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Ashish Goel

Publications and source records attributed to Ashish Goel.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2024

Opinion Change or Differential Turnout: Changing Opinions on the Austin Police Department in a Budget Feedback Process

In 2020 the tragic murder of George Floyd at the hands of law enforcement ignited and intensified nationwide protests, demanding changes in police funding and allocation. This happened during a budgeting feedback exercise where residents of Austin, Texas were invited to share opinions on the budgets of various city service areas, including the Police Department, on an online platform designed by our team. Daily responses increased by a hundredfold and responses registered after the "exogenous shock" overwhelmingly advocated for reducing police funding. This opinion shift far exceeded what we observed in 14 other Participatory Budgeting elections on our Participatory Budgeting Platform, and can't be explained by shifts in the respondent demographics. Analysis of the results from an Austin budgetary feedback exercise in 2021 and a follow-up survey indicates that the opinion shift from 2020 persisted, with the opinion gap on police funding widening. We conclude that there was an actual change of opinion regarding police funding. This study not only sheds light on the enduring impact of the 2020 events and protests on public opinion, but also showcases the value of analysis of clustered opinions as a tool in the evaluation toolkit of survey organizers.

cs.CY↗
arXiv2023

Learning and Autonomy for Extraterrestrial Terrain Sampling: An Experience Report from OWLAT Deployment

Extraterrestrial autonomous lander missions increasingly demand adaptive capabilities to handle the unpredictable and diverse nature of the terrain. This paper discusses the deployment of a Deep Meta-Learning with Controlled Deployment Gaps (CoDeGa) trained model for terrain scooping tasks in Ocean Worlds Lander Autonomy Testbed (OWLAT) at NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The CoDeGa-powered scooping strategy is designed to adapt to novel terrains, selecting scooping actions based on the available RGB-D image data and limited experience. The paper presents our experiences with transferring the scooping framework with CoDeGa-trained model from a low-fidelity testbed to the high-fidelity OWLAT testbed. Additionally, it validates the method's performance in novel, realistic environments, and shares the lessons learned from deploying learning-based autonomy algorithms for space exploration. Experimental results from OWLAT substantiate the efficacy of CoDeGa in rapidly adapting to unfamiliar terrains and effectively making autonomous decisions under considerable domain shifts, thereby endorsing its potential utility in future extraterrestrial missions.

cs.RO↗
arXiv2023

A Mechanism for Participatory Budgeting With Funding Constraints and Project Interactions

Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters. Also, the outcomes of PB in practice are subject to various minimum/maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects. We propose a novel preference elicitation scheme for PB which allows voters to express how their utilities from projects within 'groups' interact. We consider preference aggregation done under minimum and maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects, where a project can have multiple type labels as long as this classification can be defined by a 1-laminar structure (henceforth called 1-laminar funding constraints). Overall, we extend the Knapsack voting model of Goel et al. [26] in two ways - enriching the preference elicitation scheme to include project interactions and generalizing the preference aggregation scheme to include 1-laminar funding constraints. We show that the strategyproofness results of Goel et al. [26] for Knapsack voting continue to hold under 1-laminar funding constraints. Moreover, when the funding constraints cannot be described by a 1-laminar structure, strategyproofness does not hold. Although project interactions often break the strategyproofness, we study a special case of vote profiles where truthful voting is a Nash equilibrium under substitution project interactions. We then study the computational complexity of preference aggregation. Social welfare maximization under project interactions is NP-hard. As a workaround for practical instances, we give a fixed parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm for social welfare maximization with respect to the maximum number of projects in a group when the overall budget is specified in a fixed number of bits.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Low Sample Complexity Participatory Budgeting

