arXiv subjects

Asuman Ozdaglar

Publications and source records attributed to Asuman Ozdaglar.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

LiteEFG: An Efficient Python Library for Solving Extensive-form Games

LiteEFG is an efficient library with easy-to-use Python bindings, which can solve multiplayer extensive-form games (EFGs). LiteEFG enables the user to express computation graphs in Python to define updates on the game tree structure. The graph is then executed by the C++ backend, leading to significant speedups compared to running the algorithm in Python. Moreover, in LiteEFG, the user needs to only specify the computation graph of the update rule in a decision node of the game, and LiteEFG will automatically distribute the update rule to each decision node and handle the structure of the imperfect-information game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

RLHF from Heterogeneous Feedback via Personalization and Preference Aggregation

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has been an effective technique for aligning AI systems with human values, with remarkable successes in fine-tuning large-language models recently. Most existing RLHF paradigms make the underlying assumption that human preferences are relatively homogeneous, and can be encoded by a single reward model. In this paper, we focus on addressing the issues due to the inherent heterogeneity in human preferences, as well as their potential strategic behavior in providing feedback. Specifically, we propose two frameworks to address heterogeneous human feedback in principled ways: personalization-based one and aggregation-based one. For the former, we propose two approaches based on representation learning and clustering, respectively, for learning multiple reward models that trades off the bias (due to preference heterogeneity) and variance (due to the use of fewer data for learning each model by personalization). We then establish sample complexity guarantees for both approaches. For the latter, we aim to adhere to the single-model framework, as already deployed in the current RLHF paradigm, by carefully aggregating diverse and truthful preferences from humans. We propose two approaches based on reward and preference aggregation, respectively: the former utilizes both utilitarianism and Leximin approaches to aggregate individual reward models, with sample complexity guarantees; the latter directly aggregates the human feedback in the form of probabilistic opinions. Under the probabilistic-opinion-feedback model, we also develop an approach to handle strategic human labelers who may bias and manipulate the aggregated preferences with untruthful feedback. Based on the ideas in mechanism design, our approach ensures truthful preference reporting, with the induced aggregation rule maximizing social welfare functions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Mirror Duality in Convex Optimization

While first-order optimization methods are usually designed to efficiently reduce the function value $f(x)$, there has been recent interest in methods efficiently reducing the magnitude of $\nabla f(x)$, and the findings show that the two types of methods exhibit a certain symmetry. In this work, we present mirror duality, a one-to-one correspondence between mirror-descent-type methods reducing function value and reducing gradient magnitude. Using mirror duality, we obtain the dual accelerated mirror descent (dual-AMD) method that efficiently reduces $ψ^*(\nabla f(x))$, where $ψ$ is a distance-generating function and $ψ^*$ quantifies the magnitude of $\nabla f(x)$. We then apply dual-AMD to efficiently reduce $\|\nabla f(\cdot) \|_q$ for $q\in [2,\infty)$ and to efficiently compute $\varepsilon$-approximate solutions of the optimal transport problem.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Uniformly Stable Algorithms for Adversarial Training and Beyond

In adversarial machine learning, neural networks suffer from a significant issue known as robust overfitting, where the robust test accuracy decreases over epochs (Rice et al., 2020). Recent research conducted by Xing et al.,2021; Xiao et al., 2022 has focused on studying the uniform stability of adversarial training. Their investigations revealed that SGD-based adversarial training fails to exhibit uniform stability, and the derived stability bounds align with the observed phenomenon of robust overfitting in experiments. This motivates us to develop uniformly stable algorithms specifically tailored for adversarial training. To this aim, we introduce Moreau envelope-$\mathcal{A}$, a variant of the Moreau Envelope-type algorithm. We employ a Moreau envelope function to reframe the original problem as a min-min problem, separating the non-strong convexity and non-smoothness of the adversarial loss. Then, this approach alternates between solving the inner and outer minimization problems to achieve uniform stability without incurring additional computational overhead. In practical scenarios, we show the efficacy of ME-$\mathcal{A}$ in mitigating the issue of robust overfitting. Beyond its application in adversarial training, this represents a fundamental result in uniform stability analysis, as ME-$\mathcal{A}$ is the first algorithm to exhibit uniform stability for weakly-convex, non-smooth problems.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Matching of Users and Creators in Two-Sided Markets with Departures

