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Atharva Mohan

Publications and source records attributed to Atharva Mohan.

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Preference Optimization Drives Monoculture in LLM Prediction Markets

Prediction markets rest on the independence of participant errors. As LLM agents become active traders on platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket, we ask: does this independence hold when the crowd is composed of LLMs? We find it does not. LLM agents fine-tuned with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) share a convergent output distribution, producing pairwise error correlations of $\rho = 0.70$ and reducing ten agents to the effective forecasting power of ${\approx}1.4$ independent forecasters $N_{\text{eff}}$. This is not a scaling problem: $N_{\text{eff}}$ remains flat from $N=5$ to $N=40$, and the 10-agent market (67.6%) fails to match a single standalone agent (70.2%). Two controlled ablations isolate preference optimization as the causal driver, replicated across labs and scales ($\Delta\rho = +0.24$ to $+0.46$ on identical-SFT controls at 8B and 70B). Among mitigations tested, cross-model diversity achieves the largest correlation reduction ($\rho$ from 0.68 to 0.40). As LLMs become more aligned, markets built from them become more monocultural.

cs.CE

From Competition to Coordination: Market Making as a Scalable Framework for Safe and Aligned Multi-Agent LLM Systems

As foundation models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in multi-agent systems, their collective behavior raises new challenges for trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Traditional coordination mechanisms, such as centralized oversight or adversarial adjudication, struggle to scale and often obscure how decisions emerge. We introduce a market-making framework for multi-agent large language model (LLM) coordination that organizes agent interactions as structured economic exchanges. In this setup, each agent acts as a market participant, updating and trading probabilistic beliefs, to converge toward shared, truthful outcomes. By aligning local incentives with collective epistemic goals, the framework promotes self-organizing, verifiable reasoning without requiring external enforcement. Empirically, we evaluate this approach across factual reasoning, ethical judgment, and commonsense inference tasks. Market-based coordination yields accuracy gains of up to 10% over single-shot baselines while preserving interpretability and transparency of intermediate reasoning steps. Beyond these improvements, our findings demonstrate that economic coordination principles can operationalize accountability and robustness in multi-agent LLM systems, offering a scalable pathway toward self-correcting, socially responsible AI capable of maintaining trust and oversight in real world deployment scenarios.

cs.MA