We study low sample complexity mechanisms in participatory budgeting (PB), where each voter votes for a preferred allocation of funds to various projects, subject to project costs and total spending constraints. We analyze the distortion that PB mechanisms introduce relative to the minimum-social-cost outcome in expectation. The Random Dictator mechanism for this problem obtains a distortion of 2. In a special case where every voter votes for exactly one project, [Fain et al '17] obtain a distortion of 4/3 We show that when PB outcomes are determined as any convex combination of the votes of two voters, the distortion is 2. When three uniformly randomly sampled votes are used, we give a PB mechanism that obtains a distortion of at most 1.66, thus breaking the barrier of 2 with the smallest possible sample complexity. We give a randomized Nash bargaining scheme where two uniformly randomly chosen voters bargain with the disagreement point as the vote of a voter chosen uniformly at random. This mechanism has a distortion of at most 1.66. We provide a lower bound of 1.38 for the distortion of this scheme. Further, we show that PB mechanisms that output a median of the votes of three voters chosen uniformly at random have a distortion of at most 1.80.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

SPEEDEX: A Scalable, Parallelizable, and Economically Efficient Decentralized EXchange

SPEEDEX is a decentralized exchange (DEX) that lets participants securely trade assets without giving any single party undue control over the market. SPEEDEX offers several advantages over prior DEXes. It achieves high throughput -- over 200,000 transactions per second on 48-core servers, even with tens of millions of open offers. SPEEDEX runs entirely within a Layer-1 blockchain, and thus achieves its scalability without fragmenting market liquidity between multiple blockchains or rollups. It eliminates internal arbitrage opportunities, so that a direct trade from asset $\mathcal{A}$ to asset $\mathcal{B}$ always receives as good a price as trading through some third asset such as USD. Finally, it prevents certain front-running attacks that would otherwise increase the effective bid-ask spread for small traders. SPEEDEX's key design insight is its use of an Arrow-Debreu exchange market structure that fixes the valuation of assets for all trades in a given block of transactions. We construct an algorithm, which is both asymptotically efficient and empirically practical, that computes these valuations while exactly preserving a DEX's financial correctness constraints. Not only does this market structure provide fairness across trades, but it also makes trade operations commutative and hence efficiently parallelizable. SPEEDEX is prototyped but not yet merged within the Stellar blockchain, one of the largest Layer-1 blockchains.

cs.DC↗
arXiv2023

Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers

Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are a tool for creating exchange markets, have been deployed effectively in prediction markets, and are now especially prominent in the Decentralized Finance ecosystem. We show that for any set of beliefs about future asset prices, an optimal CFMM trading function exists that maximizes the fraction of trades that a CFMM can settle. We formulate a convex program to compute this optimal trading function. This program, therefore, gives a tractable framework for market-makers to compile their belief function on the future prices of the underlying assets into the trading function of a maximally capital-efficient CFMM. Our convex optimization framework further extends to capture the tradeoffs between fee revenue, arbitrage loss, and opportunity costs of liquidity providers. Analyzing the program shows how the consideration of profit and loss leads to a qualitatively different optimal trading function. Our model additionally explains the diversity of CFMM designs that appear in practice. We show that careful analysis of our convex program enables inference of a market-maker's beliefs about future asset prices, and show that these beliefs mirror the folklore intuition for several widely used CFMMs. Developing the program requires a new notion of the liquidity of a CFMM, and the core technical challenge is in the analysis of the KKT conditions of an optimization over an infinite-dimensional Banach space.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

A Lightweight Space-based Solar Power Generation and Transmission Satellite

We propose a novel design for a lightweight, high-performance space-based solar power array combined with power beaming capability for operation in geosynchronous orbit and transmission of power to Earth. We use a modular configuration of small, repeatable unit cells, called tiles, that each individually perform power collection, conversion, and transmission. Sunlight is collected via lightweight parabolic concentrators and converted to DC electric power with high efficiency III-V photovoltaics. Several CMOS integrated circuits within each tile generates and controls the phase of multiple independently-controlled microwave sources using the DC power. These sources are coupled to multiple radiating antennas which act as elements of a large phased array to beam the RF power to Earth. The power is sent to Earth at a frequency chosen in the range of 1-10 GHz and collected with ground-based rectennas at a local intensity no larger than ambient sunlight. We achieve significantly reduced mass compared to previous designs by taking advantage of solar concentration, current CMOS integrated circuit technology, and ultralight structural elements. Of note, the resulting satellite has no movable parts once it is fully deployed and all beam steering is done electronically. Our design is safe, scalable, and able to be deployed and tested with progressively larger configurations starting with a single unit cell that could fit on a cube satellite. The design reported on here has an areal mass density of 160 g/m2 and an end-to-end efficiency of 7-14%. We believe this is a significant step forward to the realization of space-based solar power, a concept once of science fiction.