Many online platforms of today, including social media sites, are two-sided markets bridging content creators and users. Most of the existing literature on platform recommendation algorithms largely focuses on user preferences and decisions, and does not simultaneously address creator incentives. We propose a model of content recommendation that explicitly focuses on the dynamics of user-content matching, with the novel property that both users and creators may leave the platform permanently if they do not experience sufficient engagement. In our model, each player decides to participate at each time step based on utilities derived from the current match: users based on alignment of the recommended content with their preferences, and creators based on their audience size. We show that a user-centric greedy algorithm that does not consider creator departures can result in arbitrarily poor total engagement, relative to an algorithm that maximizes total engagement while accounting for two-sided departures. Moreover, in stark contrast to the case where only users or only creators leave the platform, we prove that with two-sided departures, approximating maximum total engagement within any constant factor is NP-hard. We present two practical algorithms, one with performance guarantees under mild assumptions on user preferences, and another that tends to outperform algorithms that ignore two-sided departures in practice.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games and propose a two-timescale $Q$-learning algorithm with function approximation that is payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. In two-timescale $Q$-learning, the fast-timescale iterates are updated in spirit to the stochastic gradient descent and the slow-timescale iterates (which we use to compute the policies) are updated by taking a convex combination between its previous iterate and the latest fast-timescale iterate. Introducing the slow timescale as well as its update equation marks as our main algorithmic novelty. In the special case of linear function approximation, we establish, to the best of our knowledge, the first last-iterate finite-sample bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics of these types. The result implies a polynomial sample complexity to find a Nash equilibrium in such stochastic games. To establish the results, we model our proposed algorithm as a two-timescale stochastic approximation and derive the finite-sample bound through a Lyapunov-based approach. The key novelty lies in constructing a valid Lyapunov function to capture the evolution of the slow-timescale iterates. Specifically, through a change of variable, we show that the update equation of the slow-timescale iterates resembles the classical smoothed best-response dynamics, where the regularized Nash gap serves as a valid Lyapunov function. This insight enables us to construct a valid Lyapunov function via a generalized variant of the Moreau envelope of the regularized Nash gap. The construction of our Lyapunov function might be of broad independent interest in studying the behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Convergence and Stability of Coupled Belief--Strategy Learning Dynamics in Continuous Games

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate of the parameter based on players' strategies and realized payoffs using Bayes's rule. Then, players adopt a generic learning rule to adjust their strategies based on the updated belief. We present results on the convergence of beliefs and strategies and the properties of convergent fixed points of the dynamics. We obtain sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of globally stable fixed points. We also provide sufficient conditions for the local stability of fixed points. These results provide an approach to analyzing the long-term outcomes that arise from the interplay between Bayesian belief learning and strategy learning in games, and enable us to characterize conditions under which learning leads to a complete information equilibrium.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2023

Time-Reversed Dissipation Induces Duality Between Minimizing Gradient Norm and Function Value

In convex optimization, first-order optimization methods efficiently minimizing function values have been a central subject study since Nesterov's seminal work of 1983. Recently, however, Kim and Fessler's OGM-G and Lee et al.'s FISTA-G have been presented as alternatives that efficiently minimize the gradient magnitude instead. In this paper, we present H-duality, which represents a surprising one-to-one correspondence between methods efficiently minimizing function values and methods efficiently minimizing gradient magnitude. In continuous-time formulations, H-duality corresponds to reversing the time dependence of the dissipation/friction term. To the best of our knowledge, H-duality is different from Lagrange/Fenchel duality and is distinct from any previously known duality or symmetry relations. Using H-duality, we obtain a clearer understanding of the symmetry between Nesterov's method and OGM-G, derive a new class of methods efficiently reducing gradient magnitudes of smooth convex functions, and find a new composite minimization method that is simpler and faster than FISTA-G.

math.OC↗

arXiv2023

Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms

We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesian-optimal mechanism design problem, in which an individual can share her (verifiable) data in exchange for a monetary reward or services, but at the same time has a (private) heterogeneous privacy cost which we quantify using differential privacy. We consider two popular differential privacy settings for providing privacy guarantees for the users: central and local. In both settings, we establish minimax lower bounds for the estimation error and derive (near) optimal estimators for given heterogeneous privacy loss levels for users. Building on this characterization, we pose the mechanism design problem as the optimal selection of an estimator and payments that will elicit truthful reporting of users' privacy sensitivities. Under a regularity condition on the distribution of privacy sensitivities we develop efficient algorithmic mechanisms to solve this problem in both privacy settings. Our mechanism in the central setting can be implemented in time $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ where $n$ is the number of users and our mechanism in the local setting admits a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

