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Attila Szolnoki

Publications and source records attributed to Attila Szolnoki.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
arXiv2023

Game-theoretical approach for task allocation problems with constraints

The distributed task allocation problem, as one of the most interesting distributed optimization challenges, has received considerable research attention recently. Previous works mainly focused on the task allocation problem in a population of individuals, where there are no constraints for affording task amounts. The latter condition, however, cannot always be hold. In this paper, we study the task allocation problem with constraints of task allocation in a game-theoretical framework. We assume that each individual can afford different amounts of task and the cost function is convex. To investigate the problem in the framework of population games, we construct a potential game and calculate the fitness function for each individual. We prove that when the Nash equilibrium point in the potential game is in the feasible solutions for the limited task allocation problem, the Nash equilibrium point is the unique globally optimal solution. Otherwise, we also derive analytically the unique globally optimal solution. In addition, in order to confirm our theoretical results, we consider the exponential and quadratic forms of cost function for each agent. Two algorithms with the mentioned representative cost functions are proposed to numerically seek the optimal solution to the limited task problems. We further perform Monte Carlo simulations which provide agreeing results with our analytical calculations.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma

A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a spatial public goods game to receive a different proportion of goods than other participants. The second aspect influences the micro-level dynamics of strategy updates, wherein players can maintain their strategy with a certain weight. Analytical results are obtained on square lattices under the weak selection limit. If the organizer attempts to monopolize the public goods, cooperation becomes more attainable. If the confidence increases, cooperation is inhibited. Consequently, these elements have conflicting effects on cooperation, and their simultaneous presence can result in a heterogeneous change of the critical synergy factor. Our theoretical findings underscore the subtle implications of a mutual trait that may manifest as greediness or self-confidence under different circumstances, which are validated through Monte Carlo simulations.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2023

Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma

Introducing strategy complexity into the basic conflict of cooperation and defection is a natural response to avoid the tragedy of the common state. As an intermediate approach, quasi-cooperators were recently suggested to address the original problem. In this study, we test its vitality in structured populations where players have fixed partners. Naively, the latter condition should support cooperation unambiguously via enhanced network reciprocity. However, the opposite is true because the spatial structure may provide a humbler cooperation level than a well-mixed population. This unexpected behavior can be understood if we consider that at a certain parameter interval the original prisoner's dilemma game is transformed into a snow-drift game. If we replace the original imitating strategy protocol by assuming myopic players, the spatial population becomes a friendly environment for cooperation. This observation is valid in a huge region of parameter space. This study highlights that spatial structure can reveal a new aspect of social dilemmas when strategy complexity is introduced.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2023

The conflict between self-interaction and updating passivity in the evolution of cooperation

In social dilemmas under weak selection, the capacity for a player to exhibit updating passivity or interact with its own strategy can lead to conflicting outcomes. The central question is which effect is stronger and how their simultaneous presence influences the evolution of cooperation. We introduce a model that considers both effects using different weight factors. We derive theoretical solutions for the conditions of cooperation success and the cooperation level under weak selection, scanning the complete parameter space. When the weight factors are equally strong, the promoting effect of self-interaction to cooperation surpasses the inhibitory effect of updating passivity. Intriguingly, however, we identify non-monotonous cooperation-supporting effects when the weight of updating passivity increases more rapidly. Our findings are corroborated by Monte Carlo simulations and demonstrate robustness across various game types, including the prisoner's dilemma, stag-hunt, and snowdrift games.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗
arXiv2023

Emerging solutions from the battle of defensive alliances

Competing strategies in an evolutionary game model, or species in a biosystem, can easily form a larger unit which protects them from the invasion of an external actor. Such a defensive alliance may have two, three, four or even more members. But how effective can be such formation against an alternative group composed by other competitors? To address this question we study a minimal model where a two-member and a four-member alliances fight in a symmetric and balanced way. By presenting representative phase diagrams, we systematically explore the whole parameter range which characterizes the inner dynamics of the alliances and the intensity of their interactions. The group formed by a pair, who can exchange their neighboring positions, prevail in the majority of the parameter region. The rival quartet can only win if their inner cyclic invasion rate is significant while the mixing rate of the pair is extremely low. At specific parameter values, when neither of the alliances is strong enough, new four-member solutions emerge where a rock-paper-scissors-like trio is extended by the other member of the pair. These new solutions coexist hence all six competitors can survive. The evolutionary process is accompanied by serious finite-size effects which can be mitigated by appropriately chosen prepared initial states.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2023

Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change of environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. We here develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2023

Inertia in spatial public goods games under weak selection

Due to limited cognitive skills for perceptual error or other emotional reasons, players may keep their current strategies even if there is a more promising choice. Such behavior inertia has already been studied, but its consequences remained unexplored in the weak selection limit. To fill this gap, we consider a spatial public goods game model where inertia is considered during the imitation process. By using the identity-by-descent method, we present analytical forms of the critical synergy factor $r^\star$, which determines when cooperation is favored. We find that inertia hinders cooperation, which can be explained by the decelerated coarsening process under weak selection. Interestingly, the critical synergy conditions for different updating protocols, including death-birth and birth-death rules, can be formally linked by the extreme limits of the inertia factor. To explore the robustness of our observations, calculations are made for different lattices and group sizes. Monte Carlo simulations also confirm the results.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗
arXiv2023

Evolution of cooperation under a generalized death-birth process

According to the evolutionary death-birth protocol, a player is chosen randomly to die and neighbors compete for the available position proportional to their fitness. Hence, the status of the focal player is completely ignored and has no impact on the strategy update. In this work, we revisit and generalize this rule by introducing a weight factor to compare the payoff values of the focal and invading neighbors. By means of evolutionary graph theory, we analyze the model on joint transitive graphs to explore the possible consequences of the presence of a weight factor. We find that focal weight always hinders cooperation under weak selection strength. Surprisingly, the results show a non-trivial tipping point of the weight factor where the threshold of cooperation success shifts from positive to negative infinity. Once focal weight exceeds this tipping point, cooperation becomes unreachable. Our theoretical predictions are confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice of different sizes. We also verify the robustness of the conclusions to arbitrary two-player prisoner's dilemmas, to dispersal graphs with arbitrary edge weights, and to interaction and dispersal graphs overlapping arbitrarily.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2023

Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations

The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging problem for incentive-providing institutions. In particular, since the implementation of incentive is costly, to explore the optimal incentive protocol, which ensures the desired collective goal at a minimal cost, is worthy of study. In this work, we consider the positive and negative incentives respectively for a structured population of individuals whose conflicting interactions are characterized by a prisoner's dilemma game. We establish an index function for quantifying the cumulative cost during the process of incentive implementation, and theoretically derive the optimal positive and negative incentive protocols for cooperation on regular networks. We find that both types of optimal incentive protocols are identical and time-invariant. Moreover, we compare the optimal rewarding and punishing schemes concerning implementation cost and provide a rigorous basis for the usage of incentives in the game-theoretical framework. We further perform computer simulations to support our theoretical results and explore their robustness for different types of population structures, including regular, random, small-world, and scale-free networks.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Competition of alliances in a cyclically dominant eight-species population

In a diverse population, where many species are present, competitors can fight for surviving at individual and collective levels. In particular, species, which would beat each other individually, may form a specific alliance that ensures them stable coexistence against the invasion of an external species. Our principal goal is to identify those general features of a formation which determine its vitality. Therefore, we here study a traditional Lotka-Volterra model of eight-species where two four-species cycles can fight for space. Beside these formations, there are other solutions which may emerge when invasion rates are varied. The complete range of parameters is explored and we find that in most of the cases those alliances prevail which are formed by equally strong members. Interestingly, there are regions where the symmetry is broken and the system is dominated by a solution formed by seven species. Our work also highlights that serious finite-size effects may emerge which prevent observing the valid solution in a small system.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2022