astro-ph.IM↗
arXiv2022

Probing the Cosmic Dark Ages with the Lunar Crater Radio Telescope

The Cosmic Dark Ages represent the period in the early evolution of the Universe, starting immediately after the decoupling of CMB photons from matter, and ending with the formation of the first stars and galaxies. The HI signal from the neutral hydrogen atoms is the only mechanism for us to understand this crucial phase in the cosmological history of the Universe and answer fundamental questions about the validity of the standard cosmological model, dark matter physics, and inflation. Due to cosmological redshift, this signal is now only observable in the 3-30~MHz frequency band, which is blocked from reaching the surface of the Earth by the ionosphere. In this paper, we present the design of the Lunar Crater Radio Telescope that intends to carry out unprecedented measurements of this signal by deploying a kilometer-sized parabolic reflector mesh inside a lunar crater on the far side of the Moon and suspending a receiver at its focus.

astro-ph.CO↗
arXiv2021

Robust Allocations with Diversity Constraints

We consider the problem of allocating divisible items among multiple agents, and consider the setting where any agent is allowed to introduce diversity constraints on the items they are allocated. We motivate this via settings where the items themselves correspond to user ad slots or task workers with attributes such as race and gender on which the principal seeks to achieve demographic parity. We consider the following question: When an agent expresses diversity constraints into an allocation rule, is the allocation of other agents hurt significantly? If this happens, the cost of introducing such constraints is disproportionately borne by agents who do not benefit from diversity. We codify this via two desiderata capturing robustness. These are no negative externality -- other agents are not hurt -- and monotonicity -- the agent enforcing the constraint does not see a large increase in value. We show in a formal sense that the Nash Welfare rule that maximizes product of agent values is uniquely positioned to be robust when diversity constraints are introduced, while almost all other natural allocation rules fail this criterion. We also show that the guarantees achieved by Nash Welfare are nearly optimal within a widely studied class of allocation rules. We finally perform an empirical simulation on real-world data that models ad allocations to show that this gap between Nash Welfare and other rules persists in the wild.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2021

GNSS Radio Occultation on Aerial Platforms with Commercial Off-The-Shelf Receivers

In recent decades, GNSS Radio Occultation soundings have proven an invaluable input to global weather forecasting. The success of government-sponsored programs such as COSMIC is now complemented by commercial low-cost cubesat implementations. The result is access to more than 10,000 soundings per day and improved weather forecasting accuracy. This movement towards commercialization has been supported by several agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) with programs such as the Commercial Weather Data Pilot (CWDP). This has resulted in further interest in commercially deploying GNSS-RO on complementary platforms. Here, we examine a so far underutilized platform: the high-altitude weather balloon. Such meteorological radiosondes are deployed twice daily at over 900 locations globally and form an essential in-situ data source as a long-standing input to weather forecasting models. Adding GNSS-RO capability to existing radiosonde platforms would greatly expand capability, allowing for persistent and local area monitoring, a feature particularly useful for hurricane and other severe weather monitoring. A prohibitive barrier to entry to this inclusion is cost and complexity as GNSS-RO traditionally requires highly specialized and sensitive equipment. This paper describes a multi-year effort to develop a low-cost and scalable approach to balloon GNSS-RO based on Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) GNSS receivers. We present hardware prototypes and data processing techniques which demonstrate the technical feasibility of the approach through results from several flight testing campaigns.