EM for Mixture of Linear Regression with Clustered Data

Modern data-driven and distributed learning frameworks deal with diverse massive data generated by clients spread across heterogeneous environments. Indeed, data heterogeneity is a major bottleneck in scaling up many distributed learning paradigms. In many settings however, heterogeneous data may be generated in clusters with shared structures, as is the case in several applications such as federated learning where a common latent variable governs the distribution of all the samples generated by a client. It is therefore natural to ask how the underlying clustered structures in distributed data can be exploited to improve learning schemes. In this paper, we tackle this question in the special case of estimating $d$-dimensional parameters of a two-component mixture of linear regressions problem where each of $m$ nodes generates $n$ samples with a shared latent variable. We employ the well-known Expectation-Maximization (EM) method to estimate the maximum likelihood parameters from $m$ batches of dependent samples each containing $n$ measurements. Discarding the clustered structure in the mixture model, EM is known to require $O(\log(mn/d))$ iterations to reach the statistical accuracy of $O(\sqrt{d/(mn)})$. In contrast, we show that if initialized properly, EM on the structured data requires only $O(1)$ iterations to reach the same statistical accuracy, as long as $m$ grows up as $e^{o(n)}$. Our analysis establishes and combines novel asymptotic optimization and generalization guarantees for population and empirical EM with dependent samples, which may be of independent interest.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Learning, Diversity and Adaptation in Changing Environments: The Role of Weak Links

Adaptation to dynamic conditions requires a certain degree of diversity. If all agents take the best current action, learning that the underlying state has changed and behavior should adapt will be slower. Diversity is harder to maintain when there is fast communication between agents, because they tend to find out and pursue the best action rapidly. We explore these issues using a model of (Bayesian) learning over a social network. Agents learn rapidly from and may also have incentives to coordinate with others to whom they are connected via strong links. We show, however, that when the underlying environment changes sufficiently rapidly, any network consisting of just strong links will do only a little better than random choice in the long run. In contrast, networks combining strong and weak links, whereby the latter type of links transmit information only slowly, can achieve much higher long-run average payoffs. The best social networks are those that combine a large fraction of agents into a strongly-connected component, while still maintaining a sufficient number of smaller communities that make diverse choices and communicate with this component via weak links.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2023

Symmetric (Optimistic) Natural Policy Gradient for Multi-agent Learning with Parameter Convergence

Multi-agent interactions are increasingly important in the context of reinforcement learning, and the theoretical foundations of policy gradient methods have attracted surging research interest. We investigate the global convergence of natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in multi-agent learning. We first show that vanilla NPG may not have parameter convergence, i.e., the convergence of the vector that parameterizes the policy, even when the costs are regularized (which enabled strong convergence guarantees in the policy space in the literature). This non-convergence of parameters leads to stability issues in learning, which becomes especially relevant in the function approximation setting, where we can only operate on low-dimensional parameters, instead of the high-dimensional policy. We then propose variants of the NPG algorithm, for several standard multi-agent learning scenarios: two-player zero-sum matrix and Markov games, and multi-player monotone games, with global last-iterate parameter convergence guarantees. We also generalize the results to certain function approximation settings. Note that in our algorithms, the agents take symmetric roles. Our results might also be of independent interest for solving nonconvex-nonconcave minimax optimization problems with certain structures. Simulations are also provided to corroborate our theoretical findings.

math.OC↗

arXiv2023

A Finite-Sample Analysis of Payoff-Based Independent Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into temporal-difference (TD)-learning and minimax value iteration. The resulting dynamics are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric among players. Our main results provide finite-sample guarantees. In particular, we prove the first-known $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/ε^2)$ sample complexity bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics, up to a smoothing bias. In the special case where the stochastic game has only one state (i.e., matrix games), we provide a sharper $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/ε)$ sample complexity. Our analysis uses a novel coupled Lyapunov drift approach to capture the evolution of multiple sets of coupled and stochastic iterates, which might be of independent interest.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Optimal intervention in transportation networks

We study a network design problem (NDP) where the planner aims at selecting the optimal single-link intervention on a transportation network to minimize the travel time under Wardrop equilibrium flows. Our first result is that, if the delay functions are affine and the support of the equilibrium is not modified with interventions, the NDP may be formulated in terms of electrical quantities computed on a related resistor network. In particular, we show that the travel time variation corresponding to an intervention on a given link depends on the effective resistance between the endpoints of the link. We suggest an approach to approximate such an effective resistance by performing only local computation, and exploit it to design an efficient algorithm to solve the NDP. We discuss the optimality of this procedure in the limit of infinitely large networks, and provide a sufficient condition for its optimality. We then provide numerical simulations, showing that our algorithm achieves good performance even if the equilibrium support varies and the delay functions are non-linear.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

What is a Good Metric to Study Generalization of Minimax Learners?