Group-size dependent synergy in heterogeneous populations

When people collaborate, they expect more in return than a simple sum of their efforts. This observation is at the heart of the so-called public goods game, where the participants' contributions are multiplied by an $r$ synergy factor before they are distributed among group members. However, a larger group could be more effective, which can be described by a larger synergy factor. To elaborate on the possible consequences, in this study, we introduce a model where the population has different sizes of groups, and the applied synergy factor depends on the size of the group. We examine different options when the increment of $r$ is linear, slow, or sudden, but in all cases, the cooperation level is higher than that in a population where the homogeneous $r$ factor is used. In the latter case, smaller groups perform better; however, this behavior is reversed when synergy increases for larger groups. Hence, the entire community benefits because larger groups are rewarded better. Notably, a similar qualitative behavior can be observed for other heterogeneous topologies, including scale-free interaction graphs.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

A reversed form of public goods game: equivalence and difference

According to the public goods game (PGG) protocol, participants decide freely whether they want to contribute to a common pool or not, but the resulting benefit is distributed equally. A conceptually similar dilemma situation may emerge when participants consider if they claim a common resource but the related cost is covered equally by all group members. The latter establishes a reversed form of the original public goods game (R-PGG). In this work, we show that R-PGG is equivalent to PGG in several circumstances, starting from the traditional analysis, via the evolutionary approach in unstructured populations, to Monte Carlo simulations in structured populations. However, there are also cases when the behavior of R-PGG could be surprisingly different from the outcome of PGG. When the key parameters are heterogeneous, for instance, the results of PGG and R-PGG could be diverse even if we apply the same amplitudes of heterogeneity. We find that the heterogeneity in R-PGG generally impedes cooperation, while the opposite is observed for PGG. These diverse system reactions can be understood if we follow how payoff functions change when introducing heterogeneity in the parameter space. This analysis also reveals the distinct roles of cooperator and defector strategies in the mentioned games. Our observations may hopefully stimulate further research to check the potential differences between PGG and R-PGG due to the alternative complexity of conditions.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Oppressed species can form a winning pair in a multi-species ecosystem

The self-protection of alliances against external invaders is a key concept behind the maintenance of biodiversity in the face of natural selection. But since these alliances, which can be formed by different numbers of competitors, can also compete against each other, it is important to identify their strengths and weaknesses. Here, we therefore compare the vitalities of two two-species alliances whose members either beat each other mutually via a bidirectional invasion or they exchange their positions during an inner dynamics. The resulting four-species model shows rich behavior in dependence on the model parameter $p$, which characterizes the inner invasions, and $β$, which determines the intensity of site exchanges. In the low $p$ and the large $p$ limit, when the inner invasion becomes biased, three-member rock-scissors-paper-type solutions emerge, where one of the members is oppressed by having the smallest average concentration due to heterogeneous inner invasion rates. Interestingly, however, if we allow a more intensive site exchange between the oppressed species, they can morph into a winning pair and dominate the full parameter plane. We show that their victory utilizes the vulnerability of the rival alliance based on cyclic dominance, where a species can easily fixate a limited-size domain.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2022

Evolution of trust in a hierarchical population with punishing investors

Trust plays an essential role in the development of human society. According to the standard trust game, an investor decides whether to keep or transfer a certain portion of initial stake to a trustee. In the latter case, the stake is enhanced to signal the value of trust. The trustee then chooses how much to return to the investor. We here distinguish two types of investors and two types of trustees who can learn from each other. While a trustee can be trustworthy or untrustworthy, an investor could be normal or punishing one. The latter strategy punishes both untrustworthy trustees and normal investors who are reluctant to control misbehaving trustees. Importantly, we assume a hierarchical population where the portion of investors and trustees is fixed. By means of replicator equation approach, we study the $N$-player trust game and calculate the level of trust and trustworthiness. We find that the introduction of punishment can induce a stable coexistence state between punishing investors and trustworthy trustees. Furthermore, an intermediate fraction of investors can better promote the evolution of trust when the punishment intensity is low. For more intensive punishment, however, a higher fraction of investors can be more efficient to elevate the trust level. In addition, we reveal that appropriate increase of the punishment intensity can enlarge the attraction domain of the coexistence state.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

