arXiv subjects

Ashlesha Hota

Publications and source records attributed to Ashlesha Hota.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Fair, Efficient and Connected Allocations on Graphs

We study the classical and parameterized complexity of efficient connected allocation problems on graphs, where efficiency is measured by egalitarian and utilitarian welfare maximization. We first establish a sharp complexity dichotomy in the classical setting: both problems are NP-hard in general and remain hard even on very restricted graph classes such as paths, and consequently trees and cycles. In contrast, they are polynomial-time solvable on stars, but this tractability does not extend even to the case of two disjoint stars. Motivated by these boundaries, we move to the parameterized complexity framework, where we study the problem with respect to the number of agents. We obtain fixed-parameter tractability (FPT) on trees and, more generally, identify a robust phenomenon whereby tractability on a connected graph class extends to disjoint unions of graphs from that class. We further investigate the parameters treewidth and treedepth, showing that the utilitarian version is FPT for both, whereas the egalitarian version remains para-NP-hard even on graphs of treedepth two. Finally, we analyze the number of connected components and show that except for the collection of stars, the problems remain hard. For the collection of stars,while we obtain para-NP-hardness for the egalitarian case, the utilitarian case gives W[2]-hardness together with an XP algorithm.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Shift Bribery over Social Networks

In shift bribery, a briber seeks to promote his preferred candidate by paying voters to raise their ranking. Classical models of shift bribery assume voters act independently, overlooking the role of social influence. However, in reality, individuals are social beings and are often represented as part of a social network, where bribed voters may influence their neighbors, thereby amplifying the effect of persuasion. We study Shift bribery over Networks, where voters are modeled as nodes in a directed weighted graph, and arcs represent social influence between them. In this setting, bribery is not confined to directly targeted voters its effects can propagate through the network, influencing neighbors and amplifying persuasion. Given a budget and individual cost functions for shifting each voter's preference toward a designated candidate, the goal is to determine whether a shift strategy exists within budget that ensures the preferred candidate wins after both direct and network-propagated influence takes effect. We show that the problem is NP-Complete even with two candidates and unit costs, and W[2]-hard when parameterized by budget or maximum degree. On the positive side, we design polynomial-time algorithms for complete graphs under plurality and majority rules and path graphs for uniform edge weights, linear-time algorithms for transitive tournaments for two candidates, linear cost functions and uniform arc weights, and pseudo-polynomial algorithms for cluster graphs. We further prove the existence of fixed-parameter tractable algorithms with treewidth as parameter for two candidates, linear cost functions and uniform arc weights and pseudo-FPT with cluster vertex deletion number for two candidates and uniform arc weights. Together, these results give a detailed complexity landscape for shift bribery in social networks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Fair Distribution of Digital Payments: Balancing Transaction Flows for Regulatory Compliance

The concentration of digital payment transactions in just two UPI apps like PhonePe and Google Pay has raised concerns of duopoly in India s digital financial ecosystem. To address this, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) has mandated that no single UPI app should exceed 30 percent of total transaction volume. Enforcing this cap, however, poses a significant computational challenge: how to redistribute user transactions across apps without causing widespread user inconvenience while maintaining capacity limits? In this paper, we formalize this problem as the Minimum Edge Activation Flow (MEAF) problem on a bipartite network of users and apps, where activating an edge corresponds to a new app installation. The objective is to ensure a feasible flow respecting app capacities while minimizing additional activations. We further prove that Minimum Edge Activation Flow is NP-Complete. To address the computational challenge, we propose scalable heuristics, named Decoupled Two-Stage Allocation Strategy (DTAS), that exploit flow structure and capacity reuse. Experiments on large semi-synthetic transaction network data show that DTAS finds solutions close to the optimal ILP within seconds, offering a fast and practical way to enforce transaction caps fairly and efficiently.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2026

Parameterized Complexity of Finding a Maximum Common Vertex Subgraph Without Isolated Vertices

In this paper, we study the Maximum Common Vertex Subgraph problem: Given two input graphs $G_1,G_2$ and a non-negative integer $h$, is there a common subgraph $H$ on at least $h$ vertices such that there is no isolated vertex in $H$. In other words, each connected component of $H$ has at least $2$ vertices. This problem naturally arises in graph theory along with other variants of the well-studied Maximum Common Subgraph problem and also has applications in computational social choice. We show that this problem is NP-hard and provide an FPT algorithm when parameterized by $h$. Next, we conduct a study of the problem on common structural parameters like vertex cover number, maximum degree, treedepth, pathwidth and treewidth of one or both input graphs. We derive a complete dichotomy of parameterized results for our problem with respect to individual parameterizations as well as combinations of parameterizations from the above structural parameters. This provides us with a deep insight into the complexity theoretic and parameterized landscape of this problem.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2026

Minimizing Envy and Maximizing Happiness in Graphical House Allocation

We study the house allocation problem in a setting where agents are connected by a graph representing friendships. In this model, two agents can only envy each other if they are neighbors (i.e., friends) in the graph. Each agent has a set of preferred (liked) houses and dislikes the rest. An agent $a$ is said to envy a friend $b$ if $a$ is not assigned any house she likes, while $b$ is allocated a house that $a$ likes. This framework is known as graphical house allocation. Within this framework, we investigate two central problems. The first problem is to compute a house allocation that minimizes the number of envious agents. Multiple such allocations may exist that achieve the same minimum level of envy. Among all allocations that minimize envy, the second problem aims to find one that maximizes the number of agents who receive one of their preferred houses. We present a detailed complexity-theoretic analysis of these problems. In particular, we show that both problems can be solved in polynomial time when each agent prefers at most one house. However, both become NP-hard even when agents are allowed to prefer at most two houses, thereby highlighting the tight boundary between tractability and intractability. Additionally, we design exact algorithms for both problems under certain structural conditions on the agent graph, such as when the graph is sparse, has a small balanced separator, or admits a small vertex cover. These algorithms are significantly faster than the naive brute-force approach.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2026