Minimax optimization has served as the backbone of many machine learning (ML) problems. Although the convergence behavior of optimization algorithms has been extensively studied in the minimax settings, their generalization guarantees in stochastic minimax optimization problems, i.e., how the solution trained on empirical data performs on unseen testing data, have been relatively underexplored. A fundamental question remains elusive: What is a good metric to study generalization of minimax learners? In this paper, we aim to answer this question by first showing that primal risk, a universal metric to study generalization in minimization problems, which has also been adopted recently to study generalization in minimax ones, fails in simple examples. We thus propose a new metric to study generalization of minimax learners: the primal gap, defined as the difference between the primal risk and its minimum over all models, to circumvent the issues. Next, we derive generalization error bounds for the primal gap in nonconvex-concave settings. As byproducts of our analysis, we also solve two open questions: establishing generalization error bounds for primal risk and primal-dual risk, another existing metric that is only well-defined when the global saddle-point exists, in the strong sense, i.e., without strong concavity or assuming that the maximization and expectation can be interchanged, while either of these assumptions was needed in the literature. Finally, we leverage this new metric to compare the generalization behavior of two popular algorithms -- gradient descent-ascent (GDA) and gradient descent-max (GDMax) in stochastic minimax optimization.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2022

Fictitious play in zero-sum stochastic games

We present a novel variant of fictitious play dynamics combining classical fictitious play with Q-learning for stochastic games and analyze its convergence properties in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our dynamics involves players forming beliefs on the opponent strategy and their own continuation payoff (Q-function), and playing a greedy best response by using the estimated continuation payoffs. Players update their beliefs from observations of opponent actions. A key property of the learning dynamics is that update of the beliefs on Q-functions occurs at a slower timescale than update of the beliefs on strategies. We show both in the model-based and model-free cases (without knowledge of player payoff functions and state transition probabilities), the beliefs on strategies converge to a stationary mixed Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum stochastic game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller

Certain but important classes of strategic-form games, including zero-sum and identical-interest games, have the fictitious-play-property (FPP), i.e., beliefs formed in fictitious play dynamics always converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the repeated play of these games. Such convergence results are seen as a (behavioral) justification for the game-theoretical equilibrium analysis. Markov games (MGs), also known as stochastic games, generalize the repeated play of strategic-form games to dynamic multi-state settings with Markovian state transitions. In particular, MGs are standard models for multi-agent reinforcement learning -- a reviving research area in learning and games, and their game-theoretical equilibrium analyses have also been conducted extensively. However, whether certain classes of MGs have the FPP or not (i.e., whether there is a behavioral justification for equilibrium analysis or not) remains largely elusive. In this paper, we study a new variant of fictitious play dynamics for MGs and show its convergence to an NE in n-player identical-interest MGs in which a single player controls the state transitions. Such games are of interest in communications, control, and economics applications. Our result together with the recent results in [Sayin et al. 2020] establishes the FPP of two-player zero-sum MGs and n-player identical-interest MGs with a single controller (standing at two different ends of the MG spectrum from fully competitive to fully cooperative).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Why Random Reshuffling Beats Stochastic Gradient Descent

We analyze the convergence rate of the random reshuffling (RR) method, which is a randomized first-order incremental algorithm for minimizing a finite sum of convex component functions. RR proceeds in cycles, picking a uniformly random order (permutation) and processing the component functions one at a time according to this order, i.e., at each cycle, each component function is sampled without replacement from the collection. Though RR has been numerically observed to outperform its with-replacement counterpart stochastic gradient descent (SGD), characterization of its convergence rate has been a long standing open question. In this paper, we answer this question by showing that when the component functions are quadratics or smooth and the sum function is strongly convex, RR with iterate averaging and a diminishing stepsize $α_k=Θ(1/k^s)$ for $s\in (1/2,1)$ converges at rate $Θ(1/k^{2s})$ with probability one in the suboptimality of the objective value, thus improving upon the $Ω(1/k)$ rate of SGD. Our analysis draws on the theory of Polyak-Ruppert averaging and relies on decoupling the dependent cycle gradient error into an independent term over cycles and another term dominated by $α_k^2$. This allows us to apply law of large numbers to an appropriately weighted version of the cycle gradient errors, where the weights depend on the stepsize. We also provide high probability convergence rate estimates that shows decay rate of different terms and allows us to propose a modification of RR with convergence rate ${\cal O}(\frac{1}{k^2})$.

math.OC↗