When costly migration helps to improve cooperation

Motion is a typical reaction among animals and humans trying to reach better conditions in a changing world. This aspect has been studied intensively in social dilemmas where competing players' individual and collective interests are in conflict. Starting from the traditional public goods game model, where players are locally fixed and unconditional cooperators or defectors are present, we introduce two additional strategies through which agents can change their positions of dependence on the local cooperation level. More importantly, these so-called sophisticated players should bear an extra cost to maintain their permanent capacity to evaluate their neighborhood and react accordingly. Hence, four strategies compete, and the most successful one can be imitated by its neighbors. Crucially, the introduction of costly movement has a highly biased consequence on the competing main strategies. In the majority of parameter space, it is harmful to defectors and provides a significantly higher cooperation level when the population is rare. At an intermediate population density, which would be otherwise optimal for a system of immobile players, the presence of mobile actors could be detrimental if the interaction pattern changes slightly, thereby blocking the optimal percolation of information flow. In this parameter space, sophisticated cooperators can also show the co-called Moor effect by first avoiding the harmful vicinity of defectors; they subsequentially transform into an immobile cooperator state. Hence, paradoxically, the additional cost of movement could be advantageous to reach a higher general income, especially for a rare population when subgroups would be isolated otherwise.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks

Opinion dynamics on social networks have been received considerable attentions in recent years. Nevertheless, just a few works have theoretically analyzed the condition in which a certain opinion can spread in the whole structured population. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game approach for a binary opinion model to explore the conditions for an opinion's spreading. Inspired by real-life observations, we assume that an agent's choice to select an opinion is not random, but is based on a score rooted both from public knowledge and the interactions with neighbors. By means of coalescing random walks, we obtain a condition in which opinion $A$ can be favored to spread on social networks in the weak selection limit. We find that the successfully spreading condition of opinion $A$ is closely related to the basic scores of binary opinions, the feedback scores on opinion interactions, and the structural parameters including the edge weights, the weighted degrees of vertices, and the average degree of the network. In particular, when individuals adjust their opinions based solely on the public information, the vitality of opinion $A$ depends exclusively on the difference of basic scores of $A$ and $B$. When there are no negative (positive) feedback interactions between connected individuals, we find that the success of opinion $A$ depends on the ratio of the obtained positive (negative) feedback scores of competing opinions. To complete our study, we perform computer simulations on fully-connected, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively, which support and confirm our theoretical findings.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2022

Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources

When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the involution game dilemma that can be detected in several real-life situations. It is also a realistic assumption that resources are not uniform in space and time, which may influence the system's resulting involution level. We here introduce spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources and explore their consequences on involution. When spatial heterogeneity is applied, network reciprocity can mitigate the involution for rich resources, which would be critical otherwise in a homogeneous population. Interestingly, when the resource level is modest, spatial heterogeneity causes more intensive involution in a system where most cooperator agents, who want to keep investment at a low level, are present. This picture is partly the opposite in the extreme case when more investment is less effective. Spatial heterogeneity can also produce a counterintuitive effect when the presence of alternative resource levels cannot explain the emergence of involution. If we apply temporal heterogeneity additionally, then the impact of spatial heterogeneity practically vanishes, and we turn back to the behavior observed in a homogeneous population earlier. Our observations are also supported by solving the corresponding replicator equations numerically.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Competition among alliances of different sizes

To understand the biodiversity of an ecosystem cannot be understood by solely analyzing the pair relations of competing species. Instead, we should consider multi-point interactions because the presence of a third party could change the original microscopic outcome significantly. In this way an alliance may emerge where species, who may have biased relations otherwise, can protect each other from an external invader. Such an alliance can be formed by two, three or even more species. By introducing a minimal model where six species compete for space we here study how the size of an alliance determines the vitality of a formation. We show that in the majority of parameter space the group of the smallest size prevails and other solutions can only be observed in a limited parameter range. These phases are separated by discontinuous phase transitions which can only be identified by intensive numerical efforts due to serious finite size effects and long relaxation processes.

q-bio.PE↗