eess.SP↗
arXiv2020

Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing

We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents with quasilinear utilities. For \emph{linear} pricing (i.e., the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that Walrasian equilibria maximize the sum of agent valuations. This ensures efficiency, but can lead to extreme inequality across individuals. Many real-world markets -- especially for water -- use \emph{convex} pricing instead, often known as increasing block tariffs (IBTs). IBTs are thought to promote equality, but there is a dearth of theoretical support for this claim. In this paper, we study a simple convex pricing rule and show that the resulting equilibria are guaranteed to maximize a CES welfare function. Furthermore, a parameter of the pricing rule directly determines which CES welfare function is implemented; by tweaking this parameter, the social planner can precisely control the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. Our result holds for any valuations that are homogeneous, differentiable, and concave. We also give an iterative algorithm for computing these pricing rules, derive a truthful mechanism for the case of a single good, and discuss Sybil attacks.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2020

Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting

We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call "Knapsack Voting". We study its strategic properties - we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the $\ell_1$ distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter), and "partially" strategy-proof under general additive utilities. We extend Knapsack Voting to more general settings with revenues, deficits or surpluses, and prove a similar strategy-proofness result. To further demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we discuss its implementation on the digital voting platform that we have deployed in partnership with the local government bodies in many cities across the nation. From voting data thus collected, we present empirical evidence that Knapsack Voting works well in practice.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2020

Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity Mechanisms for Social Choice

We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal utilities. We consider two additional desiderata: Constant sample complexity and Squared Distortion. Constant sample complexity means that the mechanism (potentially randomized) only uses a constant number of ordinal queries regardless of the number of voters and alternatives. Squared Distortion is a measure of variance of the Distortion of a randomized mechanism. Our primary contribution is the first social choice mechanism with constant sample complexity \textit{and} constant Squared Distortion (which also implies constant Distortion). We call the mechanism Random Referee, because it uses a random agent to compare two alternatives that are the favorites of two other random agents. We prove that the use of a comparison query is necessary: no mechanism that only elicits the top-k preferred alternatives of voters (for constant k) can have Squared Distortion that is sublinear in the number of alternatives. We also prove that unlike any top-k only mechanism, the Distortion of Random Referee meaningfully improves on benign metric spaces, using the Euclidean plane as a canonical example. Finally, among top-1 only mechanisms, we introduce Random Oligarchy. The mechanism asks just 3 queries and is essentially optimal among the class of such mechanisms with respect to Distortion. In summary, we demonstrate the surprising power of constant sample complexity mechanisms generally, and just three random voters in particular, to provide some of the best known results in the implicit utilitarian framework.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2020

Continuous Credit Networks and Layer 2 Blockchains: Monotonicity and Sampling

To improve transaction rates, many cryptocurrencies have implemented so-called ''Layer-2'' transaction protocols, where payments are routed across networks of private payment channels. However, for a given transaction, not every network state provides a feasible route to perform the payment; in this case, the transaction must be put on the public ledger. The payment channel network thus multiplies the transaction rate of the overall system; the less frequently it fails, the higher the multiplier. We build on earlier work on credit networks and show that this network liquidity problem is connected to the combinatorics of graphical matroids. Earlier work could only analyze the (unnatural) scenario where transactions had discrete sizes. Superficially, it might seem like the continuous case would be harder to examine. However, removing this assumption lets us make progress in two important directions. First, we give a partial answer to the ``monotonicity conjecture'' that previous work left open. This conjecture asks that the network's performance not degrade as capacity on any edge increases. And second, we construct here a network state sampling procedure with much faster asymptotic performance than off-the-shelf Markov chains ($O(\vert E\vert β(\vert E\vert))$, where $β(x)$ is the complexity of solving a linear program on $x$ constraints.) We obtain our results by mapping the underlying graphs to convex bodies and then showing that the liquidity and sampling problems reduce to bounding and computing the volumes of these bodies. The transformation relies crucially on the combinatorial properties of the underlying graphic matroid, as do the proofs of monotonicity and fast sampling.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2020