Universal Solvability for Robot Motion Planning on Graphs

We study the Universal Solvability of Robot Motion Planning on Graphs (USolR) problem: given an undirected graph $G = (V, E)$ and $p$ robots, determine whether any arbitrary configuration of the robots can be transformed into any other arbitrary configuration via a sequence of valid, collision-free moves. We design a canonical accumulation procedure that maps arbitrary configurations to configurations that occupy a fixed subset of vertices, enabling us to analyze configuration reachability in terms of equivalence classes. We prove that in instances that are not universally solvable, at least half of all configurations are unreachable from a given one, and leverage this to design an efficient randomized algorithm with one-sided error, which can be derandomized with a blow-up in the running time by a factor of $p$. Further, we optimize our deterministic algorithm by using the structure of the input graph $G = (V, E)$, achieving a running time of $\mathcal{O}(p \cdot (|V| + |E|))$ in sparse graphs and $\mathcal{O}(|V| + |E|)$ in dense graphs. Finally, we consider the Graph Edge Augmentation for Universal Solvability (EAUS) problem, where given a connected graph $G$ that is not universally solvable for $p$ robots, the question is to check if for a given budget $b$, at most $b$ edges can be added to $G$ to make it universally solvable for $p$ robots. We provide an upper bound of $p - 2$ on $b$ for general graphs. On the other hand, we also provide examples of graphs that require $Θ(p)$ edges to be added. We further study the Graph Vertex and Edge Augmentation for Universal Solvability (VEAUS) problem, where $a$ vertices and $b$ edges can be added, and we provide lower bounds on $a$ and $b$.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2025

Knapsack on Graphs with Relaxed Neighborhood Constraints

In the knapsack problems with neighborhood constraints that were studied before, the input is a graph $\mathcal{G}$ on a set $\mathcal{V}$ of items, each item $v \in \mathcal{V}$ has a weight $w_v$ and profit $p_v$, the size $s$ of the knapsack, and the demand $d$. The goal is to compute if there exists a feasible solution whose total weight is at most $s$ and total profit is at most $d$. Here, feasible solutions are all subsets $\mathcal{S}$ of the items such that, for every item in $\mathcal{S}$, at least one of its neighbors in $\mathcal{G}$ is also in $\mathcal{S}$ for \hor, and all its neighbors in $\mathcal{G}$ are also in $\mathcal{S}$ for \hand~\cite{borradaile2012knapsack}. We study a relaxation of the above problems. Specifically, we allow all possible subsets of items to be feasible solutions. However, only those items for which we pick at least one or all of its neighbor (out-neighbor for directed graph) contribute to profit whereas every item picked contribute to the weight; we call the corresponding problems \sor and \sand. We show that both \sor and \sand are strongly \NPC even on undirected graphs. Regarding parameterized complexity, we show both \sor and \hor are \WTH parameterized by the size $s$ of the knapsack size. Interestingly, both \sand and \hand are \WOH parameterized by knapsack size, $s$ plus profit demand, $d$ and also parameterized by solution size, $b$. For \sor and \hor, we present a randomized color-coding-based pseudo-\FPT algorithm, parameterized by the solution size $b$, and consequently by the demand $d$. We then consider the treewidth of the input graph as our parameter and design pseudo fixed-parameter tractable (\FPT) algorithm parameterized by treewidth, $\text{tw}$ for all variants. Finally, we present an additive $1$ approximation for \sor when both the weight and profit of every vertex is $1$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Knapsack with Vertex Cover, Set Cover, and Hitting Set

Given an undirected graph $\mathcal{G}=(\mathcal{V},\mathcal{E})$, with vertex weights $(w(u))_{u\in\mathcal{V}}$, vertex values $(α(u))_{u\in\mathcal{V}}$, a knapsack size $s$, and a target value $d$, the \vcknapsack problem is to determine if there exists a subset $\mathcal{U}\subseteq\mathcal{V}$ of vertices such that $\mathcal{U}$ forms a vertex cover, $w(\mathcal{U})=\sum_{u\in\mathcal{U}} w(u) \le s$, and $α(\mathcal{U})=\sum_{u\in\mathcal{U}} α(u) \ge d$. In this paper, we closely study the \vcknapsack problem and its variations, such as \vcknapsackbudget, \minimalvcknapsack, and \minimumvcknapsack, for both general graphs and trees. We first prove that the \vcknapsack problem belongs to the complexity class \NPC and then study the complexity of the other variations. We generalize the problem to \setc and \hs versions and design polynomial time $H_g$-factor approximation algorithm for the \setckp problem and d-factor approximation algorithm for \hstp using primal dual method. We further show that \setcks and \hsmb are hard to approximate in polynomial time. Additionally, we develop a fixed parameter tractable algorithm running in time $8^{\mathcal{O}({\rm tw})}\cdot n\cdot {\sf min}\{s,d\}$ where ${\rm tw},s,d,n$ are respectively treewidth of the graph, the size of the knapsack, the target value of the knapsack, and the number of items for the \minimalvcknapsack problem.

cs.DS↗