectional security state propagation, allowing downstream security events to affect relevant upstream workflow states, and specifies adaptive branch-scoped containment through restricted permissions and a sandbox ("jail") execution mode where an isolation boundary is available. The deterministic decision procedure, five stated security properties, and worked authorization traces show how accepted security-state changes constrain affected operations while preserving original delegation bounds and separating unrelated workflow branches under the defined policies. Finally, the paper states its trust assumptions and the exact scope of its security properties.

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Intent-Bound Authorization for Cryptocurrency Withdrawals Under Backend Compromise

Binance's preliminary account of its October 2026 attack raises a custody question that key protection alone cannot answer: how can a provider prevent unauthorized withdrawals when an attacker controls a service permitted to request signatures? We propose the Intent-Bound Withdrawal Authorization Protocol (IWAP). Before signing, independent enforcement checks customer intent, exact transaction effects, fresh workload evidence, and a committed single-use spending reservation. Administrative actions use a separate authorization path. We specify the protocol's trust assumptions and give conditional arguments for intent preservation, replay resistance, and a fixed-epoch exposure bound. A Python reference monitor authenticates synthetic records with Ed25519 and serializes reservations with SQLite. It rejects 1,200 negative requests, accepts 3,000 valid synthetic requests, and preserves a 100-unit budget under 64 concurrent attempts in each of 20 trials. When the intent authority is deliberately compromised, malicious requests pass, but the independent budget still limits admitted exposure. The study evaluates a normalized policy model, not Binance's infrastructure or a deployed custody platform. Its contribution is an explicit authorization boundary and reproducible tests of that boundary.

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PHP2Shell and the Future of AI-Discovered Vulnerability Disclosure: Evidence, Verification, and Human Authority

AI-assisted vulnerability discovery can produce technically plausible findings faster than maintainers can validate, coordinate, and safely disclose them. The resulting challenge is not only to establish whether a vulnerability claim is credible, but also to ensure that its supporting evidence, human authorization, intended recipients, and applicable policy remain bound to the same case revision. We present FedTrust-CVDv2, a federated coordinated vulnerability disclosure framework that separates evidence validation, interorganizational coordination, human governance, and permissioned auditing. The framework binds independently signed observations to exact evidence revisions and scopes external actions to approved payloads, audiences, expiry, policy, and revocation state while preserving existing CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) roles. A local reference implementation accepted all 25 valid fixtures and rejected all 650 invalid fixtures across 27 constructed policy families; six single-safeguard ablations admitted 25-75 invalid fixtures. Supporting experiments exercised signed messaging, authenticated encryption, audit certificates, and finite quorum-set conditions. A PHP2Shell case formulation illustrates how runtime evidence, patch state, emergency coordination, and CNA authority can be represented without attributing unsupported claims to AI or treating audit integrity as vulnerability truth. This short version focuses on the architecture, evidence-to-action contract, selected conformance results, and case formulation. An expanded version containing the full implementation, extended experiments, operational analysis, and additional results will be submitted to a journal.

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Resource-Optimized and Energy-Aware Agentic AI Framework Anchored on Blockchain for Secure Software Supply Chains

This paper proposes a blockchain-backed agentic security framework designed to safeguard the complete software development lifecycle (SDLC) while also securing the agentic AI components responsible for monitoring it. The framework coordinates a set of specialised security agents, covering source integrity, dependency and SBOM analysis, CI configura tion auditing, artifact verification, and runtime policy evaluation, each supported by a large language model (LLM) that interprets artefacts, reasons over tool outputs, and produces structured security reports. To ensure agent trustworthiness, every agent generates a cryptographically signed attestation that is recorded in a permissioned blockchain via smart contracts, including an agent registry, an immutable attestation log, and an enforceable release-policy module. Communication among agents and with blockchain nodes is secured using a consortium-operated certificate authority, ensuring authenticated and tamper-resistant interactions. A detailed use-case and sequence flow demonstrate how a source code security agent performs analysis, anchors its attestation on-chain, and triggers a verifiable allow/block deployment decision. The proposed framework of fers decentralised integrity transparent provenance, uninterrupted security assurance and a generalisable architecture to incorporate the agentic AI into the modern software supply chain security.

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Agentic AI for Autonomous Defense in Software Supply Chain Security: Beyond Provenance to Vulnerability Mitigation

The software supply chain attacks are becoming more and more focused on trusted development and delivery procedures, so the conventional post-build integrity mechanisms cannot be used anymore. The available frameworks like SLSA, SBOM and in toto are majorly used to offer provenance and traceability but do not have the capabilities of actively identifying and removing vulnerabilities in software production. The current paper includes an example of agentic artificial intelligence (AI) based on autonomous software supply chain security that combines large language model (LLM)-based reasoning, reinforcement learning (RL), and multi-agent coordination. The suggested system utilizes specialized security agents coordinated with the help of LangChain and LangGraph, communicates with actual CI/CD environments with the Model Context Protocol (MCP), and documents all the observations and actions in a blockchain security ledger to ensure integrity and auditing. Reinforcement learning can be used to achieve adaptive mitigation strategies that consider the balance between security effectiveness and the operational overhead, and LLMs can be used to achieve semantic vulnerability analysis, as well as explainable decisions. This framework is tested based on simulated pipelines, as well as, actual world CI/CD integrations on GitHub Actions and Jenkins, including injection attacks, insecure deserialization, access control violations, and configuration errors. Experimental outcomes indicate better detection accuracy, shorter mitigation latency and reasonable build-time overhead than rule-based, provenance only and RL only baselines. These results show that agentic AI can facilitate the transition to self defending, proactive software supply chains rather than reactive verification ones.

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