Advertising for Demographically Fair Outcomes

Online advertising on platforms such as Google or Facebook has become an indispensable outreach tool, including for applications where it is desirable to engage different demographics in an equitable fashion, such as hiring, housing, civic processes, and public health outreach efforts. Somewhat surprisingly, the existing online advertising ecosystem provides very little support for advertising to (and recruiting) a demographically representative cohort. We study the problem of advertising for demographic representativeness from both an empirical and algorithmic perspective. In essence, we seek fairness in the outcome or conversions generated by the advertising campaigns. We first present detailed empirical findings from real-world experiments for recruiting for civic processes, using which we show that methods using Facebook-inferred features are too inaccurate for achieving equity in outcomes, while targeting via custom audiences based on a list of registered voters segmented on known attributes has much superior accuracy. This motivates us to consider the algorithmic question of optimally segmenting the list of individuals with known attributes into a few custom campaigns and allocating budgets to them so that we cost-effectively achieve outcome parity with the population on the maximum possible number of demographics. Under the assumption that a platform can reasonably enforce proportionality in spend across demographics, we present efficient exact and approximation algorithms for this problem. We present simulation results on our datasets to show the efficacy of these algorithms in achieving demographic parity.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2020

Satellite Navigation for the Age of Autonomy

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) brought navigation to the masses. Coupled with smartphones, the blue dot in the palm of our hands has forever changed the way we interact with the world. Looking forward, cyber-physical systems such as self-driving cars and aerial mobility are pushing the limits of what localization technologies including GNSS can provide. This autonomous revolution requires a solution that supports safety-critical operation, centimeter positioning, and cyber-security for millions of users. To meet these demands, we propose a navigation service from Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites which deliver precision in-part through faster motion, higher power signals for added robustness to interference, constellation autonomous integrity monitoring for integrity, and encryption / authentication for resistance to spoofing attacks. This paradigm is enabled by the 'New Space' movement, where highly capable satellites and components are now built on assembly lines and launch costs have decreased by more than tenfold. Such a ubiquitous positioning service enables a consistent and secure standard where trustworthy information can be validated and shared, extending the electronic horizon from sensor line of sight to an entire city. This enables the situational awareness needed for true safe operation to support autonomy at scale.

eess.SP↗
arXiv2020

The impossibility of low rank representations for triangle-rich complex networks

The study of complex networks is a significant development in modern science, and has enriched the social sciences, biology, physics, and computer science. Models and algorithms for such networks are pervasive in our society, and impact human behavior via social networks, search engines, and recommender systems to name a few. A widely used algorithmic technique for modeling such complex networks is to construct a low-dimensional Euclidean embedding of the vertices of the network, where proximity of vertices is interpreted as the likelihood of an edge. Contrary to the common view, we argue that such graph embeddings do not}capture salient properties of complex networks. The two properties we focus on are low degree and large clustering coefficients, which have been widely established to be empirically true for real-world networks. We mathematically prove that any embedding (that uses dot products to measure similarity) that can successfully create these two properties must have rank nearly linear in the number of vertices. Among other implications, this establishes that popular embedding techniques such as Singular Value Decomposition and node2vec fail to capture significant structural aspects of real-world complex networks. Furthermore, we empirically study a number of different embedding techniques based on dot product, and show that they all fail to capture the triangle structure.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2020

Liquidity in Credit Networks with Constrained Agents

In order to scale transaction rates for deployment across the global web, many cryptocurrencies have deployed so-called "Layer-2" networks of private payment channels. An idealized payment network behaves like a Credit Network, a model for transactions across a network of bilateral trust relationships. Credit Networks capture many aspects of traditional currencies as well as new virtual currencies and payment mechanisms. In the traditional credit network model, if an agent defaults, every other node that trusted it is vulnerable to loss. In a cryptocurrency context, trust is manufactured by capital deposits, and thus there arises a natural tradeoff between network liquidity (i.e. the fraction of transactions that succeed) and the cost of capital deposits. In this paper, we introduce constraints that bound the total amount of loss that the rest of the network can suffer if an agent (or a set of agents) were to default - equivalently, how the network changes if agents can support limited solvency guarantees. We show that these constraints preserve the analytical structure of a credit network. Furthermore, we show that aggregate borrowing constraints greatly simplify the network structure and in the payment network context achieve the optimal tradeoff between liquidity and amount of escrowed capital.

cs.GT↗